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This dissertation consists of four empirical studies that seek to furnish a better
understanding over liquidity’s broader implications in the decision-making process of
investors, managers and regulators in international capital markets. Chapter 2 investigates
the time-series as well as cross-sectional properties of the interaction between foreign
equity flows and local liquidity conditions. My findings suggest that foreign investors are
less likely to aggravate adverse selection problems in financial markets that are more
developed and demonstrate higher levels of transparency. Chapter 3 shows that liquidity
conditions play an important role in the decision to perform an equity offering. Moreover,
my findings suggest that in imperfectly liquid markets, companies take into consideration
the slope of the demand curve for their stock when deciding upon the type of an equity
offering. Chapter 4 shows that banks subject to more intense monitoring by equity markets
operate closer to the efficient frontier and are thus able to generate more value from their
investments. It also shows that the liquidity effects is significantly more pronounced in the
case of banks that are more susceptible to principal-agent type of conflicts. Chapter 5
investigates the extent of clustering of adverse liquidity shocks within and across
particular geographic regions. I document that liquidity contagion is more pronounced in
“high” rather than “low quality” stocks. Finally, I show that cross-border portfolio investment
can aggravate the clustering of negative liquidity shocks across markets that benefit
disproportionately from such flows. 
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Chapter 1                              
Introduction 
 
The main concept this dissertation builds upon is that of liquidity. Market 
liquidity, typically defined as the ability to transact with the minimum possible cost, 
is a concept that is easily identifiable but notoriously challenging to measure. In 
that respect, the market microstructure literature has been quite successful in 
developing a considerable number of measures that have managed to capture 
several of liquidity’s salient features (Amihud, 2002; Hasbrouck, 2006; Goyenko, 
Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009). In addition, asset pricing studies have demonstrated 
beyond doubt that differences in stock liquidity or in the sensitivity to liquidity risk 
can generate predictable dispersion in the cross-section of expected stock returns 
(e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005). Hence, both liquidity and liquidity risk have been already 
identified as priced state variables, and are thus viewed as important determinants 
of a stock’s required rate of return.  
One drawback of the aforementioned studies however is their limited focus 
in the U.S. market. As a result, extant literature offers little guidance when it comes 
to the relative importance of liquidity in the context of integrated financial markets 
that are able to accommodate extensive flows of capital with next to minimum 
costs. Moreover, although research to date provides a detailed account of liquidity’s 
role in an asset pricing context, only few studies have been investigating its broader 
implications with respect to international capital mobility, the type and availability 
of financing options, its role in mitigating agency frictions within firms, and the 
transmission of financial shocks across markets otherwise distant. In that respect, 
my effort in this dissertation has been to adopt a global perspective over a scope 
that extends beyond the one traditionally considered by previous studies, and 
particularly furnish a better understanding over liquidity’s implications in the 
decision-making process of investors, managers and regulators alike. The benefits 
of such an encompassing approach are demonstrated in greater detail in the 
chapters that will follow. 
2 Chapter 1  
 
This dissertation consists of four empirical studies that seek to shed more 
light over liquidity’s role in international capital markets going beyond the 
dimensions traditionally considered in the asset pricing literature. Chapter 2 
investigates the interplay between foreign portfolio flows and domestic market 
liquidity. Using a VAR framework we explore the time-series properties as well as 
the differences in the cross-section of stocks over the interaction between capital 
flows and liquidity and try to identify periods of distinguishing importance in that 
respect. Another issue this chapter is concerned with corresponds to the role of 
domestic institutions in explaining the cross-sectional heterogeneity of liquidity’s 
responsiveness over foreign investment. In Chapter 3 we show that market liquidity 
weighs considerably, both in the decision to issue equity as well as in the respective 
type of the offering. Our main argument is that liquidity conditions determine the 
slope of a firm’s demand curve for its stock and thus equity issuance becomes more 
costly during periods of deteriorating liquidity. Hence, as liquidity abates firms are 
expected to favor equity offerings less as a means of raising capital. In Chapter 4, 
we provide empirical evidence in support of a positive link between bank stock 
liquidity and operating efficiency, explore its implications, and try to identify the 
underlying mechanisms through which it operates. Among the set of alternative 
explanations, our analysis lends support to an agency based interpretation, but also 
identifies market discipline as another mechanism advanced by stock liquidity. In 
Chapter 5 I investigate the extent of liquidity contagion within as well as across 
particular geographic regions. In addition to evaluating the relative importance of 
regional over global factors in transmitting contagion, I also investigate a number 
of empirical predictions regarding the type of stocks that are expected to be more 
susceptible to adverse liquidity shocks originating from abroad. Interestingly, my 
analysis shows that liquidity contagion is more pronounced in “high” rather than 
“low quality” stocks. I also find that the holdings of international investors can 
provide a mechanism for transmitting liquidity shocks from one market to another. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will provide a more detailed account of my 
motivation as well as of the respective contribution of the aforementioned studies. 
 
 
1.1 Market Liquidity and International Investors 
 
With the liberalization of most markets in the early 1990s, one of the most 
important policy issues that has emerged concerns the extent to which foreign 
portfolio investment exposes markets to the risk of sudden outflows and as such 
can reinforce crises with otherwise minor economic impact to episodes of 
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widespread panic. This chapter is particularly concerned with the implications of 
foreign equity flows on local liquidity conditions. We conjecture that there are at 
least three different channels through which foreign investors could affect local 
market liquidity. On the one hand, if foreign investors are better informed than 
local investors, extensive foreign presence can be associated with increased adverse 
selection costs for local traders, thus undermining market liquidity. On the other 
hand, if foreign investors are less well informed, they may act as “noise” traders 
and thus improve market liquidity. Empirical evidence to date however, has been at 
best inconclusive (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Seasholes, 
2004; Dvorak, 2005; Froot and Ramadorai, 2008). Second, foreign investors can 
diminish local market liquidity if they behave as positive feedback traders, 
generating as a result excessive order imbalances and/or market volatility (e.g. 
Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 1999). Third, sophisticated institutional investors may 
enhance local liquidity when their trading strategies are designed to reap liquidity 
premia in foreign markets (e.g. Agarwal, Fung, Loon, and Naik, 2007; Stulz, 2007, 
Brophy, Paige, and Sialm, 2009; Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo, 2009).  
Our baseline empirical approach involves the estimation of an unrestricted 
VAR model at four different levels of aggregation: all countries, developed vs. 
emerging countries, six different geographic regions, and country-by-country. We 
also estimate the VARs separately for small and large cap stocks, and for liquidity 
crisis as opposed to “normal” periods. We later extend our basic model to include a 
variety of exogenous variables. Our results indicate that foreign investors are 
positive feedback traders. Capital inflows strongly respond to past local market 
returns both for developed and emerging markets, for all six regions, and for many 
individual countries. We also confirm prior evidence that capital inflows are 
associated with higher future local market returns. Both of these effects are 
economically and statistically significant for many regions and countries. In 
addition, market liquidity seems to be an important determinant of cross-border 
portfolio flows, although this effect is more pronounced in our set of Developed 
countries.  
Our analysis demonstrates that liquidity conditions in the home market are 
also important in their own right. In particular, we find that foreign investors tend 
to invest in local markets that have seen their liquidity improve during periods 
when there is ample liquidity in the home market. We interpret this finding as 
evidence that foreign investors seek return in other markets when their home 
market is awash with liquidity, but also avoid investing in these markets when they 
become illiquid. Next we run a separate analysis distinguishing between small and 
large cap stocks. Although capital flows respond more strongly to large cap returns, 
4 Chapter 1  
 
there is little indication that they are more sensitive to large cap liquidity than to 
small cap liquidity. 
Finally, we try to explain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the 
responsiveness of liquidity on foreign flows by running cross-sectional regressions 
on proxies for a country’s economic and financial development, regulatory and 
information environment, openness, and market risk. We find that the response of 
liquidity to flows is significantly more positive in countries with greater 
transparency and in countries with less developed financial markets. The first effect 
suggests that in transparent countries it is less likely that foreign investors 
aggravate adverse selection problems on local financial markets. In other words, 
they are more likely to act as noise traders that provide liquidity. The second effect 
is consistent with the view that more developed financial markets are more resilient 
to the trading behavior of foreign investors. 
 
1.2 Equity Issuance and Market Liquidity 
 
Two of the most popular corporate finance theories explaining security 
issuance, namely the tradeoff theory (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) and the 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) posit that liquidity conditions 
should be irrelevant when it comes to the decision of when and what type of 
security to issue. When raising capital, companies decide the appropriate type of 
the security offered solely on the basis of optimizing their capital structure, or 
minimizing adverse selection costs. The aforementioned theories however fall short 
in providing a convincing explanation of certain empirical regularities, one of them 
being that companies issue equity when market valuations are high (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002). In other words, equity offerings are usually decided when the 
anticipated cost to current shareholders is the lowest possible.  
In this chapter we investigate the hypothesis that security issuance is 
inversely related to illiquidity and provide strong evidence that firms are less likely 
to issue equity when the liquidity of equity markets worsens. In terms of the 
economic significance of our findings we show that liquidity innovations explain as 
much of the aggregate variation in equity issuance as stock returns. Our main result 
survives a large number of alternative specifications that control, among other 
things, for prevailing capital market conditions, investor sentiment, the state of 
economic activity, the (expected) opportunity set, and the time-series variation in 
the aggregate level of information asymmetry.  
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Our findings suggest that the role of liquidity conditions in equity issuance 
cannot be attributed to liquidity serving as a proxy for future economic growth or 
market sentiment. In further support of such an interpretation we show that the 
relation between equity issuance and liquidity is more pronounced for decreases in 
liquidity rather than increases. We next take a step forward and investigate the 
potential relation between liquidity and the particular type of equity offering 
decided. Consistent with intuition we show that the fraction of private to public 
equity issues increases as liquidity worsens. Our interpretation is that market 
liquidity becomes less relevant in the case of private equity offerings since they 
typically do not increase the supply of traded shares in the short run due to selling 
restrictions typically accompanying such shares. We believe our findings lend 
further support to the view that in imperfectly liquid markets, the demand for 
shares is downward-sloping and that corporations take into account the slope of the 
demand curve for their shares in their financing decisions. Finally, we show that 
postponements and cancellations of such offerings are also negatively related to 
liquidity innovations, which lends further supports to our hypothesis that firms tend 
to postpone or cancel equity issues during times of deteriorating liquidity and 
decreasing valuations. 
 
 
1.3 Bank Operating Efficiency and Market Monitoring 
 
In this chapter we contribute to the banking literature by investigating the 
influence exerted by equity markets on bank operating efficiency, risk-taking, and 
performance from a perspective that has not been addressed to date, namely that of 
stock liquidity. To be able to discipline bank managers, investors need to be able to 
transact in a secondary market with the minimum possible frictions. Since high 
liquidity typically translates to low transaction costs, we expect that investors will 
be more effective in their monitoring when the secondary market of a bank’s 
securities is more active. Thus, our conjecture is that banks with a liquid stock are 
subject to more rigorous monitoring by shareholders, and as a result are forced to 
operate more efficiently.  
To assess the role of liquidity, we compile a detailed dataset with balance 
sheet information for more than 1,100 banks, spanning 31 countries around the 
world. Given that stock liquidity is an elusive concept that is notoriously difficult to 
quantify, we choose to perform our analysis employing three of the most 
commonly used indicators, namely the (modified) Amihud ratio, the (proportional) 
6 Chapter 1  
 
quoted spread, and stock turnover. We also construct several indicators of risk-
taking and alternative measures of bank performance 
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, we document a 
positive relation between bank stock liquidity and Tobin’s Q. We interpret this 
finding as an early confirmation of our hypothesis that banks subject to more 
intense investor monitoring are able to generate more value from their investments. 
The same applies for banks that have low dependence on non-core funding, hold 
more cash on their balance sheet, are better capitalized, and have bigger size. Next, 
we decompose Tobin’s Q into three components, namely a factor accounting for 
investor sentiment, another for leverage, and a proxy for operating profitability. We 
find that differences in liquidity do not generate variation in investor sentiment, but, 
consistent with the market discipline interpretation, are significantly associated 
with profitability (positive) and leverage (negative). In further support of our 
hypothesis, we document that banks with higher stock liquidity operate closer to 
the efficient frontier, demonstrate lower credit risk, and have lower probability of 
default. 
Finally, we try to shed more light on the particular mechanism through 
which the liquidity channel operates. An information-based interpretation would 
suggest that improved liquidity encourages the participation of informed investors 
in the price discovery process, thus rendering market monitoring more efficient. 
We investigate this explanation by creating portfolios of bank stocks differing over 
the extent of information-driven trading, but find no evidence of a positive relation 
with liquidity. Our empirical analysis is, however, more supportive of an agency-
based interpretation. For example, when we distinguish banks’ on the basis of their 
susceptibility to principal-agent type of conflicts we find that the liquidity effects is 
significantly more pronounced in the group that ranks higher in that respect. We 
also present evidence that the monitoring exerted by debt holders and depositors is 
significantly more effective in the case of banks with more liquid stock. This is 
reflected in the increasing responsiveness of both deposit growth and debt costs to 
bank risk-taking in banks that belong to the top of the liquidity spectrum. 
 
 
1.4 Liquidity Contagion across Markets 
 
As demonstrated in the chapters above, liquidity is a multifaceted concept 
with implications that extend beyond the price discovery process, affecting 
functions as distant and important as the type of security issuance, the market for 
corporate control, and the efficient allocation of capital across different economic 
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sectors (Tadesse, 2004). Yet, to the detriment of investors and regulators alike, 
there are times when liquidity simply disappears across many markets 
simultaneously. Such episodes, although rather infrequent, are typically 
accompanied by pervasive price distortions, and thus carry substantial costs both 
for investors and the economy. This chapter is thus concerned with the 
circumstances behind these episodes as well as the potential mechanism through 
which adverse liquidity shocks propagate from one market to another. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first study to pursue such a task. 
In this chapter we therefore embark on a number of challenging tasks. First, 
we investigate the extent of clustering of adverse liquidity shocks within and across 
particular geographic regions. Second, we try to assess the relative importance of 
different channels in explaining liquidity contagion both for the aggregate market 
as well as across subsets of the cross-section organized on the basis of different 
stock characteristics. This way we try to evaluate a number of empirical predictions 
regarding the type of stocks that are more susceptible to adverse liquidity shocks 
originating abroad. 
Our analysis produces a number of interesting results. First, we show that the 
likelihood of an adverse liquidity shock increases when other markets within the 
same region experience similar shocks. In addition, deteriorating liquidity 
conditions in systemically important markets exert, in certain cases, a 
disproportionate impact over foreign markets even after controlling for own region 
developments. When we try to identify the liquidity factors with the greatest 
explanatory power over the likelihood of a liquidity exceedance, investor sentiment 
combined with aggregate volatility stand out as the ones with the most pronounced 
effect. Interestingly, even though global aggregates are important in their own right, 
regional aggregates demonstrate a leading role when it comes to explain the extent 
of contagion in the same region. 
Next, we investigate the extent of cross-sectional heterogeneity in the 
clustering of adverse liquidity shocks across markets based on a number of 
different stock characteristics. For this purpose we sort stocks on the basis of their 
market capitalization, idiosyncratic volatility, the extent of information-motivated 
order flow, and their sentiment induced overreaction. Contrary to initial 
expectations we show that liquidity contagion is actually more pronounced in “high” 
rather than “low quality” stocks. In other words, during periods of market distress 
liquidity drops are more correlated across stocks of “high quality”. Consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Brunnermeier, and Pedersen, 2009) our analysis demonstrates 
that commonality in liquidity becomes particularly pronounced in periods of 
deteriorating global funding conditions as well as downbeat investor sentiment. 
Finally, we also show that cross-border portfolio investment by international 
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investors can aggravate the clustering of negative liquidity shocks across markets 
that benefit disproportionately from such flows.  
 
     
 International Capital Flows and Liquidity 9 
   
 
 
Chapter 2                                           
International Capital Flows and 
Liquidity 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 How do foreign investors affect local capital markets? This question has been 
the subject of intense debate in both academic and policy circles. Research to date 
provides mixed evidence on the impact of capital flows on local financial markets. 
On the one hand, foreign investors are often alleged to exacerbate financial crises 
on local markets (e.g., Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Kim and Wei, 2002; Kaminsky, 
Lyons, and Schmukler, 2004). In line with this argument, a recent paper by the IMF 
(2010) argues that controls on capital inflows may reduce a country’s financial 
fragility. On the other hand, several studies show that an increase in foreign 
portfolio flows is associated with a decrease in local systematic risk (Chari and 
Henry, 2004) and a reduction in the local cost of equity capital (Bekaert, Harvey, 
and Lumsdaine, 1999, 2002; Kim and Singal, 2000). Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) 
provide evidence that the actions of foreign investors did not contribute to 
destabilizing the Korean stock market during the Asian financial crisis. 
 In this paper, we assess the impact of foreign investors on local financial 
markets from a perspective that – to the best of our knowledge – has not been 
investigated to date: we study how cross-border capital flows interact with local 
market liquidity. Our purpose is to address the following questions. Do foreign 
investors provide or consume liquidity in local financial markets? Do cross-border 
capital flows exacerbate liquidity crises? Simultaneously, we examine whether 
capital flows respond to the liquidity in the host and/or the home market. We also 
investigate whether the interaction between capital flows and liquidity varies across 
different regions or countries, across different categories of stocks, and across crisis 
and “normal” periods. 
10  Chapter 2  
 
 There are at least three different channels through which foreign investors 
could affect local market liquidity. First, market microstructure research 
emphasizes the importance of asymmetric information as a determinant of liquidity. 
If foreign investors are on average better informed than local investors, extensive 
foreign presence can be associated with increased adverse selection costs for local 
traders, undermining market liquidity. On the other hand, if foreign investors are 
less well informed, they may act as liquidity (or “noise”) traders that improve 
market liquidity. Empirical evidence on whether foreign investors have an 
informational advantage is mixed. On one side, Seasholes (2004) shows that 
foreign investors in Taiwan tend to buy (sell) before positive (negative) earnings 
surprises. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find that foreign investors are better 
informed than domestic investors in Finland. Froot and Ramadorai (2008) use data 
on closed-end country fund flows for 25 countries to provide evidence that is also 
supportive of the hypothesis that foreign investors are better informed. On the 
opposite side, Brennan and Cao (1997) argue that U.S. investors, because they are 
at an informational disadvantage, extrapolate past performance when investing 
abroad. Kang and Stulz (1997), Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005), and Dvorak (2005) 
find that local investors have an informational advantage in Japan, Korea, and 
Indonesia, respectively.  
 Second, even in the absence of systematic differences in how well foreign and 
local investors are informed, the trading behavior of foreign investors can diminish 
local market liquidity to the extent that it is associated with increased order 
imbalances and/or market volatility. Regarding the former, previous studies find 
evidence of herd behavior by foreign investors (e.g., Choe et al, 1999). If market 
makers and other providers of liquidity face capital constraints (as suggested by, 
e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), excess buying or selling initiated by 
foreign investors can exert substantial pressure on inventory limits and therefore 
adversely affect liquidity. Blume, MacKinlay, and Terker (1989) show that S&P 
stocks declined more compared to non-S&P stocks on “Black Monday” because the 
market was not able to absorb the selling pressure on the former. More generally, 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) show that market-wide order imbalances 
on the NYSE are associated with reduced liquidity, although the effect seems to be 
short-lived on this market. Regarding the latter, if foreign investors tend to be 
positive feedback traders and if their trades move prices (as suggested by, e.g., 
Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes, 2001), their actions can influence volatility and 
(perceived) inventory risk for market makers and thus the costs of providing 
liquidity. Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan (2006) report evidence that the presence of 
foreign investors in local stock markets contributes to the global spreading of stock 
market crises, with likely consequences for local market liquidity. 
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 Third, sophisticated institutional investors may enhance liquidity when their 
trading strategies are designed to provide liquidity in foreign markets and reap 
liquidity premia. For example, it is widely believed that hedge funds provide 
liquidity to financial markets (see, e.g., Fung, Hsieh, and Tsatsaronis, 2000; 
Agarwal, Fung, Loon, and Naik, 2007; Stulz, 2007, Brophy, Paige, and Sialm, 
2009). Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2010) show that algorithmic trading, 
which is generally done by sophisticated investors, enhances liquidity on the NYSE. 
Cao, Chen, Liang, and Lo (2009) find that emerging markets hedge funds invest in 
relatively illiquid securities and display significant liquidity timing ability. 
However, Stulz (2007) argues that hedge funds may withdraw liquidity in the 
presence of a systemic shock. In line with this view, Ben-David, Franzoni, and 
Moussawi (2010) provide evidence that hedge funds withdrew from the U.S. equity 
market during the crisis in 2008. It is thus possible that foreign investors tend to 
provide liquidity during normal times but consume liquidity during crises.  
 Conversely, there are good reasons to believe that liquidity affects capital flows. 
It is well-documented that equity flows respond positively to (past) local market 
returns (e.g., Clark and Berko, 1996; Brennan and Cao, 1997; Choe et al., 1999; 
Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes, 2001; Kim and Wei, 2002; Griffin, Nardari, and 
Stulz, 2004). It seems plausible that foreign investors are also attracted by 
favorable local liquidity conditions. Poor liquidity not only impedes efficient 
pricing, but also undermines investors’ ability to materialize potential gains quickly 
and at low cost. Alternatively, foreign investors could be drawn to markets with 
relatively low market liquidity with the intention to exploit the higher expected 
returns of securities with a low level of liquidity and/or a high level of liquidity risk. 
This effect is likely to be stronger during times when financial markets at home are 
flush with liquidity and investors have an incentive to seek return in other markets.  
Our empirical approach is to construct monthly time-series of capital flows (equity 
portfolio flows from and to the U.S. obtained from Treasury International Capital), 
local stock market liquidity (Amihud, 2002, liquidity computed based on 
Datastream data for 42,905 different individual stocks), and local stock returns 
(total returns in local currency from Datastream) for 46 countries from January 
1995 to December 2008. Our baseline model is an unrestricted vector 
autoregression (VAR) with three endogenous variables: flows, liquidity, and 
returns. We estimate the VAR at four different levels of aggregation: all countries, 
developed vs. emerging countries, six different regions, and country-by-country. 
We also estimate the VARs separately for small and large cap stocks, for liquidity 
crisis periods and “normal” periods, and with a variety of exogenous variables.  
 Consistent with previous studies, we find that foreign investors are positive 
feedback traders. Capital inflows strongly respond to past local market returns for 
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both developed and emerging markets, for all six regions, and for many individual 
countries. We also confirm prior evidence that capital inflows are associated with 
higher future local market returns. Both of these effects are economically and 
statistically significant for many regions and countries. 
Even after controlling for the interaction between flows and returns, market 
liquidity is an important determinant of cross-border portfolio flows. Local market 
liquidity positively predicts future capital inflows for developed countries, 
especially in Europe and Asia/Pacific. For emerging countries, it seems that local 
market liquidity may be a second-order concern (relative to, for example, political 
risk) in investment decisions by foreigners. 
 Moreover, capital flows to developed and emerging Europe and emerging 
Asia increase when U.S. market liquidity improves. The economic magnitude of 
these effects is substantial. Foreign investors thus condition their decision to invest 
in stocks in various regions not only on local liquidity, but also on the liquidity in 
the home market. In particular, they tend to invest in local markets that have seen 
their liquidity improve, in periods when there is ample liquidity in the home market. 
We interpret these findings as evidence that foreign investors seek return in other 
markets when their home market is flush with liquidity, but they are careful to 
avoid investing in these markets when they are illiquid. 
 We present evidence that is consistent with the view that foreign investors 
have an impact on local market liquidity. Liquidity shows a positive and significant 
response to an increase in capital inflows for the group of developed countries, for 
four of the six regions (developed America, developed Europe, and developed and 
emerging Asia/Pacific), and for a substantial number of individual countries. A one 
standard deviation (1SD) shock in flows is associated with an increase in local 
market liquidity of on average around 0.30SD over the next six months. Although 
we do not provide direct evidence that foreign investors provide instead of 
consume liquidity on local markets, these findings suggest that an increased 
presence of foreign investors helps rather than hurts local liquidity. 
 As several studies (e.g., Kang and Stulz, 1997; Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp, 2009) argue that foreign investors face constraints in trading small 
stocks, we run a separate analysis that distinguishes between small and large cap 
stocks. Although capital flows respond more strongly to large cap returns than to 
small cap returns, there is little indication that they are more sensitive to large cap 
liquidity than to small cap liquidity. And the positive response of liquidity to 
capital inflows over the next six months (discussed above) is mainly driven by 
small cap stocks. This finding indicates that the liquidity of small caps is more 
sensitive to capital flows than the liquidity of large caps and/or that foreign 
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investors (for example, hedge funds in the later part of our sample period) are more 
active in small caps than previous studies suggest. 
 An important policy issue concerns the extent to which foreign investors 
exacerbate financial crises on local markets. If foreign investors destabilize markets, 
policy makers should reassess the net benefits of opening up local markets to 
investors from other countries. We investigate this issue by analyzing the 
magnitude and direction of flows as well as the relation between flows and liquidity 
separately for liquidity crisis periods and normal periods. We find no convincing 
evidence that foreign investors destabilize local stock markets by undermining 
market liquidity. First, the data show little systematic tendency of foreign investors 
to actively withdraw from local markets during crises. Second, there is no 
significant short-term response of liquidity to flows during crises. 
 We try to identify the determinants of the variation in the impact of flows on 
liquidity across individual countries by running cross-sectional regressions on 
proxies for a country’s economic and financial development, regulatory and 
information environment, openness, and market risk. We find that the response of 
liquidity to flows is significantly more positive in countries with greater 
transparency and in countries with less developed financial markets. The first effect 
suggests that in transparent countries it is less likely that foreign investors 
aggravate adverse selection problems on local financial markets. In other words, 
they are more likely to act as noise traders that provide liquidity. The second effect 
is consistent with the view that more developed financial markets are more resilient 
to the trading behavior of foreign investors. The economic magnitude of both of 
these effects is substantial.  
 
 
2.2 Data description 
 
 In this section, we describe the data sources and the screening procedures we 
use to construct our sample. We also discuss the summary statistics of the main 
variables in our analysis. 
 
2.2.1 Data sources and variable definitions 
 
 Since information on bilateral portfolio flows among countries is not publicly 
available at a high frequency, we restrict our analysis to U.S. transactions in foreign 
stocks. We obtain monthly data on cross-border equity portfolio flows (expressed 
in million US$) from the U.S. Treasury International Capital (TIC) reporting 
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system for 46 countries for the period starting in January 1995 until December 
2008. These data consist of financial transactions of at least $50 million (gross 
purchases and sales of foreign stocks) between U.S and foreign residents. U.S. 
residents include branches or subsidiaries of foreign entities that are located in the 
U.S. Branches of U.S. companies incorporated outside the U.S. are considered 
foreign residents. Consequently, transactions that are initiated by foreign-based 
firms on behalf of domestic investors are not recorded by the TIC database (Tesar 
and Werner, 1994, 1995). Additionally, direct cross-border investment activities are 
not included in the data. A limitation of the TIC data is that they only include 
transactions in which U.S. investors are involved. However, U.S. investors 
constitute by far the most important group of investors worldwide. Portes and Rey 
(2005) report that almost 60% of the aggregate equity transactions in their dataset 
of annual bilateral equity flow data between 14 major developed countries over 
1989-1996 involve U.S. investors. Ferreira and Matos (2008) document that foreign 
institutions held on average 13.5% of the local equity market capitalization in 26 
developed and emerging countries outside the U.S. at the end of 2005, and that U.S. 
institutions accounted for 7.4%, or over half of this fraction. Another potential 
drawback is that the TIC equity flow data are only available at a monthly frequency. 
It is possible that the impact of foreign investors on local market liquidity can only 
be observed at a higher frequency. At the same time, regulators that want to assess 
whether foreign investors help or hurt local market liquidity are probably interested 
in the long-term effects. From that perspective, any relation between capital flows 
and liquidity that does not show up in an analysis of monthly data may be 
considered immaterial.  
 We calculate net equity portfolio inflows by subtracting gross sales of foreign 
equity by U.S. investors from gross U.S. purchases of foreign equity for each 
country in our sample. Consistent with the approach adopted in Froot et al. (2001), 
Bekaert et al. (2002), and Griffin et al. (2004), we scale net portfolio flows by the 
aggregate local market capitalization (taken from Datastream): 
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 ,                                                                                          (2.1) 
where FLOWk,t is the (scaled) net equity inflow from the U.S. to country k in month 
t, Fbuyk,t denotes the gross purchases by U.S. investors of equity in country k in 
month t, Fsellk,t denotes the gross sales by U.S. investors of equity in country k in 
month t, and MCAPk,t is the aggregate market capitalization of all stocks in country 
k at the beginning of month t. For the U.S., we calculate the net equity inflow as 
aggregate gross purchases of U.S. equity by foreigners from U.S. investors minus 
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gross sales of U.S. equity by foreigners from the remaining 45 countries, scaled by 
aggregate U.S. market capitalization. 
 We use Datastream to collect the daily adjusted price (P; closing price in local 
currency, which is adjusted for splits and dividends), the daily total return index 
(RI), trading volume at a monthly frequency (VO; expressed in 1,000 shares), the 
monthly market capitalization (MV; expressed in millions of local currency), the 
monthly market dividend yield index (DY), and the daily number of shares 
outstanding (NOSH; expressed in thousands of shares) for all individual stocks in 
the 46 countries. In line with Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2009) we restrict our 
sample to stocks from major exchanges. These are the exchanges on which the 
majority of each country’s stocks are listed. In the case of U.S., we only use data 
from the NYSE, since trading volume definitions are different for NASDAQ. 
Countries for which we collect data from more than one stock exchange are China 
(Shenzen and Shanghai), Japan (Osaka and Tokyo), and Germany (Frankfurt and 
Xetra). Datastream reports that the volume definitions applied by the different 
exchanges in these countries are the same. We exclude stocks with special features 
such as depository receipts (DRs), real estate investment trusts (REITs), closed-end 
funds, and preferred stocks (following Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001; 
Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003). To avoid survivorship bias, we include dead and 
delisted stocks in our sample. 
 We collect monthly exchange rates of domestic currencies against the U.S. 
dollar (from WM/Reuters) from Datastream. Interest rate data are also from 
Datastream. Following Bekaert et al. (2002), we construct the world interest rate as 
the average of the short-term interest rates of the G-7 countries weighted by each 
country’s GDP in the previous year.  
 Using the classification by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), we 
categorize the 46 countries in our sample into different groups based on their 
economic development and their geographic location. 22 countries are classified as 
developed, whereas 24 are emerging. Our final sample includes 42,905 stocks from 
markets in developed Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the U.K.), emerging Europe (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Hungary, Israel, Poland, Portugal, and Turkey), developed Asia/Pacific (Australia, 
Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore), emerging Asia (China, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand), 
developed America (Canada and the U.S.), and emerging America (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela). 
 
 
16  Chapter 2  
 
2.2.2 Liquidity measure and data screens 
 
 The literature has developed a number of different measures of liquidity. 
However, there is no consensus on which is the most appropriate, in part because 
different measures capture different aspects of liquidity. Since arguably the most 
refined of these measures (e.g., the quoted and effective bid-ask spread and the 
transaction-by-transaction market impact) are based on detailed microstructure data 
that are generally not available for markets outside the U.S., we adopt the Amihud 
(2002) price impact measure as a proxy for liquidity. The Amihud proxy is 
designed to capture the marginal impact of a unit of trading volume (in local 
currency) on the stock price. It is computed as the daily ratio of the absolute stock 
return over the local currency volume of the stock. This measure stays close to the 
intuitive description of liquid markets as those that accommodate trading with the 
least effect on price. Amihud (2002) shows that this measure is strongly positively 
related to microstructure estimates of illiquidity for the U.S. stock market. 
Hasbrouck (2006) and Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) show that the 
Amihud measure performs well relative to other proxies in capturing high-
frequency measures of transaction costs based on U.S. data. Lesmond (2005) 
reports a high correlation between the Amihud measure and bid-ask spreads in 23 
emerging markets. Many recent empirical studies use the Amihud proxy to measure 
stock market liquidity, both for the U.S. and for other countries. Examples include 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Spiegel and Wang (2005), Avramov, Chordia, and 
Goyal (2006), Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008), Watanabe and Watanabe (2008), 
and Karolyi et al. (2009).1 
 We follow other studies (e.g., Karolyi et al., 2009) and take the logarithm of 
one plus the Amihud liquidity proxy. We multiply the result by -1 to obtain a 
measure that is increasing with liquidity. The liquidity of stock i on day d is thus 
defined as follows: 
,
,
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where LIQi,d is the Amihud liquidity measure, Ri,d is the return, Pi,d is the adjusted 
closing price, and VOi,d is the trading volume of stock i on day d.  
To mitigate the effect of reporting errors, we perform several screens. First, we 
discard non-trading days. We follow Karolyi et al. (2009) and identify these as days 
on which 90% or more of the stocks listed on a given exchange have a zero return. 
                                            
1 We refer to Hasbrouck (2006), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), and Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) for a 
detailed discussion of different liquidity measures. 
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Second, we exclude stocks for which the number of zero-return days is more than 
80% in a given month. Third, we follow Ince and Porter (2006) and set daily 
returns to missing if the following condition is satisfied:  
 
5.1)1)(1( 1,, d didi RR ,                                                                                             (2.3) 
 
where Ri,d and Ri,d-1 are the stock returns of firm i on day d and d-1, respectively, 
with at least one being greater than or equal to 100%. Fourth, we set daily returns 
to missing if the value of the total return index for either the previous or the current 
day is below 0.01. Fifth, we discard stock-day observations with a daily return or 
liquidity in the top or bottom 0.1% of the cross-sectional distribution within a 
country and with daily trading volume (VOi,d) greater than the corresponding 
number of shares outstanding (NOSHi,d).  
 We construct monthly liquidity time-series for individual stocks by calculating 
the equally-weighted average of the daily stock liquidity. We create monthly return 
index and price series by taking the end-of-month values for the return index and 
the adjusted price from our daily data. For monthly returns, we again adopt the 
screen proposed by Ince and Porter (2006), and thus exclude stock-month 
observations that satisfy the following condition: 
 
   5.111 1,, d titi RR ,                                                           (2.4) 
 
where Ri,t and Ri,t-1 are the stock returns of firm i in months t and t-1, respectively, 
and at least one is greater than or equal to 300%. We also set monthly returns to 
missing if the total return index for either the previous month or the current month 
is smaller than 0.01. We exclude stock-month observations with a monthly stock 
price or return in the top or bottom 2.5% or liquidity in the top or bottom 2.5% of 
the cross-sectional distribution within a country. Finally, we limit the effect of 
outliers in our monthly time-series by winsorizing the values that fall below the 
bottom 1% and above the top 99% of the distribution to the aforementioned 
percentiles, respectively. 
 We construct monthly time-series of market-wide liquidity (LIQk,t) and returns 
(Rk,t; in local currency) for each country by taking the value-weighted average 
across all stocks in that country for that month. We carry out robustness checks 
with equally-weighted liquidity and return series as well as with U.S. dollar instead 
of local currency returns. 
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2.2.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
 Table 2.1 provides summary statistics on our time series of net portfolio 
inflows, Amihud liquidity, market returns, EGARCH(1,1) volatility, and aggregate 
market capitalization for each of the 46 countries in our sample, grouped by region. 
Returns are expressed as a percentage per month. By construction, Amihud 
liquidity is negative, with greater values (i.e., negative values closer to zero) 
indicating greater liquidity. Flows are expressed as a percentage of local stock 
market capitalization at the beginning of the month. A positive number for the 
mean flow in Table 2.1 indicates that the country on average experienced capital 
inflows from the U.S. over our sample period. The table also reports the time 
period that our sample covers and the total number of distinct individual stocks for 
each country. For several countries, the sample period starts later than 1995. For 
Brazil, the sample period starts in February 1999 due to a change in trading volume 
definitions. For Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ireland, and Luxembourg, the 
sample period is shorter because of insufficient observations for one of the time-
series.  
 On average, emerging countries have higher and more volatile market returns 
than developed countries. We note that a direct comparison between the liquidity 
levels of different countries is not possible due to differences in trading volume 
definitions and currency units across countries. However, this measurement issue 
does not affect our empirical analysis, since we first standardize all the country 
time-series to have zero mean and unit standard deviation (as described below).  
Many markets, especially in emerging economies, experience positive net capital 
inflows over the sample period. The most striking example is China, with mean 
flows of 1.65%. Colombia and the Czech Republic are the only emerging markets 
that saw U.S. investors recede over the sample period. During our sample period, 
we observe a total of $632.8bn. of net equity portfolio flows from the U.S. to the 
remaining 45 countries. Emerging markets received $136.2bn., whereas the 
remaining $496.6bn. went to developed markets. U.S. gross purchases of equity in 
emerging markets peaked in 2007, reaching a total of approximately $237.2bn. In 
2008, the direction of aggregate net flows reversed with $52.7bn. ($7.3bn.) worth 
of net equity flows fleeing developed (emerging) markets to the U.S. Figure 2.1 
shows the cumulative net portfolio inflows for each of the six regions (where the 
countries within each region are equally-weighted). Emerging Asia (plotted using 
the secondary y-axis on the right) is by far the leading region in terms of monthly 
net inflows, with developed America, emerging America, and developed Europe 
competing for second place. Aggregate net inflows into emerging America turn 
negative during the period 1998-1999 (currency crisis in Brazil), and remain at 
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relatively low levels during 2001-2005 (economic crisis in Argentina). However, in 
2006 and 2007 we observe a boom in net stock purchases by U.S. investors in the 
region. The same applies for developed Asia/Pacific. Aggregate flows into Europe, 
both developed and emerging, remain stable for most of the sample period. 
Unreported results show that capital flows exhibit significant persistence in 40 out 
of the 46 countries. Average first-order autocorrelations of net flows within each 
region range from 0.15 to 0.25. 
 Figure 2.2 displays the local currency equity market returns for each of the six 
regions (where the countries within each region are equally-weighted). After stellar 
returns from 2003 to early 2007, stock markets in all regions show a steep decline 
from the second half of 2007 and onwards. The effects of the 1997-1998 Asian 
crisis are clearly visible for emerging Asia, and to a lesser extent for the other 
regions. Two distinctive dates on which markets across almost all regions display 
significant drops are August/September 1998 (LTCM collapse) and September 
2001 (terrorist attacks in the U.S.). 
 Figure 2.3 shows the aggregate market liquidity series for each of the six 
regions (where the countries within each region are equally-weighted). Since the 
level of Amihud liquidity is not comparable across countries, we standardize the 
series before we aggregate within each region. As with the return series, there are 
some clear common patterns in the liquidity series for the different regions. This is 
not surprising, as previous research (Brockman, Chung, and Perignon, 2009) 
documents the importance of global commonality in liquidity across different 
countries. Periods of widespread liquidity declines tend to accompany dramatic 
market events with global implications. In our sample, such periods include 1997 
and 1998 (Asian and LTCM crises, respectively), 2001 until 2003 (terrorist attacks 
and burst of the “dot-com” bubble in the U.S.; Argentinean crisis), and the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis. With respect to the latter crisis, it is noteworthy that its 
impact on equity market liquidity in America and emerging Asia appears to be 
relatively minor, in contrast to the dramatic effect that is evident in Europe and in 
developed Asia/Pacific.2 Our liquidity time-series exhibit significant persistence in 
almost all the countries in our sample. Unreported results indicate that average 
first-order autocorrelations of market liquidity within each region range from 0.51 
to 0.92. 
 To save space, we do not report correlation matrices for flows, liquidity, and 
returns. Correlations between flows are generally negligible across regions, 
whereas within regions they range from -0.31 to 0.30. With respect to market 
returns and liquidity, correlations are also generally higher within regions than 
                                            
2 In the case of developed America, the substantial decline in market liquidity we observe in the U.S. is 
counterweighted by the much lesser drop observed in Canada. As a result, the aggregate effect is modest. 
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across regions (consistent with Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2003). Return correlations 
are especially high between countries in developed Europe. 
Because many of our time-series display long-term trends, we formally test for 
stationarity by performing the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for each of the series, 
at the country-level. We allow both for an intercept and a time trend under the 
alternative hypothesis, and use the Hannan-Quinn information criterion to decide 
for the appropriate augmentation lags. In unreported analyses, we find that for a 
substantial number of countries we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
at conventional significance levels for the time-series of market liquidity, dividend 
yield, volatility, and turnover, as well as for the world interest rate. To eliminate 
non-stationarity, we adjust these time-series by following the example of other 
papers (e.g., Baker and Stein, 2004; Griffin et al., 2007) and stochastically detrend 
them for all the countries. We carry out the detrending by subtracting the moving 
average over the previous six months from the current value. 
 
 
2.3 Methodology 
 
 Our goal is to investigate the interaction between capital flows and market 
liquidity. Since previous studies identify an important relation of both variables 
with market returns, we control for any endogenous interaction with returns in all 
our analyses. Several papers document that past market performance is an 
important determinant of portfolio flows. Brennan and Cao (1997) attribute this 
trend chasing behavior to differences in the information endowments between 
domestic and foreign investors. Choe et al. (2005) show that foreign investors buy 
(sell) from domestic individuals before an abnormal drop (increase) in the price of 
a stock. In turn, flows may affect returns. Froot et al. (2001) and Griffin et al. (2004) 
provide evidence that flows into emerging markets predict local returns. Possible 
explanations for this finding include informed trading and transitory price pressure. 
Griffin et al. (2004) find no evidence for the view that informed trading can explain 
the predictability. Froot and Ramadorai (2008) use data on closed-end country fund 
flows to distinguish between both explanations and conclude that their evidence is 
most consistent with the information hypothesis. 
 The relation between market returns and liquidity is also the subject of a large 
body of research. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that illiquid stocks on 
average have higher returns. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) find that market liquidity is a priced risk factor. Bekaert et al. 
(2007) and Lee (2010) provide international evidence. Among others, Chordia, Huh, 
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and Subrahmanyam (2006) document a relation between absolute returns and 
trading activity in the U.S. Griffin et al. (2007) establish a link between past returns 
and trading activity in 24 out of the 46 countries in their sample. In addition, 
market microstructure research suggests a direct link between trading activity and 
liquidity, so these patterns may result in an effect of market returns on liquidity. 
More directly, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Hameed, Kang, and 
Viswanathan (2008) report evidence that market liquidity declines during down 
markets.  
 Since we want to avoid imposing a priori restrictions on the dynamic 
interaction of flows, liquidity, and returns, we adopt a vector autoregression (VAR) 
methodology. The general form of an unrestricted VAR model of order p with m 
endogenous variables and n exogenous factors can expressed as follows: 
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where Yt=(y1,t,, y2,t, …, ym,t)´ is an m×T matrix of jointly determined dependent 
variables assumed to be covariance stationary, Xt=(x1,t, x2,t, …, xn,t)´ is an n×T 
vector of exogenous variables, A is an m×1 vector of intercepts, and Φl (l=1,2,…,p) 
and Ψ are the m×m and m×n coefficient matrices to be estimated. In our case, Yt 
consists of three variables (defined for each country k): monthly net flows as a 
percentage of market capitalization (FLOWk,t), monthly market returns (Rk,t), and 
stochastically detrended monthly Amihud liquidity (LIQk,t). Suppressing exogenous 
factors, our country-specific VAR model can be expressed as follows: 
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 The diagonal elements φl11, φl22, φl33 of the coefficient matrix Φl represent the 
conditional persistence in flows, liquidity, and returns for country i. 
Besides our endogenous variables, we take several external factors into 
consideration. We include market volatility (using the EGARCH specification of 
Nelson, 1991, to account for asymmetries between positive and negative returns) 
because of its relation to stock returns (e.g., Whitelaw, 1994) and liquidity (e.g., 
Chordia et al., 2002; Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2005). Given the 
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substantial correlations of capital flows within regions, we account for spillover 
effects by including regional flows (FLOW_REG; the equally-weighted average of 
monthly flows for the remaining countries within the region). Following Bekaert et 
al. (2002), we include the local market dividend yield (DY; the ratio of the total 
dividend payments to aggregate market capitalization) as a proxy for the domestic 
cost of capital, changes in which affect a country’s attractiveness for foreign 
investment. We also account for changes in global macroeconomic conditions by 
including the world interest rate (WIR). For example, a drop in the world interest 
rate can spur cross-country portfolio flows as foreign investors from developed 
countries can borrow at low cost in their home currency and invest in riskier and 
potentially higher yielding assets abroad. We also include U.S. market returns 
(R_US) and market liquidity (LIQ_US) as exogenous factors in our VAR 
specifications. U.S. investors may well condition their cross-border investment 
decisions on domestic returns or liquidity conditions. Finally, we directly control 
for trading activity by including aggregate local market turnover (TURN; the 
number of shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding) as an 
exogenous factor.  
 Prior research identifies differences in the behavior of capital flows, market 
returns, and market liquidity that depend on geographic location and economic 
development (e.g., Froot et al., 2001; Bekaert et al., 2002, 2007; Griffin et al., 2007; 
Brockman et al., 2009). To infer how these attributes affect the interaction among 
our endogenous variables, we use a top-down approach by estimating the VARs at 
four different levels of aggregation: all countries simultaneously, developed and 
emerging countries separately, six regions defined based on geographic location 
and economic development (see section  2.2.1), and country-by-country. 
 We follow Froot et al. (2001) and Froot and Ramadorai (2001) and constrain 
the parameters in equation (2.6) to be equal for all countries within each group. 
Before estimation, we standardize all country-level variables to have zero mean and 
unit standard deviation. In that way, we allow for country fixed effects, while 
eliminating the disparity in liquidity and turnover across countries due to 
differences in trading volume definitions and/or currency units. In line with Griffin 
et al. (2004), we restrict the variance-covariance and coefficient matrices to be 
block diagonal. To decide upon the optimal lag length p, we use the Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criterion (HQC) for the country-specific VARs. Consistent with 
previous studies, we find an optimal lag length equal to one month for the majority 
of the countries.3 Consequently, for the sake of parsimony we use a lag length of 
                                            
3 Griffin et al. (2007) find an optimal lag length between 2 and 5 weeks in a model that describes the relation 
between turnover and market return for 46 countries. Froot et al. (2001) use 40 daily lags in a bivariate VAR of 
capital flows and returns for 44 countries.  
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one month in all VARs. We use a pooled feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
procedure to estimate the variance-covariance and coefficient matrices. That is, we 
first estimate the coefficient matrices using maximum likelihood, then estimate the 
residuals’ variance-covariance matrix and repeat this procedure until convergence. 
The results are identical when we use GMM. 
 In line with Griffin et al. (2007), we use the generalized impulse response 
functions (GIRs) proposed by Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and Pesaran and 
Shin (1998) to measure the long-term response of our endogenous variables to 
innovations in these variables and to evaluate the economic significance. The 
typical approach in calculating impulse responses (IRs) involves orthogonalizing 
the endogenous shocks based on a Cholesky decomposition of the cross-equation 
covariance matrix Σ. However, this approach imposes an arbitrary structure on the 
contemporaneous correlations between the endogenous variables and it makes the 
IRs depend on the ordering of the variables in the VAR. GIRs do not suffer from 
these drawbacks. It is important to note that they do not only reflect the isolated 
impact of an innovation in a single variable, but rather the accumulated effect 
implied by the contemporaneous interaction between the endogenous variables. 
Pesharan and Shin (1998) define the GIR of yt at horizon n as follows: 
      111 |,|,,  ::  : tnttjjtnttjy yEyEnGIR GHG                                             (2.7) 
 
where Ωt-1 denotes the known economic history up to time t-1 and δj a shock to the 
jth factor. To evaluate the statistical significance of the GIRs we compute upper and 
lower 95% confidence bounds using standard Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
 
2.4  Results 
 
2.4.1 VARs for all countries and for developed vs. emerging 
countries 
 
 Table 2.2 reports the results of our baseline VAR estimated for all countries 
(Panel A) and for developed and emerging countries separately (Panel B and C, 
respectively). The table presents results based on both equally-weighted and value-
weighted liquidity and return series and based on both local currency and U.S. 
dollar returns. As all series in the VARs are standardized to have zero mean and 
unit standard variation, the coefficients can be interpreted as the effect (after one 
month) of a one standard deviation (1SD) shock in the right hand side variable 
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expressed as a fraction of one SD of the left hand side variable. As in Griffin et al. 
(2007), we assess the long-term impact of a 1SD shock to one of the endogenous 
variables in the baseline VAR on the other variables using the generalized impulse 
response functions (GIRs). We focus on the cumulative response after six months, 
as most GIRs level off after that horizon. To save space, we only present the GIRs 
for the regional and country-by-country VARs in the paper, but we discuss some of 
the other GIR results in the text. The full set of GIRs is available from the authors. 
Consistent with the large body of research on positive feedback trading by foreign 
investors (e.g., Clark and Berko, 1996; Brennan and Cao, 1997; Choe et al., 1999; 
Froot et al., 2001; Kim and Wei, 2002; Griffin et al., 2004), we find that local 
returns in the current month positively and significantly predict next month’s net 
equity inflows for both developed and emerging markets. The effect is somewhat 
weaker for emerging markets, and insignificant in the emerging markets 
specification with the equally-weighted series and local currency returns. This 
finding suggests that positive feedback trading by foreign investors in emerging 
markets is driven by large cap stocks. We find no evidence of an effect of flows on 
future local currency returns at the monthly horizon when we use value-weighted 
series. There is a significant effect (at the 10% level) for the equally-weighted 
series for developed markets, which suggests that price pressure or informed 
trading has a greater impact on small cap stocks in those markets. In developed 
markets, there is also a significantly positive relation (at the 1% level) between 
current flows and next month’s U.S. dollar returns, an effect that can potentially be 
explained by the effect of a currency appreciation driven by portfolio inflows. The 
long-term effects of returns on flows and flows on returns are remarkably similar 
across developed and emerging markets. The (unreported) GIRs suggest that a 1SD 
shock to current returns (flows) is associated with a cumulative response in flows 
(returns) of close to 0.15SD (0.23SD) over the next six months. These effects are 
significant at any conventional confidence level.  
 The coefficients in the aggregate VARs indicate that liquidity positively 
predicts capital flows (with the exception of the equally-weighted specification for 
emerging markets). The coefficient is only statistically significant for developed 
countries (where it is a bit stronger when we use dollar returns and/or equally-
weighted variables). A 1SD shock to current liquidity predicts a change in future 
flows of up to 4.6% of the SD of flows, an effect that is relatively small. However, 
the GIRs suggest that the long-term effects can be substantial. A 1SD shock to 
current liquidity is associated with a cumulative response of capital flows of up to 
0.29SD over the next six months, which is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
all specifications for both developed and emerging countries. The coefficients on 
flows in the liquidity equations in Table 2.2 are not significant. But for developed 
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markets, the GIRs show a significant cumulative impact of flows on liquidity after 
six months (close to 0.30SD as a response to a 1SD shock to flows). The long-term 
effect of flows on liquidity in emerging markets is also statistically significant, but 
small in economic terms (around 0.03SD). 
 Future liquidity is positively and significantly associated with current returns 
at the 1% level in all specifications and both at the one-month and the six-month 
horizon, consistent with Bekaert et al. (2007). The relation between future returns 
and current liquidity is less clear-cut. There is a negative relation in the equally-
weighted local currency returns specification for emerging markets, but a positive 
relation in both the value-weighted and the equally-weighted dollar returns 
specification for developed markets.  
In all three panels and in all four specifications in each panel, the endogenous 
variables show strong persistence. The VARs do a much better job in capturing the 
dynamics of liquidity (R2 of 18% to 47%) than of flows and returns (R2 of around 
5%).  
 An advantage of the aggregate VARs in Table 2.2 is their potentially large 
statistical power. However, the drawback of aggregating over many different 
countries is that we ignore cross-country heterogeneity and that contrasting 
interactions among the endogenous variables in the VARs for different countries 
may cancel out. We therefore turn to VARs estimated at lower level of 
aggregations in the next subsections. 
 
2.4.2 VARs for six different regions 
 
 Table 2.3 presents the results of VARs estimated for six different groups of 
countries based on their economic development and their geographic location: 
developed Europe (Panel A), emerging Europe (Panel B), developed Asia/Pacific 
(Panel C), emerging Asia (Panel D), developed America (Panel E), and emerging 
America (Panel F). The table presents only the results for the value-weighted 
liquidity and return series and only for local currency returns. Next to the baseline 
VAR specification results (presented in the first row of the flows, liquidity, and 
returns equations), Table 2.3 also includes the results of VARs that include the 
following exogenous variables: regional flows (FLOW_REG), local market 
volatility (VOL), the local market dividend yield (DY), the world interest rate (WIR), 
U.S. market returns and liquidity (R_US and LIQ_US), and local market turnover 
(TURN). We present the regional GIRs in Figure 2.4 (developed and emerging 
Europe), Figure 2.5 (developed and emerging Asia/Pacific), and Figure 2.6 
(developed and emerging America). To conserve space, we only present GIRs of 
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flows to a shock in returns and liquidity, and GIRs of returns and liquidity to a 
shock in flows.  
 For developed Europe (see Panel A), future flows are positively related to 
current liquidity and returns in the baseline VAR and in the majority of other 
specifications. Figure 2.4 suggests that the long-term effects are substantial. A 1SD 
shock in liquidity (returns) is associated with an increase in flows of around 
0.25SD (0.18SD) during the next six months (both are statistically significant). The 
flows equation also shows a significant effect of regional flows, and of market 
liquidity in the U.S. The latter effect seems to dominate the effect of local market 
liquidity, with a 1SD increase in U.S. liquidity predicting a 0.16SD increase in 
flows to developed Europe in the next month (significant at the 1% level). This 
finding is consistent with the view that U.S. investors seek return in developed 
Europe in times of abundant liquidity in the U.S. market. Future liquidity is 
positively related to current local returns, local liquidity, U.S. returns, and local 
turnover, and negatively to local volatility and the local dividend yield. The VAR 
coefficients show no significant effect of last month’s flows on current liquidity, 
but the GIRs in Figure 2.4 suggest that there is a significant long-term effect; the 
cumulative response to a 1SD shock in flows amounts to almost 0.20SD after 6 
months. Local returns in developed Europe are also strongly persistent, and are 
significantly related to regional flows, the dividend yield, the world interest rate, 
U.S. returns, and turnover. Capital inflows do not have a direct effect on returns 
after 1 month, but a 1SD shock in flows leads to an increase of 0.10SD in 
cumulative market returns after half a year. 
 The most striking result in the flows equation for emerging Europe is the 
strong effect of U.S. market liquidity (see Panel B of Table 2.3). A positive shock 
to current U.S. liquidity equal to 1SD is associated with 0.16SD greater capital 
flows to emerging Europe in the next month. There is no evidence of a significant 
short-term or long-term response of flows to local market liquidity, as reflected in 
the GIRs in Figure 2.4. Conversely, we also find no effect of flows on liquidity for 
emerging Europe. However, regional flows are a strong predictor of future liquidity 
in the domestic market, as a 1SD shock to regional flows is associated with 0.18SD 
change in future liquidity. Consistent with, e.g., Froot et al. (2001), we find that 
flows respond positively to local returns (a 0.18SD effect after six months) and 
future returns are positively related to current flows (a 0.21SD effect after six 
months). 
 For developed countries in Asia/Pacific, only the coefficients on past flows 
and past returns are significant in the flows equation (see Panel C). The positive 
feedback trading effect is strong both at the monthly horizon and in the long-term. 
The GIRs in Figure 2.5 show a cumulative effect of flows of no less than 0.40SD in 
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response to a 1SD shock in returns. Interestingly, the long-term effect of local 
liquidity on capital inflows is almost as large, and also statistically significant. The 
positive effects of flows on liquidity and returns can also only be observed at the 
longer horizons, but the GIRs indicate that these effects are economically large and 
statistically significant. 
 Panel D reports our findings for emerging Asia. Again, we find a strong 
interaction between flows and returns, especially at longer horizons. There is no 
impact of local market liquidity on flows at either the one-month or the longer 
horizons. However, in line with the results for developed and emerging Europe, an 
improvement in U.S. market liquidity is associated with greater subsequent capital 
flows to the region. A 1SD increase in U.S. liquidity is associated with a ceteris 
paribus increase of 0.05SD in next months’ capital flows. The long-term response 
of local market liquidity to capital inflows is positive and significant, although the 
economic magnitude of the effect (around 0.10SD after six months) is smaller than 
for developed Europe and developed Asia/Pacific. Regional flows have an impact 
on local liquidity that is at least as big, with a 0.09SD liquidity response after one 
month.  
 The VAR estimation results for developed America are in Panel E.4 Flows 
respond significantly to returns and returns to flows – although the latter effect is 
only significant for longer horizons. The coefficients on flows in the liquidity 
equations are not significant, but the long-term effect in Figure 2.7 is large. A 1SD 
shock to flows is associated with a 0.40SD increase in liquidity over the next six 
months. Flows do not significantly respond to local liquidity at any horizon. 
For emerging America (Panel F), we once more find a strong and significant long-
term response of flows to returns, and vice versa. There is no significant interaction 
between flows and liquidity. And with one exception, none of the exogenous 
factors show up significantly. 
 Overall, we find that future flows respond significantly to a shock in current 
returns and current flows significantly affect future returns in all six regions. Local 
liquidity positively affects future flows in developed countries in Europe and 
Asia/Pacific. In addition, we find evidence that the liquidity conditions in the U.S. 
market have an effect on flows to developed and emerging Europe and to emerging 
Asia. Flows to all of these regions increase when U.S. liquidity improves. Local 
liquidity in developed Europe, developed and emerging Asia/Pacific, and 
developed America shows a positive long-term response to an increase in capital 
inflows. This result suggests that foreign investors tend to provide rather than 
consume local market liquidity in these regions. 
                                            
4 For the VAR specification that includes U.S. returns and U.S. liquidity, we exclude the U.S and only keep 
Canada in the sample for this region.  
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2.4.3 VARs for six different regions: Small cap vs. large cap 
stocks 
 
 Our analysis thus far considers the interaction of capital flows with market-
wide liquidity for all the stocks in our sample, irrespective of firm size. However, 
previous studies suggest that foreign investors tend to refrain from trading small 
capitalization stocks due to, among other things, liquidity constraints, information 
costs, or client mandates. For example, Kang and Stulz (1997) and Van 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) argue that foreign investors overweight large 
stocks to reduce the impact of information asymmetries associated with less visible 
stocks. Dvorak (2005) shows that foreign trading is more pronounced among the 
largest stocks in Indonesia. Ferreira and Matos (2008) document that foreign 
investors have a strong preference for large companies with a dispersed investor 
base. Evidence provided by Seasholes (2004) suggests that foreign investors in 
Taiwan outperform local investors in the trading of large caps. The interaction of 
capital flows with market liquidity may thus differ across large cap and small cap 
stocks. Table 2.4 presents the results of a VAR estimated with the average market 
liquidity and returns of large cap stocks and of a VAR with the liquidity and returns 
of small cap stocks. We classify stocks in the top 35% (bottom 35%) of the cross-
sectional market capitalization distribution by country as large caps (small caps). 
Table 2.4 also contains the six-month cumulative GIRs of flows (liquidity) to a 
1SD shock in liquidity (flows), expressed as a fraction of 1SD of flows (liquidity). 
For brevity, we do not report the other GIRs.  
 Consistent with the view that foreign investors primarily trade large caps, we 
find that flows are more strongly related to large cap returns than to small cap 
returns. The VAR coefficients suggest that flows respond significantly to large cap 
returns for developed Europe, Asia/pacific, and America, and emerging Asia. There 
are no such effects for small cap returns. The coefficient on returns in the liquidity 
equation is significantly positive for all six regions in the large cap VAR, and for 
five of the six regions in the small cap VAR.  
 For large cap stocks, the coefficient on liquidity in the flows equation is 
positive and significant for developed Europe. The six-month GIR of flows to a 
shock in large cap liquidity is also significant for this region, consistent with the 
result in Figure 2.4 for large and small caps combined. For small cap stocks, there 
is no significant coefficient on liquidity in the flows equation, but again we find a 
significantly positive GIR for developed Europe. The long-term effect of liquidity 
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on capital flows to developed Europe is actually stronger for small caps than for 
large caps (0.33SD vs. 0.20SD).  
 The coefficient on flows in the liquidity equation is positive for the majority of 
the regions, and significantly so for large caps in developed America and small 
caps in emerging Asia. However, the significant six-month GIRs are concentrated 
in the small cap VARs. The GIRs indicate a significantly positive long-term effect 
of flows on small cap liquidity for developed America, Europe, and Asia/Pacific, 
and emerging Asia. The economic magnitudes of these effects are substantial, at 
0.22SD to 0.42SD of liquidity. The significance of the GIRs of liquidity to a shock 
in flows for these regions in Figures 2.4-2.6 for large and small caps combined is 
thus driven by small caps. Hence, the liquidity of small cap stocks seems to be 
more sensitive to the behavior of foreign investors than the liquidity of large caps.  
Somewhat surprisingly, we thus find little indication that flows respond more 
strongly to large cap liquidity than to small cap liquidity. A potential explanation is 
that even though foreign investors primarily invest in large and liquid stocks, they 
are relatively more concerned about the liquidity of any small cap investments they 
make. It could also be that foreign investors are more active in small stocks than 
the studies discussed above suggest. For example, Cao et al. (2009) provide 
evidence that hedge funds – at least those investing in emerging markets – focus on 
relatively illiquid securities. Hedge funds have become more prominent in the later 
part of our sample period. An alternative reason might be that capital inflows and 
the liquidity of small cap stocks share a business cycle component (Naes, Skjeltorp, 
Ødegaard, 2010, show that the liquidity of U.S. small caps is procyclical) that is not 
captured by our baseline VAR model. At the same time, Table 2.3 suggests that the 
inclusion of business cycle variables such as the local dividend yield and the world 
interest to the baseline model do not considerably alter our findings. 
 
2.4.4 VARs for six different regions: Liquidity crises vs. “normal 
periods” 
 
 In this subsection, we investigate whether the interaction between flows and 
liquidity is different during liquidity crisis periods than during “normal” periods. 
We are especially interested in whether domestic markets become more responsive 
to flows – and thus more vulnerable to foreign trading – when market liquidity 
evaporates. We define liquidity crises as the months in the bottom 30% of the 
liquidity distribution within each country. (We obtain qualitatively similar results 
when we define market crises based on the bottom 30% of the return distribution.) 
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Before we analyze the interaction between flows and liquidity during crises, we 
examine whether the magnitude and direction of flows differs across crisis and 
normal periods. Do foreign investors withdraw from local markets during crises? 
Stulz (2007) argues that hedge funds may withdraw liquidity under adverse market 
conditions. Ben-David et al. (2010) and Cao et al. (2009) show that hedge funds 
(especially global macro funds) adjust their equity holdings in favor of more liquid 
stocks during periods of low market liquidity. Anand, Irvine, Puckett, and 
Venkataraman (2010) report similar findings for institutional investors on the 
NYSE. We compute the average dollar flows and the fraction of months with net 
outflows for all six regions for crisis months versus all other months. The results 
are not tabulated, but they are available from the authors. As shown in Figure 2.1, 
all regions experience substantial capital inflows over our sample period. But the 
descriptive statistics of flows across crisis and normal periods suggest that inflows 
are considerably attenuated during crises for most regions. For example, emerging 
America sees average capital inflows of $56.7m. per month in normal periods and 
only $10.7m. during liquidity crises. Similarly, average monthly inflows during 
normal periods (liquidity crisis periods) are equal to $94.5m. ($73.2m.) for 
developed Europe, $15.6m. ($7.9m.) for emerging Europe, $408.6m. (-$12.5m.) for 
developed Asia/Pacific, $56.9m. ($44.2m.) for emerging Asia, and $3237.0m. 
($2508.1m.) for developed America. The number of months with outflows is also 
greater during crisis periods as compared to normal periods for most regions, but 
the difference is relatively small. Averaged across regions, 44.7% of the crisis 
months show outflows, versus 39.8% of the normal months. (Differences between 
crisis and normal periods are somewhat more pronounced when we base our crisis 
definition on returns rather than liquidity.) There is thus some indication that 
foreign investors tend to reduce their investments in local stock markets during 
financial crises. But, with the possible exception of developed Asia/Pacific, we do 
not observe a significant amount of capital leaving local markets. 
 Even though we do not observe large capital outflows during crisis periods for 
any region (for developed Asia/Pacific, the number is negative but small relative to 
inflows in normal months), it is still possible that foreign investors destabilize 
markets if their trading behavior has a different impact on local markets during 
crises than during normal periods. Local market conditions are likely to be more 
fragile during crisis periods, which may imply that local liquidity is more 
responsive to changes in asymmetric information, order imbalances, and/or 
inventory risk as a result of the trading behavior of foreign investors. Hence, the 
response of liquidity to a given shock to capital flows could differ across crisis and 
normal periods. We investigate this possibility by estimating models of flows and 
liquidity in which the independent variables are interacted with dummy variables 
 International Capital Flows and Liquidity 31 
   
for liquidity crisis periods and normal periods. These interactions force us to 
abandon the VAR framework, as VARs cannot handle endogenous variables that 
are interacted with a dummy variable. Instead, we estimate separate panel models 
for the flows and liquidity equations. We also include the liquidity and returns on 
the U.S. market as independent variables, as they show up significantly in a number 
of the specifications in Table 2.3. As in the VARs, we constrain all coefficients to 
be the same for all countries within each region and assume independence across 
regions.  
 The results are in Table 2.5. The main conclusion is that there is no significant 
response of liquidity to flows during crisis periods. A drawback of the panel 
models is that we cannot construct impulse response functions. On the other hand, 
for foreign investors to destabilize local markets during crisis, we would expect a 
strong short-term effect of flows on liquidity during crisis periods. Table 2.5 
suggests that the short-term effects are small and statistically insignificant. In sum, 
no convincing case can be made that foreign investors destabilize local equity 
markets through an adverse impact on liquidity. 
 Table 2.5 shows a number of other results. Both flows and liquidity tend to be 
highly persistent during both crisis and normal periods. For developed America, we 
find a positive short-term effect of local liquidity on inflows, but only during 
normal periods. Consistent with Table 2.3, U.S. liquidity tends to have a positive 
effect on flows to other regions. These effects are even stronger once we allow for 
differences across crisis and normal periods. Interestingly, the impact of U.S. 
liquidity on flows is somewhat more pronounced during local liquidity crises. 
 
2.4.5 VARs for individual countries 
 
 We now turn to the results of our baseline VAR estimated at the individual 
country-level. An advantage of this approach is that we can fully explore the 
heterogeneity in the relation between flows, liquidity, and returns across countries. 
A drawback is that explaining time-series variation in flows, liquidity, and returns 
is challenging, so the loss of power may be an important concern. To save space, 
we do not present the estimation results of the VARs, but we present the 3, 6, and 
12-month cumulative GIRs of flows to liquidity (and vice versa) in Figures 2.7 and 
2.8. (Black bars indicate GIRs that are statistically significant at the 5% level.) The 
other GIRs are available on request. Unreported results show a GIR of flows to 
returns that is positive for 39 out of 46 countries, and significant for 13 of these 
countries (for at least one of the horizons). The GIR of returns to flows is positive 
for 39 countries, and significantly so for 16 countries.  
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 Figure 2.7 shows the cumulative GIRs of flows after 3, 6, and 12 months to a 
1SD shock in liquidity. We find a positive response for 30 countries, of which 11 
show an effect that is significant at the 5% level (for at least one of the horizons). 
None of the GIRs is significantly negative. For most of these countries, the effect is 
also economically significant. The effect is especially large for Canada, Denmark, 
Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K, each of which show a 
response of inflows to local liquidity that is greater than 0.50SD. We carry out 
Granger causality tests (not tabulated) and find that local market liquidity Granger 
causes capital inflows (at the 10% level) in nine countries. Interestingly, flows to 
the US respond negatively to local market liquidity, an effect that could reflect the 
role of the U.S. as a safe haven during global financial crises. The effect is quite 
large, but not statistically significant.  
 Figure 2.8 shows the cumulative GIRs of liquidity to a 1SD shock in flows. 
The response is positive for 30 countries, and significantly so for 12 countries. 
There is some heterogeneity across countries, but none of the GIRs is significantly 
negative. Most markets experience a substantial improvement in liquidity following 
capital inflows. We observe responses greater than 0.20SD for many countries and 
greater than 0.50SD in several cases. Unreported Granger causality tests show that 
capital inflows Granger cause local market liquidity in eight countries.  
 Lack of power may prevent us from making statistically reliable statements for 
some of the individual countries. But, overall, the results confirm our findings at 
higher levels of aggregations that more liquid equity markets tend to be associated 
with greater capital inflows and that capital inflows tend to help rather than hurt 
local market liquidity. 
 
 
2.4.6  Why does the impact of flows on liquidity differ across 
countries? 
 
 Our results thus far suggest that capital flows tend to positively affect local 
market liquidity in most regions and countries. In this subsection, we try to identify 
the cross-country determinants of the impact of flows on liquidity by regressing the 
six-month cumulative GIR of liquidity to a 1SD shock in flows on several country 
characteristics. This analysis is not only interesting from a policy perspective, but 
can also shed light on the relative importance of the different channels through 
which foreign investors can affect local market liquidity (discussed in the 
introduction).  
 International Capital Flows and Liquidity 33 
   
 We use proxies that account for a country’s economic and financial 
development, regulatory environment, information environment, openness, and 
market risk. We measure financial/economic development using the logarithm of 
stock market capitalization to GDP (MKTCAP_GDP), GDP per capita 
(GDP_CAPITA), and a dummy variable for emerging markets (EMERGING). The 
ratio of domestic credit provided by commercial banks over GDP 
(BANK_CREDIT_GDP) is a proxy for the development of the banking sector, 
which illustrates the importance of financial intermediation as a driver of domestic 
growth (Levine, and Zervos, 1998). TURNOVER proxies for the intensity of trading 
on each market. We expect the impact of flows on liquidity to be smaller in 
countries with more developed economies and a more sophisticated financial sector, 
as the capacity of domestic intermediaries and investors to absorb foreign order 
imbalances (the second channel through which foreign investors can affect liquidity, 
as discussed in the introduction) is larger in these countries.  
 We use anti-director rights (AD_RIGHTS), rule of law (RULE_OF_LAW), 
corruption in government (CORRUPTION), and a dummy variable that indicates 
whether shorting is common practice (SHORT_SALES) as proxies for a country’s 
regulatory environment. We expect that a stronger regulatory environment 
increases a country’s resilience to capital inflows. Also, Morck, Yeung, and Yu 
(2000) argue that better investor protection is associated with more informed stock 
prices, so foreign investors are arguably less likely to have superior information in 
countries with better investor protection (the first channel through which foreign 
investors can affect liquidity, as discussed in the introduction).  
Accounting standards (ACCOUNT_STAND), the average number of analysts 
following large firms (ANALYST), and the extent of media penetration in a country 
(MEDIA_DEVELOP) are our measures of a country’s information environment. 
These variables are most closely related to the first channel through which foreign 
investors can affect local liquidity, which is through their impact on information 
asymmetries in the local market. We expect that the greater the transparency of the 
information environment, the less likely it is that foreign investors possess superior 
information and therefore the less adverse their impact on liquidity. 
In addition, it seems reasonable to assume that foreign investors have better access 
to information in more open economies. To control for market openness, we use 
indices for international capital controls (CAP_CONTROLS), as well as for the 
freedom to trade internationally (TRADE_FREEDOM). We also include a measure 
of the presence of foreign banks in the local market (FOREIGN_BANKS). 
Following Kaniel, Li, and Starks (2009), we use the average monthly volatility 
(VOL) of market returns within each country as a measure of risk in equity markets. 
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We expect the impact of the trading behavior of foreign investors to be greater in 
more volatile equity markets. 
 Table 2.6 reports the result of the regressions of the GIR of liquidity to a 
shock in flows on various combinations of these country characteristics. We limit 
the number of explanatory variables in each regression, because many of the 
characteristics are related to each other and because the number of degrees of 
freedom is limited.  
 The most prominent result in Table 2.6 is the effect of accounting standards 
(ACCOUNT_STAND). The coefficient on this variable is positive and significant at 
the 1% level in all specifications. This result suggests that the impact of foreign 
investors on local market liquidity is more positive in countries with greater 
transparency, consistent with the argument that foreign investors are more likely to 
act as liquidity or noise traders that improve market liquidity in these countries – as 
opposed to informed traders that worsen adverse selection problems (first channel). 
The economic magnitude of the effect of accounting standards is large. A 1SD 
improvement in accounting standards is associated with an increase of 
approximately 0.65SD in the response of liquidity to flows. 
 In four of the nine specifications, we find evidence that the impact of flows on 
liquidity is smaller in countries with more developed financial markets (as proxied 
by MKTCAP_GDP). Again, the economic effect is substantial. A 1SD increase in 
MKTCAP_GDP is associated with a reduction of the impact of flows on liquidity of 
around 0.40SD. This finding is in line with our hypothesis that the trading behavior 
of foreign investors (second channel) has a smaller impact in more developed 
markets. We find no significant effects for the variables related to a country’s 
regulatory environment, openness, and market risk 
 
 
2.5 Conclusions  
 
 This paper investigates the interaction of international capital flows with local 
and U.S. market liquidity for 46 countries from January 1995 to December 2008. 
We estimate unrestricted vector autoregressions (VARs) – with flows, liquidity, 
and returns as endogenous variables – at four different levels of aggregation: all 
countries, developed vs. emerging countries, six different regions, and country-by 
country.  
 We present evidence of significant interactions between capital flows and 
liquidity, although there are important differences across regions and countries. For 
two of the three developed regions (Europe and Asia/Pacific), capital inflows 
 International Capital Flows and Liquidity 35 
   
respond positively to local market liquidity. For three regions (developed and 
emerging Europe and emerging Asia), there is a positive response of inflows to U.S. 
market liquidity. Foreign investors thus seem to have a preference for favorable 
liquidity conditions on the host market, but they are inclined to seek return in other 
markets when the home market is flush with liquidity.  
For four out of the six regions (developed America, Europe, and Asia/Pacific, and 
emerging Asia), capital inflows positively predict local market liquidity. 
Establishing causality in the interaction between flows and liquidity is hard, but it 
seems implausible that foreign investors systematically time their purchases of 
local securities before an improvement in local market liquidity. Hence, our 
interpretation of these results is that foreign investors tend to provide rather than 
consume liquidity on local markets.  
The interaction between flows and liquidity is stronger for small cap stocks 
than for large cap stocks. When we examine liquidity crises separately, we find 
little support for the view that foreign investors destabilize local financial markets 
through an adverse impact on liquidity. We do not observe systematic and large 
capital outflows during liquidity crises, and there is also no significant short-term 
impact of capital flows on local market liquidity during these periods. 
The response of local liquidity to capital inflows is more positive in countries with 
greater transparency and less developed financial markets. In more transparent 
countries, foreign investors are more likely to act as noise traders than as traders 
with superior information. In less developed financial markets, the impact of the 
trading behavior of foreign investors is greater.  
Our results should help investors to develop trading strategies that take into 
account the interaction of capital flows with market liquidity and regulators to 
assess and affect the impact of foreign investors on local markets. 
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Ta
ble
 2.
2: 
VA
R 
re
su
lts
 fo
r a
ll c
ou
nt
rie
s a
nd
 fo
r d
ev
elo
pe
d a
nd
 em
er
gin
g c
ou
nt
rie
s s
ep
ar
ate
ly 
Th
is 
tab
le 
pre
sen
ts 
the
 re
su
lts
 of
 ve
cto
r a
uto
reg
res
siv
e (
VA
R)
 m
od
els
 of
 or
de
r 1
 w
ith
 m
on
thl
y n
et 
ca
pit
al 
inf
low
s, 
ma
rke
t li
qu
idi
ty,
 an
d m
ark
et 
ret
urn
s a
s e
nd
og
en
ou
s 
va
ria
ble
s. 
Pa
ne
l A
 pr
ese
nts
 th
e r
esu
lts
 of
 V
AR
s e
sti
ma
ted
 fo
r a
ll 4
6 c
ou
ntr
ies
 in
 ou
r s
am
ple
 jo
int
ly,
 an
d P
an
el 
B 
an
d C
 pr
ese
nt 
the
 re
su
lts
 of
 V
AR
s e
sti
ma
ted
 fo
r 2
2 
de
ve
lop
ed
 co
un
tri
es 
an
d 2
4 e
me
rgi
ng
 co
un
tri
es 
sep
ara
tel
y, 
us
ing
 th
e c
las
sif
ica
tio
n o
f t
he
 In
ter
na
tio
na
l F
ina
nc
e C
orp
ora
tio
n (
IF
C)
 of
 th
e W
orl
d B
an
k G
rou
p. 
Ea
ch
 
pa
ne
l r
ep
ort
s t
he
 re
su
lts
 of
 fo
ur 
dif
fer
en
t V
AR
 sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
, b
ase
d o
n t
he
 ti
me
-se
rie
s o
f v
alu
e-w
eig
hte
d o
r e
qu
all
y-w
eig
hte
d a
ve
rag
e r
etu
rns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty 
ac
ros
s 
ind
ivi
du
al 
sto
ck
s b
y c
ou
ntr
y a
nd
 ba
sed
 on
 lo
ca
l c
urr
en
cy
 re
tur
ns
 (R
etu
rn)
 or
 U
.S.
 do
lla
r r
etu
rns
 ($
Re
tur
n) 
fro
m 
Jan
ua
ry 
19
95
 to
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
00
8. 
W
e s
tan
da
rdi
ze
 al
l 
va
ria
ble
s t
o h
av
e z
ero
 m
ea
n a
nd
 un
it 
sta
nd
ard
 de
via
tio
n a
t t
he
 co
un
try
-le
ve
l, t
hu
s a
cc
ou
nti
ng
 fo
r c
ou
ntr
y f
ixe
d e
ffe
cts
. B
efo
re 
the
 st
an
da
rdi
za
tio
n, 
we
 st
oc
ha
sti
ca
lly
 
de
tre
nd
 li
qu
idi
ty 
at 
the
 co
un
try
-le
ve
l b
y 
su
btr
ac
tin
g 
a s
ix-
mo
nth
 m
ov
ing
 av
era
ge
. F
oll
ow
ing
 F
roo
t e
t a
l. 
(20
01
), 
we
 co
ns
tra
in 
co
eff
ici
en
ts 
to 
be
 th
e s
am
e f
or 
all
 
co
un
tri
es 
wi
thi
n 
the
 g
rou
ps
 o
f d
ev
elo
pe
d 
an
d 
em
erg
ing
 c
ou
ntr
ies
 in
 P
an
els
 B
 an
d 
C.
 In
 li
ne
 w
ith
 G
rif
fin
 e
t a
l. 
(20
04
), 
we
 re
str
ict
 th
e v
ari
an
ce
-co
va
ria
nc
e 
an
d 
co
eff
ici
en
t m
atr
ice
s t
o b
e b
loc
k d
iag
on
al.
 W
e u
se 
ite
rat
ive
 m
ax
im
um
 lik
eli
ho
od
 to
 es
tim
ate
 th
e V
AR
s. 
Sig
nif
ica
nc
e a
t th
e 1
%,
 5%
, a
nd
 10
% 
lev
el 
is 
ind
ica
ted
 by
 a,
 b,
 
an
d c
, re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
. 
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3: 
VA
R 
re
su
lts
 fo
r s
ix 
dif
fer
en
t r
eg
ion
s s
ep
ar
ate
ly 
Th
is 
tab
le 
pre
sen
ts 
the
 re
su
lts
 of
 V
AR
(1)
 m
od
els
 (w
ith
 m
on
thl
y n
et 
ca
pit
al 
inf
low
s, 
ma
rke
t l
iqu
idi
ty,
 an
d m
ark
et 
ret
urn
s a
s e
nd
og
en
ou
s v
ari
ab
les
) e
sti
ma
ted
 by
 si
x 
dif
fer
en
t r
eg
ion
s: 
de
ve
lop
ed
 E
uro
pe
 (P
an
el 
A)
, e
me
rgi
ng
 E
uro
pe
 (P
an
el 
B)
, d
ev
elo
pe
d A
sia
/Pa
cif
ic 
(P
an
el 
C)
, e
me
rgi
ng
 A
sia
 (P
an
el 
D)
, d
ev
elo
pe
d A
me
ric
a (
Pa
ne
l E
), 
an
d 
em
erg
ing
 A
me
ric
a (
Pa
ne
l F
). 
Th
e t
im
e-s
eri
es 
of 
liq
uid
ity
 an
d 
(lo
ca
l c
urr
en
cy
) r
etu
rns
 ar
e t
he
 v
alu
e-w
eig
hte
d 
av
era
ge
 re
tur
ns
 an
d 
liq
uid
ity
 ac
ros
s i
nd
ivi
du
al 
sto
ck
s b
y c
ou
ntr
y. 
Th
e f
irs
t l
ine
 of
 ea
ch
 pa
ne
l c
on
tai
ns
 th
e b
ase
lin
e V
AR
 re
su
lts
 w
ith
 th
e t
hre
e e
nd
og
en
ou
s v
ari
ab
les
 on
ly.
 S
ub
seq
ue
nt 
lin
es 
co
nta
in 
the
 re
su
lts
 of
 
VA
Rs
 th
at 
inc
lud
e t
he
 fo
llo
wi
ng
 ex
og
en
ou
s f
ac
tor
s: 
reg
ion
al 
flo
ws
 (F
LO
W
_R
EG
), 
loc
al 
ma
rke
t v
ola
tili
ty 
(V
OL
), 
the
 lo
ca
l m
ark
et 
div
ide
nd
 yi
eld
 (D
Y)
, t
he
 w
orl
d 
int
ere
st 
rat
e (
W
IR
), 
U.
S. 
ma
rke
t r
etu
rns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty 
(R
_U
S 
an
d L
IQ
_U
S)
, a
nd
 lo
ca
l m
ark
et 
tur
no
ve
r (
TU
RN
) W
e s
tan
da
rdi
ze
 al
l v
ari
ab
les
 to
 ha
ve
 ze
ro 
me
an
 an
d 
un
it s
tan
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n a
t th
e c
ou
ntr
y-l
ev
el,
 th
us
 ac
co
un
tin
g f
or 
co
un
try
 fi
xe
d e
ffe
cts
. B
efo
re 
the
 st
an
da
rdi
za
tio
n, 
we
 st
oc
ha
sti
ca
lly
 de
tre
nd
 liq
uid
ity
, V
OL
, D
Y,
 an
d 
TU
RN
 at
 th
e c
ou
ntr
y-l
ev
el,
 as
 w
ell
 as
 W
IR
, b
y s
ub
tra
cti
ng
 a 
six
-m
on
th 
mo
vin
g a
ve
rag
e. 
W
e c
on
str
ain
 th
e c
oe
ffi
cie
nts
 to
 be
 th
e s
am
e f
or 
all
 co
un
tri
es 
wi
thi
n e
ac
h 
reg
ion
 a
nd
 w
e 
res
tri
ct 
the
 v
ari
an
ce
-co
va
ria
nc
e 
an
d 
co
eff
ici
en
t m
atr
ice
s t
o 
be
 b
loc
k 
dia
go
na
l. 
W
e 
us
e 
ite
rat
ive
 m
ax
im
um
 li
ke
lih
oo
d 
to 
est
im
ate
 th
e 
VA
Rs
. W
e 
su
pp
res
s 
int
erc
ep
ts 
to 
co
ns
erv
e 
sp
ac
e. 
Sig
nif
ica
nc
e 
at 
the
 
1%
, 
5%
, 
an
d 
10
% 
lev
el 
is 
ind
ica
ted
 
by
 
a, 
b, 
an
d 
c, 
res
pe
cti
ve
ly.
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VA
R 
re
su
lts
 fo
r s
ma
ll c
ap
 an
d l
ar
ge
 ca
p s
toc
ks
 se
pa
ra
tel
y  
Th
is 
tab
le 
pre
sen
ts 
the
 re
su
lts
 of
 V
AR
(1)
 m
od
els
 (w
ith
 m
on
thl
y n
et 
ca
pit
al 
inf
low
s, 
ma
rke
t li
qu
idi
ty,
 an
d m
ark
et 
ret
urn
s a
s e
nd
og
en
ou
s v
ari
ab
les
) e
sti
ma
ted
 fo
r s
ma
ll 
ca
p 
an
d 
lar
ge
 ca
p s
toc
ks
 se
pa
rat
ely
. W
e a
lso
 re
po
rt 
the
 si
x-m
on
th 
cu
mu
lat
ive
 ge
ne
ral
ize
d i
mp
uls
e r
esp
on
se 
(G
IR
) o
f f
low
s (
liq
uid
ity
) t
o 
a o
ne
 st
an
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n 
(1S
D)
 sh
oc
k i
n l
iqu
idi
ty 
(fl
ow
s),
 ex
pre
sse
d a
s a
 fr
ac
tio
n o
f 1
SD
 of
 fl
ow
s (
liq
uid
ity
). 
W
e e
sti
ma
te 
the
 V
AR
s b
y s
ix 
dif
fer
en
t r
eg
ion
s f
rom
 Ja
nu
ary
 19
95
 to
 D
ec
em
be
r 
20
08
. W
e d
efi
ne
 sm
all
 ca
p (
lar
ge
 ca
p) 
sto
ck
s a
s t
ho
se 
wi
th 
a m
ark
et 
va
lue
 in
 th
e b
ott
om
 (t
op
) 3
5%
 of
 th
e c
ros
s-s
ec
tio
na
l d
ist
rib
uti
on
 of
 al
l s
toc
ks
 in
 a 
giv
en
 co
un
try
, 
at 
the
 b
eg
inn
ing
 o
f e
ac
h 
mo
nth
. W
e c
on
str
uc
t s
ep
ara
te 
liq
uid
ity
 an
d (
loc
al 
cu
rre
nc
y) 
ret
urn
s t
im
e-s
eri
es 
for
 sm
all
 ca
p a
nd
 la
rge
 ca
p 
sto
ck
s a
s t
he
 va
lue
-w
eig
hte
d 
av
era
ge
 re
tur
ns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty 
ac
ros
s i
nd
ivi
du
al 
sto
ck
s i
n e
ac
h c
ate
go
ry 
by
 co
un
try
. W
e s
tan
da
rdi
ze
 al
l v
ari
ab
les
 to
 ha
ve
 ze
ro
 m
ea
n a
nd
 un
it s
tan
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n a
t th
e 
co
un
try
-le
ve
l, 
thu
s a
cc
ou
nti
ng
 fo
r c
ou
ntr
y 
fix
ed
 e
ffe
cts
. B
efo
re 
the
 st
an
da
rdi
za
tio
n, 
we
 st
oc
ha
sti
ca
lly
 d
etr
en
d 
the
 li
qu
idi
ty 
tim
e-s
eri
es 
at 
the
 c
ou
ntr
y-l
ev
el 
by
 
su
btr
ac
tin
g a
 si
x-m
on
th 
mo
vin
g a
ve
rag
e. 
W
e c
on
str
ain
 th
e c
oe
ffi
cie
nts
 to
 be
 th
e s
am
e f
or 
all
 co
un
tri
es 
wi
thi
n e
ac
h r
eg
ion
 an
d w
e r
est
ric
t th
e v
ari
an
ce
-co
va
ria
nc
e a
nd
 
co
eff
ici
en
t m
atr
ice
s t
o b
e b
loc
k d
iag
on
al.
 W
e u
se 
ite
rat
ive
 m
ax
im
um
 lik
eli
ho
od
 to
 es
tim
ate
 th
e V
AR
s. 
W
e s
up
pre
ss 
int
erc
ep
ts 
to 
co
ns
erv
e s
pa
ce
. S
ign
ifi
ca
nc
e a
t th
e 
1%
, 5
%,
 an
d 1
0%
 le
ve
l is
 in
dic
ate
d b
y a
, b
, a
nd
 c,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
.  
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In
te
ra
ct
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
flo
w
s a
nd
 li
qu
id
ity
 fo
r 
liq
ui
di
ty
 c
ri
sis
 p
er
io
ds
 a
nd
 “
no
rm
al
” 
pe
ri
od
s s
ep
ar
at
el
y 
Th
is 
tab
le 
pre
sen
ts 
the
 re
su
lts
 of
 pa
ne
l m
od
els
 to
 ex
pla
in
 m
on
th
ly
 n
et
 c
ap
ita
l i
nf
lo
w
s 
an
d 
m
ar
ke
t l
iq
ui
di
ty
 in
 li
qu
id
ity
 c
ris
is
 p
er
io
ds
 a
nd
 “
no
rm
al
” 
pe
rio
ds
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y.
 
W
e e
sti
ma
te 
the
 p
an
el 
mo
de
ls 
by
 si
x 
dif
fer
en
t r
eg
ion
s f
rom
 Ja
nu
ary
 1
99
5 
to 
De
ce
mb
er 
20
08
. I
n 
bo
th 
mo
de
ls,
 w
e u
se 
on
e-m
on
th 
lag
ge
d 
flo
ws
, l
iqu
idi
ty,
 m
ark
et 
ret
urn
s, 
U.
S. 
ma
rke
t r
etu
rns
 (R
_U
S)
, a
nd
 U
.S.
 m
ark
et 
liq
uid
ity
 (L
IQ
_U
S)
 as
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ari
ab
les
. W
e i
nte
rac
t e
ac
h o
f t
he
se 
va
ria
ble
s w
ith
 du
mm
y v
ari
ab
les
 fo
r 
liq
uid
ity
 cr
isi
s p
eri
od
s a
nd
 no
rm
al 
pe
rio
ds
. W
e d
efi
ne
 liq
uid
ity
 cr
ise
s a
s t
he
 bo
tto
m 
30
% 
of 
the
 ti
me
-se
rie
s d
ist
rib
uti
on
 of
 m
ark
et 
liq
uid
ity
 w
ith
in 
ea
ch
 co
un
try
. T
he
 
tim
e-s
eri
es 
of 
liq
uid
ity
 an
d 
(lo
ca
l c
urr
en
cy
) r
etu
rns
 ar
e t
he
 v
alu
e-w
eig
hte
d 
av
era
ge
 re
tur
ns
 an
d 
liq
uid
ity
 ac
ros
s i
nd
ivi
du
al 
sto
ck
s b
y 
co
un
try
. W
e s
tan
da
rdi
ze
 al
l 
va
ria
ble
s t
o h
av
e z
ero
 m
ea
n a
nd
 un
it 
sta
nd
ard
 de
via
tio
n a
t t
he
 co
un
try
-le
ve
l, t
hu
s a
cc
ou
nti
ng
 fo
r c
ou
ntr
y f
ixe
d e
ffe
cts
. B
efo
re 
the
 st
an
da
rdi
za
tio
n, 
we
 st
oc
ha
sti
ca
lly
 
de
tre
nd
 th
e l
iqu
idi
ty 
tim
e-s
eri
es 
at 
the
 co
un
try
-le
ve
l b
y s
ub
tra
cti
ng
 a 
six
-m
on
th 
mo
vin
g a
ve
rag
e. 
W
e c
on
str
ain
 th
e c
oe
ffi
cie
nts
 to
 be
 th
e s
am
e f
or 
all
 co
un
tri
es 
wi
thi
n 
ea
ch
 re
gio
n a
nd
 w
e r
est
ric
t th
e v
ari
an
ce
-co
va
ria
nc
e a
nd
 co
eff
ici
en
t m
atr
ice
s t
o b
e d
iag
on
al.
 W
e s
up
pre
ss 
int
erc
ep
ts 
to 
co
ns
erv
e s
pa
ce
. S
ign
ifi
ca
nc
e a
t th
e 1
%,
 5%
, a
nd
 
10
% 
lev
el 
is 
ind
ica
ted
 by
 a,
 b,
 an
d c
, re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
. 
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Fl
ow
s e
qu
ati
on
Li
qu
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eq
ua
tio
n
Re
tur
ns
× 
Cr
isi
s
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× 
No
rm
al
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US
× 
Cr
isi
s
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US
× 
No
rm
al
LI
Q_
US
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Cr
isi
s
R2
Flo
ws
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No
rm
al
Flo
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Cr
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idi
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rm
al
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Cr
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s
Re
tur
ns
× 
No
rm
al
  
 
 
Ta
ble
 2.
6: 
Re
gr
ess
ion
s t
o e
xp
lai
n d
iff
er
en
ce
s a
cr
os
s c
ou
nt
rie
s i
n t
he
 re
sp
on
se 
of 
liq
uid
ity
 to
 a 
sh
oc
k i
n c
ap
ita
l f
low
s 
Th
is 
tab
le 
pre
sen
ts 
the
 re
su
lts
 of
 ni
ne
 m
ult
iva
ria
te 
cro
ss-
sec
tio
na
l r
eg
res
sio
ns
 of
 th
e s
ix-
mo
nth
 cu
mu
lat
ive
 ge
ne
ral
ize
d i
mp
uls
e r
esp
on
se 
(G
IR
) o
f m
ark
et 
liq
uid
ity
 to
 a 
1S
D 
ch
oc
k i
n c
ap
ita
l in
flo
ws
 fo
r e
ac
h o
f t
he
 46
 co
un
tri
es 
in 
ou
r s
am
ple
 on
 se
ve
ral
 co
un
try
 ch
ara
cte
ris
tic
s m
ea
su
rin
g a
 co
un
try
’s
 e
co
no
m
ic
 a
nd
 fi
na
nc
ia
l d
ev
el
op
m
en
t, 
reg
ula
tor
y 
en
vir
on
me
nt,
 in
for
ma
tio
n 
en
vir
on
me
nt,
 o
pe
nn
ess
, a
nd
 m
ark
et 
ris
k. 
EM
ER
GI
NG
 is
 a 
du
mm
y 
va
ria
ble
 fo
r e
me
rgi
ng
 m
ark
ets
 as
 cl
ass
ifi
ed
 b
y 
the
 IF
C.
 
GD
P_
CA
PI
TA
 a
nd
 M
KT
CA
P_
GD
P 
(W
orl
d 
De
ve
lop
me
nt 
Ind
ica
tor
s) 
are
 th
e 
log
ari
thm
 o
f t
he
 a
ve
rag
e 
rat
io 
of 
sto
ck
 m
ark
et 
ca
pit
ali
za
tio
n 
ov
er 
GD
P 
an
d 
the
 
log
ari
thm
 o
f G
DP
 p
er 
ca
pit
a. 
BA
NK
_C
RE
DI
T_
GD
P 
(W
orl
d 
Ba
nk
) i
s t
he
 lo
ga
rit
hm
 o
f t
he
 ra
tio
 o
f d
om
est
ic 
cre
dit
 p
rov
ide
d 
by
 c
om
me
rci
al 
ba
nk
s o
ve
r G
DP
. 
TU
RN
OV
ER
 (W
orl
d B
an
k) 
is 
the
 to
tal
 va
lue
 of
 sh
are
s t
rad
ed
 ea
ch
 ye
ar 
div
ide
d b
y t
he
 av
era
ge
 m
ark
et 
ca
pit
ali
za
tio
n d
uri
ng
 th
e y
ea
r. 
AD
_R
IG
HT
S (
Dj
an
ko
v e
t a
l., 
20
08
) i
s t
he
 an
ti-
dir
ec
tor
 ri
gh
ts 
ind
ex
, w
hic
h 
is 
an
 ag
gre
ga
te 
ind
ex
 o
f s
ha
reh
old
ers
 ri
gh
ts.
 R
UL
E_
OF
_L
AW
 (L
a P
ort
a e
t a
l., 
19
98
) m
ea
su
res
 th
e l
aw
 an
d 
ord
er 
tra
dit
ion
 in
 th
e c
ou
ntr
y. 
CO
RR
UP
TI
ON
 (L
a P
ort
a e
t a
l., 
19
98
) m
ea
su
res
 th
e c
orr
up
tio
n i
n g
ov
ern
me
nt.
 Sh
ort
 sa
les
 (B
ris
 et
 al
., 2
00
7) 
is 
a d
um
my
 va
ria
ble
 th
at 
eq
ua
ls 
1 i
f s
ho
rt-
sel
lin
g i
s c
om
mo
n p
rac
tic
e. 
AC
CO
UN
T_
ST
AN
D 
(L
a P
ort
a e
t a
l., 
19
98
) m
ea
su
res
 in
for
ma
tio
n d
iss
em
ina
tio
n i
n a
cc
ou
nti
ng
 pr
ac
tic
es.
 A
NA
LY
ST
 (C
ha
ng
 et
 
al.
, 2
00
0) 
me
asu
res
 th
e a
ve
rag
e n
um
be
r o
f a
na
lys
ts 
fol
low
ing
 la
rge
 fi
rm
s. 
M
ED
IA
_D
EV
EL
OP
 (B
us
hm
an
 et
 al
., 2
00
4) 
me
asu
res
 m
ed
ia 
de
ve
lop
me
nt 
in 
ea
ch
 co
un
try
. 
CA
P_
CO
NT
RO
LS
 an
d 
TR
AD
E_
FR
EE
DO
M
 (2
00
9 E
co
no
mi
c F
ree
do
m 
of 
the
 W
orl
d 
an
nu
al 
rep
ort
) m
ea
su
re 
int
ern
ati
on
al 
ca
pit
al 
ma
rke
t c
on
tro
ls 
an
d f
ree
do
m 
to 
tra
de
 in
ter
na
tio
na
lly
. F
OR
EI
GN
_B
AN
KS
 (L
ev
ine
, 2
00
1) 
is 
the
 fr
ac
tio
n o
f f
ore
ign
-ow
ne
d b
an
kin
g a
sse
ts 
of 
tot
al 
ba
nk
ing
 as
set
s i
n a
 co
un
try
. V
OL
 is
 th
e a
ve
rag
e 
ma
rke
t-w
ide
 E
GA
RC
H(
1,1
) v
ola
tili
ty 
for
 ea
ch
 co
un
try
. I
nte
rce
pts
 ar
e s
up
pre
sse
d t
o c
on
ser
ve
 sp
ac
e. 
Sig
nif
ica
nc
e a
t t
he
 1%
, 5
%,
 an
d 1
0%
 le
ve
l i
s i
nd
ica
ted
 by
 a,
 b,
 
an
d c
, re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
 – 
ba
sed
 on
 he
ter
os
ke
da
sti
cit
y c
on
sis
ten
t (
W
hit
e) 
sta
nd
ard
 er
ror
s. 
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Fi
gu
re
 2.
1: 
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 ne
t p
or
tfo
lio
 fl
ow
s b
y r
eg
ion
, 1
99
5:0
1 –
 20
08
:12
 
Th
is 
fig
ure
 sh
ow
s t
he
 cu
mu
lat
ive
 ag
gre
ga
te 
ne
t e
qu
ity
 po
rtf
oli
o i
nfl
ow
s f
or 
six
 re
gio
ns
 fr
om
 Ja
nu
ary
 19
95
 to
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
00
8. 
W
e s
ca
le 
co
un
try
-sp
ec
ifi
c p
ort
fol
io 
inf
low
s b
y 
the
 m
ark
et 
ca
pit
ali
za
tio
n o
f t
he
 lo
ca
l s
toc
k m
ark
et 
at 
the
 be
gin
nin
g o
f e
ac
h m
on
th.
 A
gg
reg
ate
 ne
t f
low
s b
y r
eg
ion
 ar
e c
om
pu
ted
 as
 th
e e
qu
all
y-
we
igh
ted
 av
era
ge
 of
 ne
t f
low
s 
ac
ros
s t
he
 co
un
tri
es 
in 
ea
ch
 re
gio
n. 
W
e n
ote
 th
at 
em
erg
ing
 A
sia
 is
 pl
ott
ed
 us
ing
 th
e s
ec
on
da
ry 
y-
ax
is 
on
 th
e r
igh
t. 
 
  
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 2.
2: 
Ag
gr
eg
ate
 m
ar
ke
t r
etu
rn
s b
y r
eg
ion
, 1
99
5:0
1 –
 20
08
:12
 
Th
is 
fig
ure
 sh
ow
s t
he
 ti
me
-se
rie
s o
f a
gg
reg
ate
 m
ark
et 
ret
urn
s f
or 
six
 re
gio
ns
 fr
om
 Ja
nu
ary
 19
95
 to
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
00
8. 
W
e c
om
pu
te 
co
un
try
-sp
ec
ifi
c m
ark
et 
ret
urn
s a
s 
the
 va
lue
-w
eig
hte
d a
ve
rag
e o
f m
on
thl
y r
etu
rns
 (i
n l
oc
al 
cu
rre
nc
y) 
ac
ros
s i
nd
ivi
du
al 
sto
ck
s w
ith
in 
a c
ou
ntr
y. 
Ag
gre
ga
te 
ma
rke
t r
etu
rns
 by
 re
gio
n a
re 
co
mp
ute
d a
s t
he
 
eq
ua
lly
-w
eig
hte
d a
ve
rag
e o
f c
ou
ntr
y-s
pe
cif
ic 
ma
rke
t r
etu
rns
 ac
ros
s t
he
 co
un
tri
es 
in 
ea
ch
 re
gio
n. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 2.
3: 
Ag
gr
eg
ate
 m
ar
ke
t l
iqu
idi
ty 
by
 re
gio
n, 
19
95
:01
 – 
20
08
:12
 
Th
is 
fig
ure
 sh
ow
s t
he
 tim
e-s
eri
es 
of 
ag
gre
ga
te 
ma
rke
t li
qu
idi
ty 
for
 si
x r
eg
ion
s f
rom
 Ja
nu
ary
 19
95
 to
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
00
8. 
W
e c
om
pu
te 
co
un
try
-sp
ec
ifi
c m
ark
et 
liq
uid
ity
 
as 
the
 va
lue
-w
eig
hte
d a
ve
rag
e o
f m
on
thl
y s
toc
k l
iqu
idi
ty 
ac
ros
s i
nd
ivi
du
al 
sto
ck
s w
ith
in 
a c
ou
ntr
y. 
Sin
ce
 th
e l
ev
el 
of 
liq
uid
ity
 is
 no
t c
om
pa
rab
le 
ac
ros
s c
ou
ntr
ies
 du
e 
to 
dif
fer
en
ce
s i
n t
rad
ing
 vo
lum
e d
efi
nit
ion
s a
nd
 cu
rre
nc
y u
nit
s, 
we
 st
an
da
rdi
ze
 th
e s
eri
es 
to 
ha
ve
 ze
ro 
me
an
 an
d u
nit
 st
an
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n b
efo
re 
we
 ag
gre
ga
te 
wi
thi
n 
ea
ch
 re
gio
n. 
Ag
gre
ga
te 
ma
rke
t l
iqu
idi
ty 
by
 re
gio
n 
is 
co
mp
ute
d 
as 
the
 eq
ua
lly
-w
eig
hte
d 
av
era
ge
 o
f c
ou
ntr
y-s
pe
cif
ic 
ma
rke
t l
iqu
idi
ty 
ac
ros
s t
he
 co
un
tri
es 
in 
ea
ch
 
reg
ion
. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 2.
4: 
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 G
IR
s o
f t
he
 ba
sel
ine
 V
AR
 m
od
el 
for
 de
ve
lop
ed
/em
er
gin
g E
ur
op
e 
Th
is 
fig
ure
 sh
ow
s t
he
 st
an
da
rdi
ze
d c
um
ula
tiv
e g
en
era
liz
ed
 im
pu
lse
 re
sp
on
se 
fun
cti
on
s (
GI
Rs
) b
ase
d o
n t
he
 re
su
lts
 of
 th
e b
ase
lin
e V
AR
 m
od
els
 (w
ith
 m
on
thl
y n
et 
ca
pit
al 
inf
low
s, 
ma
rke
t l
iqu
idi
ty,
 an
d m
ark
et 
ret
urn
s a
s e
nd
og
en
ou
s v
ari
ab
les
) f
or 
de
ve
lop
ed
 an
d e
me
rgi
ng
 E
uro
pe
 re
po
rte
d i
n T
ab
le 
3. 
To
 co
ns
erv
e s
pa
ce
, w
e o
nly
 
pre
sen
t G
IR
s o
f f
low
s t
o a
 on
e s
tan
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n (
1S
D)
 sh
oc
k i
n r
etu
rns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty 
(ex
pre
sse
d a
s a
 fr
ac
tio
n o
f 1
SD
 of
 fl
ow
s),
 an
d G
IR
s o
f r
etu
rns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty 
to 
a 
1S
D 
sh
oc
k i
n f
low
s (
ex
pre
sse
d a
s a
 fr
ac
tio
n o
f 1
SD
 of
 re
tur
ns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty)
. T
he
 95
% 
co
nfi
de
nc
e i
nte
rva
ls 
are
 co
mp
ute
d u
sin
g M
on
te 
Ca
rlo
 si
mu
lat
ion
.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 2.
5: 
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 G
IR
s o
f t
he
 ba
sel
ine
 V
AR
 m
od
el 
for
 de
ve
lop
ed
/em
er
gin
g A
sia
/P
ac
ifi
c 
Th
is 
fig
ure
 sh
ow
s t
he
 st
an
da
rdi
ze
d 
cu
mu
lat
ive
 g
en
era
liz
ed
 im
pu
lse
 re
sp
on
se 
fun
cti
on
s (
GI
Rs
) b
ase
d o
n 
the
 re
su
lts
 o
f t
he
 b
ase
lin
e V
AR
 m
od
els
 (w
ith
 m
on
thl
y n
et 
ca
pit
al 
inf
low
s, 
ma
rke
t li
qu
idi
ty,
 an
d m
ark
et 
ret
urn
s a
s e
nd
og
en
ou
s v
ari
ab
les
) f
or 
de
ve
lop
ed
 A
sia
/P
ac
ifi
c a
nd
 em
erg
ing
 A
sia
 re
po
rte
d i
n T
ab
le 
3. 
To
 co
ns
erv
e s
pa
ce
, w
e o
nly
 pr
ese
nt 
GI
Rs
 of
 fl
ow
s t
o a
 on
e s
tan
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n (
1S
D)
 sh
oc
k i
n r
etu
rns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty 
(ex
pre
sse
d a
s a
 fr
ac
tio
n o
f 1
SD
 of
 fl
ow
s),
 an
d 
GI
Rs
 of
 re
tur
ns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty 
to 
a 1
SD
 sh
oc
k i
n 
flo
ws
 (e
xp
res
sed
 as
 a 
fra
cti
on
 of
 1S
D 
of 
ret
urn
s a
nd
 liq
uid
ity
). 
Th
e 9
5%
 co
nfi
de
nc
e i
nte
rv
als
 ar
e c
om
pu
ted
 us
ing
 M
on
te 
Ca
rlo
 si
mu
lat
ion
.   
 
  
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 2.
6:
 C
um
ula
tiv
e G
IR
s o
f t
he
 ba
sel
ine
 V
AR
 m
od
el 
for
 de
ve
lop
ed
/em
er
gin
g A
me
ric
a 
Th
is 
fig
ure
 sh
ow
s t
he
 st
an
da
rdi
ze
d 
cu
mu
lat
ive
 g
en
era
liz
ed
 im
pu
lse
 re
sp
on
se 
fun
cti
on
s (
GI
Rs
) b
ase
d o
n 
the
 re
su
lts
 o
f t
he
 b
ase
lin
e V
AR
 m
od
els
 (w
ith
 m
on
thl
y n
et 
ca
pit
al 
inf
low
s, 
ma
rke
t li
qu
idi
ty,
 an
d m
ark
et 
ret
urn
s a
s e
nd
og
en
ou
s v
ari
ab
les
) f
or 
de
ve
lop
ed
 an
d e
me
rgi
ng
 A
me
ric
a r
ep
ort
ed
 in
 T
ab
le 
3. 
To
 co
ns
erv
e s
pa
ce
, w
e o
nly
 pr
ese
nt 
GI
Rs
 of
 
flo
ws
 to
 a 
on
e s
tan
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n (
1S
D)
 sh
oc
k i
n r
etu
rns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty 
(ex
pre
sse
d a
s a
 fr
ac
tio
n o
f 1
SD
 of
 fl
ow
s),
 an
d G
IR
s o
f r
etu
rns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty 
to 
a 1
SD
 sh
oc
k i
n f
low
s 
(ex
pre
sse
d a
s a
 fr
ac
tio
n o
f 1
SD
 of
 re
tur
ns
 an
d l
iqu
idi
ty)
. T
he
 95
% 
co
nfi
de
nc
e i
nte
rva
ls 
are
 co
mp
ute
d u
sin
g M
on
te 
Ca
rlo
 si
mu
lat
ion
.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fi
gu
re
 2.
7: 
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 G
IR
s o
f f
low
s t
o a
 1S
D 
sh
oc
k i
n l
iqu
idi
ty 
for
 46
 in
div
idu
al 
co
un
tri
es
 
Th
is 
fig
ure
 sh
ow
s t
he
 st
an
da
rdi
ze
d c
um
ula
tiv
e g
en
era
liz
ed
 im
pu
lse
 re
sp
on
ses
 (G
IR
s) 
of 
ne
t c
ap
ita
l in
flo
ws
 to
 a 
on
e s
tan
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n (
1S
D)
 sh
oc
k i
n m
ark
et 
liq
uid
ity
 af
ter
 3,
 
6, 
an
d 1
2 m
on
ths
 (e
xp
res
sed
 as
 a 
fra
cti
on
 of
 1S
D 
of 
flo
ws
) f
or 
ea
ch
 of
 th
e 4
6 c
ou
ntr
ies
 in
 ou
r s
am
ple
 fr
om
 Ja
nu
ary
 19
95
 to
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
00
8. 
Th
e G
IR
s a
re 
ba
sed
 on
 th
e r
esu
lts
 
of 
the
 ba
sel
ine
 V
AR
 m
od
el 
(w
ith
 m
on
thl
y n
et 
ca
pit
al 
inf
low
s, 
ma
rke
t li
qu
idi
ty,
 an
d m
ark
et 
ret
urn
s a
s e
nd
og
en
ou
s v
ari
ab
les
) e
sti
ma
ted
 by
 co
un
try
. T
he
 co
un
tri
es 
on
 th
e x
-ax
is 
of 
the
 fi
gu
re 
are
 gr
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Chapter 3                                                
Do Firms Issue More Equity when 
Markets are More Liquid?5  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
If the demand for a firm’s shares is perfectly elastic, an increase in the 
supply of that firm’s shares resulting from an equity issue has no effect on the price 
of shares keeping everything else the same. The existing empirical literature 
presents considerable challenges to the view that the demand for shares is perfectly 
elastic. First, many studies build on the finding in Shleifer (1986) that firms added 
to indices, which increases their demand, experience abnormal returns. Second, 
studies that have access to data that make it possible to directly measure the 
demand for shares find that it is downward-sloping (e.g., Bagwell, 1992). Third, 
there is a vast literature showing that in many countries stock prices fall when an 
equity issue is announced, a result that is consistent with the existence of 
downward-sloping demand curves as well as other explanations (see Eckbo, 
Masulis, and Norli (2007) for a review of the literature). Fourth, more generally the 
theoretical and empirical market liquidity literature suggests that buy or sell orders 
(which tend to involve far fewer shares than equity issues) move share prices (e.g., 
Kyle, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Breen, Hodrick, 
and Korajczyk, 2002). Fifth, a more recent literature shows that market liquidity 
affects the expected costs of underwriters in placing an issue, their fees, and the 
price at which shares are sold (e.g., Gao and Ritter, 2010; Butler, Grullon, and 
Weston, 2005; Ellul and Pagano, 2006).  
                                            
5 Van Dijk thanks the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for financial support through a 
“Vidi” grant. We are grateful for comments from Andrew Carverhill, Thierry Foucault, Jeffrey Pontiff, Ioanid 
Rosu, and seminar participants at Boston College, Boston University, Erasmus University, HEC Paris, and the 
2012 Frontiers of Finance Conference at Warwick Business School. 
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Imperfect liquidity is a common thread to these findings from the empirical 
literature. As a firm’s shares trade in a less liquid market, investors have to be 
given more of a discount to absorb these shares. We would therefore expect that 
equity issuance is more costly for existing shareholders when a firm’s stock is less 
liquid. As issuance becomes more costly, firms are expected to issue less equity, 
everything else equal. In this paper, we investigate the hypothesis that security 
issuance is inversely related to illiquidity. We find very strong evidence across the 
world that firms become less likely to issue equity when the liquidity of equity 
markets worsens.  
The liquidity of a firm’s common stock can worsen because aggregate 
liquidity is becoming poorer or because of idiosyncratic shocks. Idiosyncratic 
liquidity shocks could be caused by shocks to firm attributes related to firm value, 
so that it would be difficult to identify the impact of liquidity as opposed to the 
impact of shocks to factors that affect liquidity but other firm characteristics as well. 
For instance, adverse information about a firm could lower the stock price and 
increase information asymmetry which would then lower liquidity as well. Since 
one would expect an increase in information asymmetry to make it more expensive 
for a firm to issue equity, identification of the liquidity effect when liquidity 
changes because of information asymmetry would be challenging. In this paper, we 
resolve this identification issue by focusing on equity issuance at the country level 
and by examining the relation between aggregate equity issuance and aggregate 
liquidity. Aggregate liquidity could affect a firm’s decision to issue equity because 
there are strong common factors in liquidity (e.g., Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam, 2000) and because aggregate liquidity could proxy for the general 
capacity of the market to absorb new shares. 
We create a sample of equity issues that covers 36 countries from 1995 to 
2008. Like earlier papers that investigate equity issuance globally, such as 
Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) and Kim and Weisbach (2008), we 
obtain the equity issues from SDC and include both initial public offerings and 
seasoned offerings. Our dataset has 1,872 country-quarters. We use two measures 
of equity issuance. The first measure consists of counts normalized by listings. The 
second one uses proceeds normalized by market capitalization. Most of our work 
focuses on the counts measure as the proceeds measure can be affected by a single 
large issue in many countries. We use the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure 
estimated across countries by Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). The level of the 
Amihud measure is not comparable across countries due to differences in trading 
volume definitions and currency units. We thus standardize the Amihud measure, 
so that it can be compared in a meaningful way across countries. However, we 
would expect differences in levels of liquidity across countries to affect equity 
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issuance. Further, as noted by recent studies (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2012; 
Kim and Weisbach, 2008; McLean, Zhang, and Zhao, 2011), countries differ along 
many dimensions that affect equity issuance. We therefore estimate our regressions 
with country fixed effects and year fixed effects. All our regressions use quarterly 
data. When we regress our count equity issuance measure on lead liquidity 
innovations, contemporaneous liquidity innovations and four lags of liquidity 
innovations controlling for market returns, we find that while the effect of lead 
liquidity innovations is not significant, the lead as well as three of the four lagged 
liquidity innovation variables have a positive and significant coefficient.  
The unconditional quarterly count variable is 2.52%. We find that a one 
standard deviation shock to liquidity increases equity issuance contemporaneously 
by 28 basis points, representing an increase of 11%.  The economic impact of a 
liquidity innovation in any of the three prior quarters affects equity issuance at least 
by half of the contemporaneous impact. The cumulative effect of a one standard 
deviation improvement in liquidity on equity issues over the next five quarters is 
101 basis points (or roughly 40% of the unconditional mean of the quarterly count 
variable). Another useful way to assess the importance of the liquidity effect is that 
liquidity innovations explain as much of the variation in equity issuance as stock 
returns. Stock returns are often used as a proxy for market timing. 
After having established that equity issuance is positively related to liquidity 
innovations, we examine whether this relation could be explained by variables 
known to be correlated with aggregate liquidity that might affect equity issuance on 
their own. In particular, studies in the U.S. predicting aggregate seasoned equity 
issuance (e.g., Choe, Masulis, and Nanda, 1993) and the aggregate rate at which 
firms go public (e.g., Lowry, 2003) show that equity issuance is affected by the 
state of capital markets and aggregate economic activity, which are variables 
known to be related to liquidity as well. It is already known from the literature that 
aggregate equity issuance is lower when market volatility is higher (e.g., Schill, 
2004). We therefore control for volatility. While we find a negative coefficient on 
lagged volatility, lagged volatility does not affect the coefficient on liquidity in a 
meaningful way. We do find that recent conditional volatility in liquidity (a 
measure of liquidity risk) is strongly negatively related to equity issuance, and 
reduces the explanatory power of lagged liquidity innovations, which suggests that 
firms not only care about the level of liquidity, but also about the risk that it 
deteriorates. 
Market-to-book is used in studies of market timing (e.g., Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995, 1997; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 
2010). There is also evidence that more liquid firms in the U.S. have a higher 
market-to-book ratio (Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009), so that liquidity could be 
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proxying for market-to-book in our regressions. After controlling for liquidity and 
market returns, we find no significant effect of market-to-book on equity issuance, 
while our conclusion concerning the effect of liquidity is unchanged.  
Recent literature shows that liquidity is a predictor of economic activity (e.g., Næs, 
Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard, 2010). Since at least Miller (1963), it is known that poor 
economic activity is associated with lower equity issuance and, not surprisingly, 
this finding holds in our sample. We find that when we control for proxies for 
future levels of economic activity, the coefficients on the liquidity measures remain 
significant.  
Baker and Stein (2004) argue that liquidity is higher when more irrational 
investors are in the market and that the presence of these investors (in combination 
with short sales constraints) is associated with overvaluation. Their prediction is 
that firms issue more as liquidity improves. When we control for various measures 
of sentiment, we find that these measures are not related to equity issuance in our 
sample and the effects of the liquidity variables are unchanged when we include 
these measures. Also, we examine whether the effect of liquidity is symmetric, 
namely whether positive and negative shocks have a similar effect. We find that 
negative shocks have a much stronger effect and that there is little evidence that 
positive shocks have an effect at all. This finding is not supportive of Baker and 
Stein (2004) and other models whose key prediction is that an increase in liquidity 
leads to greater equity issuance. 
We then turn to tests that focus more directly on the nature of the mechanism 
that explains this relation between liquidity and equity issues. We would expect 
that many factors that affect equity issuance would be the same for public and 
private equity issues. However, private equity issues do not increase the supply of 
traded shares as typically the investors in a private equity issue face restrictions on 
selling the shares. We would therefore expect firms to have a private equity issue 
rather than a public equity issue when liquidity is poor. We investigate this 
hypothesis and find support for it. Next, we would expect adverse liquidity shocks 
to be accompanied by postponements and cancellations of equity issues. We find 
that postponements are more likely for this group of countries following adverse 
liquidity shocks, although cancellations are not. When we examine whether the 
effect of liquidity is similar for IPOs and seasoned equity offerings, we find that it 
is stronger for IPOs. Through most of the paper, we measure equity issuance by 
dividing counts of equity issues by the number of listed firms. We would expect 
results to be weaker when we use proceeds instead of counts because the proceeds 
measure is extremely skewed and can be heavily influenced by one single 
extremely large issue in many countries. When we investigate whether there is a 
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relation between aggregate equity issuance proceeds and liquidity at the country 
level, we find that such an effect exists, but only for IPOs.   
Our paper contributes to several literatures. We obviously contribute to the 
equity issuance literature. We find that liquidity is an important determinant of 
equity issuance across the world. While the recent literature on equity issuance has 
focused on market timing motivations for equity issuance, we show that liquidity’s 
importance is of the same magnitude as the market timing motivation. A growing 
recent literature emphasizes the interaction between market liquidity and funding 
liquidity, following the work of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). The empirical 
literature on this interaction has focused on financial institutions. In this paper, we 
show that market liquidity affects funding liquidity generally. Several papers 
investigate how stock liquidity affects some aspects of the equity issuance process. 
In particular, Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) show that underwriters charge 
more as liquidity is lower and Gao and Ritter (2010) demonstrate that underwriters 
affect the slope of the demand function for shares through their marketing activities. 
Our paper adds to that literature by showing that aggregate liquidity has a powerful 
effect on security issuance. Finally, there is an extremely large literature on the role 
of liquidity on the pricing of financial assets. In this paper, we show that the effects 
of liquidity extend beyond financial markets; liquidity also has a pervasive impact 
on corporate financial policies. While Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) and Lipson and 
Mortal (2009) show that stock liquidity is related to a firm’s capital structure, such 
a finding does not necessarily mean that firms are more likely to issue equity in 
more liquid markets. Our contribution therefore helps understand one mechanism 
whereby more liquid firms have less leverage, namely that higher liquidity makes it 
less costly to issue equity.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce our sample. In 
Section 3.3, we show how equity issuance is related to liquidity. In Section 3.4, we 
check whether liquidity is related to equity issuance because it proxies for other 
variables that are known to affect equity issuance. In Section 3.5, we investigate in 
more detail how equity issuance depends on liquidity. We conclude in Section  3.6.    
 
 
3.2 Data 
 
We collect monthly data on the number of as well as on the amount of 
proceeds (in US$) raised from both IPOs and SEOs (public and private) in 36 
countries from January 1995 to December 2008 from the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) database. Our sample consists only of common stock offerings (ordinary 
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common shares). However, in discussions with SDC representatives it was brought 
to our attention that there is a limited number of outdated security classifications 
that refer to common shares and were applied in the early part of our sample for 
certain countries. For these cases, we extend our sample of equity offerings to 
include the earlier definitions as well.6 We include only primary offerings, since 
pure secondary issues by current shareholders do not increase the supply of a firm’s 
shares, and therefore fall outside the scope of the present study. We exclude issues 
by utility companies, which are heavily regulated (2-digit SIC codes of 49), as well 
as issues by financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999). We also exclude 
foreign issues and issues of depository receipts (DRs). In addition, we discard 
issues that although announced, have been eventually withdrawn (cancelled or 
postponed) from our main sample. For the U.S., we only include offerings from 
companies traded on the NYSE because our liquidity measure is not comparable 
across exchanges.7 SEOs consist of public follow-on offerings, as well as private 
placements and rights offerings. The sample includes both underwritten issues and 
rights issues. In almost every market, the overwhelming majority of equity 
offerings are underwritten (the exceptions are Australia and Japan).  
We aggregate equity issues at a quarterly frequency on the basis of their 
issue date. We deflate the quarterly number (US$ proceeds) of issues by the total 
number (market capitalization in US$) of all publicly listed companies in the 
country as of the end of the previous year. The resulting issuance measures reflect 
the relative increase in the supply of equity given the size of each market. We use 
the World Development Indicators database to obtain information on the number of 
listed companies in a market, and Datastream for the overall market capitalization.   
As a measure of time-variation in liquidity, we use the market-wide Amihud (2002) 
proxy constructed by Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) that is available for the 36 
countries in our sample over our sample period.8 The Amihud proxy is designed to 
capture the marginal impact of a unit of trading volume on the stock price. It is 
computed as the daily ratio of the absolute stock return over the local currency 
trading volume of the stock. This measure stays close to the intuitive description of 
liquid markets as those that accommodate trading with the least effect on price. 
Amihud (2002) shows that this measure is strongly positively related to 
microstructure estimates of illiquidity for the U.S. stock market. Hasbrouck (2006) 
and Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) show that the Amihud measure 
performs well relative to other proxies in capturing high-frequency measures of 
transaction costs based on U.S. data. Lesmond (2005) reports a high correlation 
                                            
6 Examples of such security definitions include the category of “Par Value Common Shares” for Japan, “Equity Shares” 
for India, and “Class A Common/Ordinary Shares” for China. 
7 We identify NYSE equity offerings based on the SDC field “Primary Exchange Where Issuer’s Stock Trades”. 
8 The data on liquidity is available at http://mathijsavandijk.com.  
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between the Amihud measure and bid-ask spreads in 23 emerging markets. Many 
recent empirical studies use the Amihud proxy to measure stock market liquidity, 
both for the U.S. and for other countries. Examples include Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005), Spiegel and Wang (2005), Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006), Kamara, 
Lou, and Sadka (2008), Watanabe and Watanabe (2008), and Beber and Pagano 
(2011). Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) take a log transformation of the Amihud 
measure and multiply it by -10,000 to obtain a measure that is increasing in 
liquidity. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize their monthly liquidity 
time-series at the 1st and 99th percentiles by country. We then transform the 
monthly market liquidity time-series to a quarterly frequency by computing the 
average within each quarter. We apply the same procedure to the monthly turnover 
time-series from Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). 
Because market liquidity is characterized by persistent long-term trends (e.g., 
Chordia, Roll, and Subramanyam, 2008; Naes, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard, 2011), we 
test for stationarity using the panel unit root test of Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and 
find evidence of non-stationarity. Therefore, all our regressions include a measure 
of liquidity innovations (rather than liquidity levels), taken as the residuals from 
country-by-country AR(1) regressions of the level of market liquidity.  
We obtain the daily total market return index for each country in our sample from 
Datastream. We then compute the equally-weighted average of the daily market 
returns within each quarter to obtain the corresponding quarterly time-series. We 
construct a quarterly time-series of market volatility for each country as the 
standard deviation of the daily market returns within the quarter and a quarterly 
time-series of liquidity risk as the conditional volatility of the raw quarterly 
liquidity series based on a GARCH(1,1) model.  
We also construct quarterly time-series of idiosyncratic volatility and of 
“stock price synchronicity” (Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000) based on the average R2 
from a simple market model run for individual stocks based on daily data within 
the quarter. For this purpose, we use Datastream to collect the daily total return 
index (RI) and monthly market capitalization (MV; expressed in millions of local 
currency) for all individual stocks traded in the 36 countries in our sample. To be 
consistent with Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012), we limit our sample to only 
stocks from major exchanges.  
Data on quarterly aggregate market-to-book ratios, price-earnings ratios, and 
dividend yields are also obtained from Datastream. As proxies for macroeconomic 
conditions we use the quarterly seasonally adjusted real GDP growth rates obtained 
from Haver Analytics, and the sales growth rates from obtained from Datastream 
(following, e.g., Lowry, 2003; Naes, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard, 2011). For the same 
purpose, we use the amplitude adjusted composite leading economic indicator from 
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the OECD, which is a compilation of several key economic indicators that provide 
signals on future turning points of economic activity.  
To account for investor sentiment we use three different proxies: the U.S. 
investor sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006), which is increasing with 
investors’ optimism; the local closed-end country fund discount (Lee, Shleifer, and 
Thaler, 1991), which is only available for 24 countries in our sample; and a global 
sentiment indicator computed as the equally-weighted average of the discounts of 
local closed-end fund discounts as in Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). For the 
latter two variables, lower numbers indicate more optimistic investors.9  
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the number of equity issues, equity 
issuance proceeds, and market returns, liquidity, and volatility for each of the 36 
countries in our sample. The table distinguishes developed and emerging countries 
based on the classification by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The 
total number of equity issues (IPOs plus SEOs) in the sample is 47,399 (of which 
36,400 took place in developed countries and 10,999 in emerging countries). The 
number of equity issues in Australia (12,013) is striking and may be due to the 
mining boom. We have carefully inspected the SDC data for Australia and found 
no reasons to assume that the number of equity issues is incorrect. Nonetheless, we 
rerun all our analyses without Australia to make sure the results are not driven by 
this particular country. Other countries with a large number of IPOs and SEOs over 
1995-2008 include Canada, Hong Kong, India, Japan, South Korea, the U.K., and 
the U.S. 
The second and third columns of Table 3.1 show the time-series mean and 
standard deviation of the quarterly number of equity issues scaled by the number of 
listed stocks by country. This is the main dependent variable in our analyses. On 
average, the countries in our sample experience a number of equity issues per 
quarter that corresponds to 2.52% of the number of listed stocks on the local equity 
market. There is considerable variation in the average equity issuance count 
variable across countries. The mean ratio of equity issues to listed stocks varies 
from 0.26% for South Africa to 15.31% for Australia. The ratio is larger in 
developed than in emerging countries (3.24% vs. 1.62%), even when we exclude 
Australia (2.61% vs. 1.62%). The time-series standard deviations in the third 
column of Table 3.1 suggest considerable time-variation in equity issuance. 
Consistent with prior studies, we find that equity issues tend to be clustered in time. 
The slope coefficient in a pooled AR(1) model of the quarterly equity issues count 
variable across countries is 0.81. 
                                            
9 Data for these variables is available at http://mathijsavandijk.com. 
 Do Firms Issue More Equity when Markets are More Liquid? 65 
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 3.1 show the time-series mean and 
standard deviation of the quarterly proceeds of these equity issues (expressed in 
US$) scaled by the local stock market capitalization (also in US$). We use this 
equity issuance proceeds variable as an alternative to the counts variable in some of 
our tests. On average, firms in the countries in our sample raise public equity 
capital per quarter corresponding to 0.22% of the local equity market capitalization. 
This number is much smaller than the average count variable of 2.52% and thus 
indicates that the size of the average equity issue is much smaller than the average 
market cap of the firms listed on the local stock market. Average equity proceeds 
are somewhat greater in emerging countries than in developed countries, at 0.27% 
vs. 0.18%. China displays an outlier for this variable, with average equity proceeds 
per quarter corresponding to 0.77% of the local market capitalization, or 3.5 times 
the average across all 36 countries. Again, we have no reasons to question the SDC 
data for China and suspect this number is driven by several large privatizations 
early on in the sample when the Chinese stock market was still relatively 
undeveloped. 
 The means and standard deviations of market returns, market liquidity, and 
market volatility lie in the same range of values as reported by Karolyi, Lee, and 
van Dijk (2012) when we take into account that we measure market returns in % 
per quarter and market volatility in % per day – as opposed to per month as in 
Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). It is important to note that a direct comparison 
of the level of Amihud liquidity across countries is not possible because of 
differences in currency units and trading volume definitions. Therefore, we 
standardize the quarterly time-series of market liquidity innovations for each 
country to have zero mean and unit standard deviation in our tests. 
 
 
3.3 Does liquidity help to explain time-variation in 
equity issues? 
 
Table 3.2 shows the estimation results of pooled tobit models to explain 
quarterly variation in the equity issuance count variable (i.e., the number of IPOs + 
SEOs scaled by the number of listed stocks) in the 36 countries in our sample over 
1995-2008 (in unreported tests, we obtain similar results when we exclude the 
years of the recent global financial crises 2007-2008). We use tobit specifications 
since the dependent variable is truncated at zero; many of the countries in our 
sample have zero equity issues in at least some quarters. Almost all models include 
country fixed effects to account for time-invariant country characteristics that can 
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explain cross-country variation in equity issuance intensity. To be conservative, we 
also include year fixed effects in almost all models to account for any common 
global trends – although they subsume some of the time-variation in equity issues 
that could potentially be due to liquidity. As prior studies (e.g., Lowry, 2003) argue 
that there may be institutional reasons that cause equity issuance to be less intense 
in the first calendar quarter, we also include a quarter one dummy in many of the 
tobit models. In the last model of Table 3.2, we also include a lagged dependent 
variable. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. The last two rows of 
Table 3.2 report the results of F-tests on the joint significance of all liquidity 
variables, and of only the lagged liquidity variables. 
Model (1) of Table 2 includes one-quarter lead local stock market liquidity 
innovations, contemporaneous liquidity innovations, and four quarterly lags of 
liquidity innovations as explanatory variables. The coefficients on the 
contemporaneous and the first three lags of liquidity innovations are all positive 
and statistically significant, which is consistent with the hypothesis that firms issue 
more equity in and following quarters of improving market liquidity. The 
coefficient on lead liquidity innovations is close to zero and statistically 
insignificant. There is thus little evidence of liquidity timing in the sense that firms 
are able to time their equity issues before market liquidity worsens. 
The economic effects of contemporaneous and lagged liquidity innovations 
are substantial. A one standard deviation increase in market liquidity is associated 
with a contemporaneous increase in equity issues by 28 basis points (equal to the 
magnitude of the coefficient, since the liquidity variables have been standardized to 
have unit standard deviation), which corresponds to 11% of the unconditional 
average ratio of equity issues of 2.52%. The economic effects of the lagged 
liquidity variables are smaller, but still sizable at more than half of the 
contemporaneous effect. The cumulative effect of a one standard deviation 
improvement in liquidity on equity issues over the next five quarters is 101 basis 
points (or around 40% of the average fraction of issues in any given quarter across 
all countries in our sample). 
One could argue that the contemporaneous effect of liquidity on issues may 
be driven by reverse causality, since equity issues could affect local stock market 
liquidity. However, there are at least three reasons why this is unlikely to be a 
concern in our analyses. First, equity issues correspond to a tiny fraction of existing 
listings on each market (counts are on average 2.52% of the number of listed stocks 
and proceeds are on average 0.22% of local market capitalization) and we measure 
market liquidity based on the value-weighted average liquidity across the existing 
stocks on a market. We thus expect the impact of equity issues on our liquidity 
variables to be very small. Second, if anything, we would expect the effect of 
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equity issues on market liquidity to be negative, while we find a positive coefficient 
on contemporaneous liquidity innovations in Table 3.2. IPOs tend to involve 
relatively small stocks that are less liquid than the average existing stock. SEOs 
create the equivalent of a large sell order imbalance on the market for existing 
stocks, which is likely to temporarily depress liquidity. Third, in each of the models 
in Table 3.2 at least two of the coefficients on the lagged liquidity variables are 
significant (in addition to the significant contemporaneous effect of liquidity), 
which suggests that liquidity matters even when disregarding the contemporaneous 
effect because of potential reverse causality concerns.  
In model (2) of Table 3.2, we use the same specification as in model (1) but 
then for lead, contemporaneous, and lagged local market returns instead of market 
liquidity innovations (for the same sample of country-quarters). These results serve 
two purposes. First, they confirm the finding of prior work that equity issues are 
positively and significantly related to contemporaneous and lagged market returns, 
and negatively and significantly related to lead market returns. 10  Second, they 
provide a benchmark for the importance of the effect of market liquidity in model 
(1). Both the contemporaneous and the lagged effects of liquidity innovations are 
comparable in magnitude to the effects of market returns. The cumulative effect of 
a positive one standard deviation shock to market returns on equity issues over the 
next five quarters is 102 basis points (not taking into account the coefficient on lead 
market returns), which is almost identical to the cumulative effect of 101 basis 
points for liquidity innovations discussed above. 
In model (3), we include liquidity innovations and returns at the same time. 
The effects of both diminish somewhat relative to the first two models (for example, 
the coefficient on one-quarter lagged liquidity innovations becomes insignificant), 
but both liquidity and returns are still statistically and economically significant 
determinants of time-variation in equity issues and still have comparable 
cumulative effects. The coefficient on the quarter one dummy is negative and 
significant, but its inclusion does not materially affect the coefficients on the 
liquidity and return variables. In model (4), we drop the lead liquidity innovations 
as well as the three- and four-quarter lags of market returns as they are not 
significant in model (3). Models (5) and (6) demonstrate that the effects of liquidity 
and returns are roughly equally strong when we discard either the year fixed effects 
or both the year and country fixed effects. Model (7) includes a lagged dependent 
variable, which has a coefficient of 0.544 and is statistically significant. The effects 
of liquidity and returns survive. In most of the other analyses we present below, we 
do not include a lagged dependent variable since our purpose is to understand 
                                            
10 Whether the latter finding can be attributed to market timing abilities by managers is subject to debate (e.g., 
Butler, Grullon, and Weston, 2005). 
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which economic forces drive time-variation in equity issues rather than to develop 
the best possible econometric model to explain the dynamics of equity issues.  
In unreported robustness tests, we estimate the specifications in Table 3.2 using 
panel tobits with random effects (instead of country fixed effects) and using regular 
panel models (instead of tobits) and obtain similar results.  
In sum, Table 3.2 presents evidence that equity issuance is positively related 
to innovations in liquidity. The effect of liquidity on equity issues survives 
controlling for market returns and is roughly equally important as the effect of 
market returns uncovered by earlier studies. 
 
 
3.4 Is the effect of liquidity due to other factors? 
 
The results in the previous section show that equity issuance is positively 
related to liquidity, even after controlling for market returns. This finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that managers take the costs associated with 
downward-sloping demand curves into account in their decision to issue equity. 
However, it could also be the case that our liquidity variables proxy for other 
factors that affect equity issuance. In this section, we investigate whether the effects 
of liquidity can be explained by other financial and economic variables, including 
capital market conditions, (expected) economic activity, asymmetric information, 
and investor sentiment. 
Table 3.3 reports the results of tobit regressions that include various other 
measures of capital market conditions in addition to market liquidity innovations 
and market returns. All models include country and year fixed effects as well as the 
quarter one dummy. Significance is again based on standard errors clustered at the 
country-level. 
In model (1), we add contemporaneous and lagged market volatility to our 
baseline model that includes market liquidity and returns. We know that liquidity is 
negatively related to volatility (e.g., Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2005) 
and Schill (2004) shows there are fewer equity issues in volatile times. It is thus 
possible that the effects of liquidity in Table 3.2 capture the role of market 
volatility. Consistent with Schill (2004), we find a negative and significant 
coefficient on (one-quarter lagged) volatility. However, there is virtually no change 
in the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients on the liquidity 
variables. 
Baker and Stein (2004) argue that market liquidity is a sentiment indicator and that 
periods of positive sentiment coincide with intense equity issuance. Using turnover 
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as a liquidity proxy, they show that liquidity is positively correlated with aggregate 
time-variation in U.S. equity issuance. Model (2) of Table 3.3 shows that the 
liquidity effects in our global sample are not driven by turnover. The coefficients 
on neither contemporaneous nor on one- or two-quarter lagged market turnover are 
significant and the coefficients on the liquidity variables are unaffected. Model (3) 
shows that the contemporaneous effect of liquidity survives controlling for a proxy 
for liquidity risk (conditional liquidity volatility based on a GARCH(1,1) model). 
However, the significantly negative effect of one-quarter lagged liquidity risk and 
the weakened effects of lagged liquidity innovations suggest that equity issuance is 
in part related to liquidity because firms respond to uncertainty about liquidity in 
the recent past. 
Although we control for potential market timing effects using lead, 
contemporaneous, and lagged market returns, many studies use the market-to-book 
ratio as a proxy for market timing. Since more liquid firms in the U.S. have a 
higher market-to-book ratio (Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009), we want to make sure 
that liquidity is not picking up the effect of market-to-book. Model (4) shows that 
issuance is not related to the market-to-book ratio after controlling for liquidity and 
returns, and the effects of liquidity are not diminished. Model (5) shows a 
significant effect of the contemporaneous price-earnings ratio on equity issues, but 
again the effects of liquidity are intact. The coefficients on the dividend-price ratio 
in model (6) are not significant. The effects of liquidity can thus not be attributed to 
these valuation proxies. 
The estimation results of model (7) indicate that even when controlling for 
all of these variables as well as a lagged dependent variable, there is still a 
statistically and economically significant effect of liquidity innovations on 
aggregate equity issues. In addition to the effects of liquidity and market returns, 
model (7) still shows a significant effect of liquidity risk and of the price-earnings 
ratio. In sum, the effect of liquidity is not driven away by controlling for a host of 
other capital market conditions.  
Recent studies show that liquidity forecasts economic activity (e.g., Næs, 
Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard, 2010) and we know from the equity issuance literature 
that firms issue more equity in anticipation of better economic conditions. 
Following Lowry (2003), we proxy for expectations about economic conditions 
using contemporaneous and lead GDP growth as well as sales growth in models (1) 
through (3) of Table 3.4. Lowry introduces these variables as proxies for the 
demand for capital. In model (3), we also include the composite leading economic 
indicator by the OECD. (We note that data on the sales growth and the leading 
economic indicator variables are available for fewer country-quarter observations 
than reported in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.) In line with the results of earlier studies that 
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document that firms issue more equity in (anticipation of) good economic times, 
the coefficients on contemporaneous GDP growth and sales growth are positive and 
significant – though only when these variables are considered in isolation. 
Moreover, the effects of the liquidity variables are still significant.  
It is well-documented that the liquidity of a stock is inversely related to the 
degree of asymmetric information about the stock’s value. More asymmetric 
information is also likely to lead to greater costs of raising equity capital, so 
changes in information asymmetries could influence liquidity and equity issuance 
simultaneously and in the same direction. As argued in the introduction, this 
identification issue is unlikely to be of great concern in our analysis of the effect of 
aggregate liquidity on aggregate equity issuance.11 Nonetheless, it may be the case 
that market-wide fluctuations in information asymmetries affect aggregate liquidity 
and aggregate issuance at the same time and in a similar way. In model (4) of Table 
3.4, we include two proxies for market-wide variation in information asymmetries. 
The first is idiosyncratic volatility, computed as the value-weighted average of the 
residual volatility from market model regressions run for each individual stock 
within a country. The second is “stock price synchronicity,” which is computed as 
the equally-weighted average R2 from market model regressions run for each 
individual stock within a country. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) argue that greater 
stock price synchronicity is associated with less-informative stock prices. Model (4) 
shows that the inclusion of these variables does not materially affect the 
coefficients on the contemporaneous and lagged liquidity innovations. 
Models (5) through (7) of Table 3.4 include various proxies for investor 
sentiment. In the model of Baker and Stein (2004), irrational investors can drive up 
stock prices above their fundamental value in the presence of short-sales constraints, 
and irrational investors also make the market more liquid. If market liquidity and 
sentiment are related, the effects of liquidity on equity issues could thus be driven 
not by managerial concerns about downward-sloping demand curves, but by their 
incentives to issue equity when their stock is overvalued. Investor sentiment should 
be reflected in market returns and valuation ratios, so our evidence that the effects 
of liquidity survive the inclusion of returns and valuation proxies (such as market-
to-book) is hard to reconcile with a sentiment-based explanation for our main 
results. However, to further examine the sentiment hypothesis, we also include 
direct proxies for sentiment in our tobit models. We use local and global closed-end 
country fund discounts (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991) and the U.S. investor 
sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) as proxies for variation in investor 
sentiment. We obtain the country fund discount variables from Karolyi, Lee, and 
                                            
11 Baker and Stein (2004, p. 272) state that it seems “a stretch to argue that there are large swings in the degree of 
asymmetric information about the market as a whole.” 
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van Dijk (2012). They construct time-series of local closed-end country fund 
discounts for 22 of the countries in our sample based on a sample of 42 closed-end 
funds. The global sentiment indicator is the equally-weighted average of the 
discounts of these 42 country funds. None of the sentiment variables is significant 
in models (5) through (7) and the effects of liquidity remain significant even after 
controlling for these sentiment proxies. The magnitudes of the coefficients on 
liquidity innovations are somewhat attenuated in model (7), but this model can only 
be estimated based on 840 country-quarter observations (compared to 1,800 in 
Table 3.2) and the F-tests in the bottom two rows of Table 3.4 confirm that the 
joint effects of all liquidity variables and of only the lagged liquidity variables are 
still significant at the 5% level. 
Overall, the results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 suggest that the positive relation 
between market liquidity and aggregate equity issues is not due to economic or 
financial variables that are unrelated to the aggregate demand elasticity of the stock 
market, but could simultaneously affect liquidity and equity issuance for other 
reasons. 
 
 
3.5. How do equity issues depend on liquidity? 
 
In this section, we investigate the mechanism through which liquidity affects 
equity issuance. We explore asymmetries in this relation, study the choice between 
private and public equity issues, and analyze postponement and cancellations of 
equity issues. We conclude with an analysis of the effect of liquidity on IPOs vs. 
SEOs and of the effect of liquidity on equity issue proceeds rather than equity issue 
counts. 
Table 3.5 allows for an asymmetric effect of declines and improvements in 
liquidity by introducing dummy variables indicating quarters with the top (Market 
liquidity UP) and the bottom (Market liquidity DOWN) 33% observations by 
country based on liquidity innovations. The table contains five different models 
that differ in the number of lags of these dummy variables and in the extent to 
which we control for market returns. The results are consistent throughout the table: 
the relation between liquidity and equity issues is driven by the quarters with the 
greatest deterioration in liquidity. The coefficient on the contemporaneous DOWN 
market liquidity dummy is always statistically significant at the 5% level or better. 
Its magnitude suggests that the ratio of equity issues is about 30 to 40 basis points 
lower in quarters with the most negative liquidity innovations, or about 15% of the 
unconditional average ratio of equity issues of 2.52%. In addition, in most models, 
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the coefficients on at least two of the lagged DOWN liquidity dummies are 
significant. In model (4), the cumulative effect of a large deterioration in liquidity 
on equity issues over the next five quarters (based only on the significant 
coefficients on the DOWN liquidity dummies) is negative 89 basis points, or 
around 35% of the average fraction of issues in any given quarter across all 
countries in our sample. This effect is close in magnitude to the cumulative effect 
of a one standard deviation shock to liquidity documented in Section 3.3 based on 
Table 3.2. In contrast, we find only weak evidence that equity issuance goes up in 
or following quarters with large improvements in market liquidity. The coefficient 
on the contemporaneous UP market liquidity dummy is positive and significant at 
the 10% level, but only in models (1) and (2) and none of the lagged UP market 
liquidity variables has a significant coefficient.12  
These results seem to be at variance with the intuition of the model of Baker 
and Stein (2004), which predicts that liquidity is related to equity issues because – 
in the presence of short-sales constraints – stocks can become overvalued and more 
liquid at the same time, and managers tend to issue more equity during these times. 
In contrast, our results are driven by periods of deteriorating liquidity. More 
generally, stories about managers exploiting mispricing on the equity market tend 
to focus on episodes of overvaluation and high liquidity when the overvaluation is 
associated with active participation in the markets of noise traders. The asymmetric 
effects of liquidity innovations on equity issuance documented in Table 3.5 thus 
seem hard to reconcile with alternative explanations based on investor sentiment. 
It is interesting to note that although Baker and Stein (2004) argue that liquidity 
and sentiment are positively related, they do not necessarily attribute the positive 
empirical relation between market turnover (their proxy for liquidity) and aggregate 
U.S. equity issuance they find to managers having some comparative advantage in 
assessing mispricing and therefore timing equity issues to exploit overvaluation. In 
fact, footnote 7 of Baker and Stein (2004) discusses that their preferred 
interpretation is that “managers care about market liquidity per se – i.e., they 
simply wish to avoid large price impacts when issuing equity.” The bigger point 
Baker and Stein want to make is that managers may appear to time the market 
successfully even when they base their decision to issue equity on the demand 
elasticity of the equity market, which happens to be correlated with investor 
sentiment. 
The results in Table 5 lead us to conclude that it is unlikely that the effect of 
liquidity on equity issuance is due to sentiment. First, sentiment should be picked 
up by the market return variables and valuation proxies. Second, including direct 
                                            
12 In unreported robustness tests, we obtain almost identical results for the UP and DOWN liquidity dummies 
when we allow for asymmetric effects of market returns in a similar way. 
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measures of sentiment in our regression does not take away the effects of liquidity. 
Third, the effects of liquidity are driven by large deteriorations in liquidity, which 
is not consistent with common stories about how sentiment affects public capital 
raising. 
We would expect that many of the other factors that could affect equity 
issues (and that may not have been perfectly controlled for in Tables 3.2 through 
3.5) should have similar effects on public and private equity issues. However, 
downward-sloping demand curves are less of a concern for private equity issues 
since investors in a private issue tend to face restrictions on selling the shares, 
which implies that a private equity issue has less of an effect on the supply of 
shares in the public market. We therefore expect that poor liquidity conditions lead 
managers to opt for a private rather than a public equity issue. We test this 
conjecture in Table 3.6 by estimating tobit models to explain time-variation in the 
quarterly number of privately placed SEOs scaled by the number of public SEOs 
plus the number of privately placed SEOs. All models in Table 3.6 contain 
contemporaneous and lagged market liquidity innovations and market returns as 
well as lead of market returns. Models (2) through (6) also include proxies for 
capital market conditions, future economic activity, or asymmetric information. 
The bottom line is that liquidity has a negative and significant effect on the fraction 
of private equity issues. In other  words, firms tend to issue more private equity 
relative to public equity when market liquidity deteriorates. In model (1), the 
cumulative effect of a one standard deviation deterioration in liquidity on the 
fraction of private equity issues over the next two quarters is around 3.1% (where 
the unconditional average fraction of private SEOs in our sample is 25.0%). The 
negative relation between the fraction of private equity issues and liquidity 
innovations survives the inclusion of market volatility, market-to-book, 
idiosyncratic volatility, and stock price synchronicity.  
If firms are concerned about the price impact of equity issues, adverse 
liquidity shocks should make them more likely to postpone or cancel equity issues 
previously filed. We investigate this hypothesis in Table 3.7. We obtain quarterly 
data on the number of postponements and cancellations from SDC. We scale the 
number of postponements (cancellations) in a country-quarter by the number of 
actual equity issues plus the number of postponements (cancellations). Models (1) 
through (4) explain time-variation in postponements, while models (5) through (8) 
explain time-variation in cancellations. Like in Table 3.6, we control for market 
returns and for proxies for capital market conditions, future economic activity, or 
asymmetric information in different models. One drawback of the SDC data on 
postponements and cancellations is that they are reported by the filing date of the 
equity issue and not by the actual postponement or cancellation date. We expect 
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that most postponements and cancellations are announced within six months of the 
filing date, so we include only contemporaneous and two quarterly leads of the 
explanatory variables in Table 3.7. The aggregation of postponements and 
cancellations by filing dates prevents us from making strong statements about the 
exact timing of postponements and cancellations relative to changes in market 
liquidity, returns, capital market conditions, and economic activity.  
Model (1) of Table 3.7 shows that postponements are negatively related to 
both market liquidity innovations and to market returns, consistent with the 
hypothesis that firms tend to postpone equity issues during times of deteriorating 
liquidity and decreasing valuations. The economic effect of liquidity is large and of 
the same order of magnitude as that of returns. Both the effects of liquidity and 
returns survive the inclusion of additional variables in models (2) through (4). In 
contrast, we find no significant effect of the liquidity variables on the fraction of 
cancelled equity issues. A potential explanation is that cancellations of equity 
issues are more costly (if only as a signal about the issuing firm’s prospects) and 
are therefore less likely to be based on capital market conditions alone. We do still 
find a significantly negative effect of market returns, though it is weaker in models 
(5)-(8) than in models (1)-(4). Unreported results show that the impact of liquidity 
on postponements of equity issues is similar for IPOs and SEOs. 
In Table 3.8, we examine whether the effects of market liquidity innovations 
are different for IPOs and SEOs. Models (1) through (4) have the ratio of IPOs to 
listed stock as dependent variable, while models (5) through (8) are based on SEOs 
over listed stocks. There are a number of interesting results in Table 3.8. First, 
liquidity is a significant determinant of time-variation in both IPOs and SEOs. 
Second, the liquidity effects are stronger for IPOs. The cumulative effect of a one 
standard deviation shock to liquidity on equity issues over the next five quarters 
(based only on the significant liquidity coefficients in models (1) and (5)) is 65 
basis points for IPOs and 25 basis points for SEOs. The effect of contemporaneous 
liquidity innovations is stronger for IPOs than for SEOs throughout. In models (4) 
and (8) – which control for all explanatory variables in this table – four of the five 
liquidity coefficients are significant for IPOs, versus only two for SEOs. That said, 
the number of observations is significantly reduced in models (4) and (8) and, if 
anything, the F-tests reported in the last two rows of Table 3.8 seem to suggest a 
stronger joint effect of lagged liquidity for SEOs. Third, the effects of market 
returns are considerably stronger both statistically and economically for SEOs than 
for IPOs. Most notably, the negative effect of one-quarter lead returns reported in 
previous tables is only observed in the SEO specifications. In other words, the 
evidence consistent with market timing is much stronger for SEOs than for IPOs. 
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In Table 3.9, we investigate whether our finding that firms issue less equity 
when market liquidity deteriorates is robust to using equity issue proceeds instead 
of equity issue counts. We run similar tobits as before, but use quarterly equity 
issue proceeds scaled by the local stock market capitalization (both expressed in 
US$) as dependent variable. We again distinguish between IPOs and SEOs; models 
(1) through (4) try to explain time-variation in IPO proceeds, and models (5) 
through (8) focus on SEO proceeds. Ex ante, we expect these results to be weaker 
since the proceeds measure is highly skewed and is more sensitive to individual 
extreme observations. We therefore drop China from the sample for this analysis, 
as Table 3.1 shows that there were a number of issues with very large proceeds that 
are likely to influence the results. (We obtain slightly weaker results when we 
include China.) 
Models (1) through (4) of Table 3.9 show a strong effect of liquidity 
innovations on IPO proceeds. At least two of the coefficients on contemporaneous 
and lagged liquidity innovations are significant in each model. The cumulative 
effect of a one standard deviation shock to liquidity on IPO proceeds over the next 
five quarters (based only on the significant liquidity coefficients in model (1)) is 
0.09% of local market capitalization, which corresponds to around 40% of the 
unconditional average fraction of equity issues of 0.22% in our sample – an 
economic effect that is comparable in magnitude to the effect on equity issue 
counts documented in Section 3.3 based on Table 3.2. In contrast, models (5) 
through (8) show almost no significant effect of liquidity innovations on SEO 
proceeds. 
 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have shown that equity issuance across the world is 
strongly related to equity market liquidity. In particular, liquidity is an equally 
important determinant of equity issuance as market returns. We provide evidence 
that this important role of liquidity in equity issuance cannot be attributed to 
liquidity serving as a proxy for future economic growth or market sentiment. The 
relation between equity issuance and liquidity appears stronger for decreases in 
liquidity than increases. As one would expect, the fraction of private equity issues 
to public equity issues increases as liquidity worsens since private equity issues do 
not increase the supply of traded shares in the short run because of restrictions on 
selling the shares from such issues. We interpret our finding to be supportive of the 
view that that in imperfectly liquid markets, the demand for shares is downward-
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sloping and that corporations take into account the slope of the demand curve for 
shares in their financing decisions. Our analysis has focused on market-level 
liquidity and issuance. Further research should examine whether liquidity at the 
firm level affects financing policies as well. 
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
This table reports the total number of equity issues (IPOs and SEOs from SDC), and the time-series average and 
standard deviation (based on quarterly data) of the number of equity issues scaled by the number of listed stocks, 
of the total proceeds (in US$) of these equity issues scaled by the local stock market capitalization (in US$), of 
local stock market returns (in local currency), and of market liquidity, as well as the time-series average of the 
local market volatility. The sample covers the period from the first quarter of 1995 through the fourth quarter of 
2008 (with the exception of Brazil and Germany, for which the data start in 1999:I, and Poland, for which the 
data start in 1996:II). Market returns are the total returns on the value-weighted local market index from 
Datastream. The liquidity time-series are taken from Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) and are based on the 
value-weighted average of the daily estimates of Amihud’s (2002) price impact proxy for individual stocks – 
computed as the absolute stock return divided by local currency trading volume. The Amihud measure is 
multiplied by -10,000 so that we obtain a measure that is increasing in liquidity. Volatility is the value-weighted 
average of individual stock volatility for every quarter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries # Equity issues 
Market 
volatility
mean (%) st.dev. mean (%) st.dev. mean (%) st.dev. mean st.dev. mean
Developed 
Countries
Australia 12,013 15.309 4.5993 0.4126 0.5686 0.0391 0.0988 -0.706 0.3872 0.8445
Austria 95 1.7238 1.8889 0.2189 0.2689 0.0219 0.1636 -0.9726 0.6679 0.8661
Belgium 151 1.6293 2.0957 0.0906 0.1401 0.026 0.158 -0.5089 0.3242 0.9367
Canada 5,178 5.1065 3.1686 0.2284 0.1823 0.0422 0.132 -0.7698 0.4018 0.9106
Denmark 197 1.6133 1.4026 0.1173 0.1563 0.0384 0.1568 -0.0748 0.0643 0.9925
Finland 181 2.757 3.0731 0.1586 0.2696 0.0621 0.2785 -0.4777 0.4481 1.8307
France 1,138 2.7289 1.7541 0.1753 0.243 0.0391 0.1688 -0.9335 0.6931 1.1561
Germany 934 2.3011 2.1491 0.2317 0.2787 0.0304 0.1799 -1.2991 0.9297 1.1213
Hong Kong 2,823 5.9706 3.4771 0.1055 0.0862 0.0393 0.1952 -0.0827 0.0636 1.4499
Italy 377 2.5403 2.3623 0.2953 0.5504 0.0291 0.172 -0.2152 0.1764 1.1665
Japan 4,534 2.9519 1.0626 0.1576 0.1583 -0.0005 0.1588 -0.0025 0.0014 1.2258
Netherlands 229 1.9035 1.736 0.1098 0.1696 0.0286 0.1743 -0.1425 0.1384 1.1334
New 
Zealand 130 1.5674 1.8053 0.1806 0.345 0.0287 0.1068 -1.1213 0.3764 0.7295
Norway 377 3.8794 2.5345 0.4214 0.4376 0.041 0.1894 -0.0777 0.0412 1.2298
Singapore 876 3.8994 2.3402 0.1367 0.1627 0.019 0.2232 -0.9222 0.5042 1.1754
Spain 178 0.4728 0.5821 0.1573 0.27 0.0506 0.1588 -0.189 0.175 1.0485
Sweden 428 2.8811 2.0682 0.1328 0.2519 0.0456 0.1978 -0.0573 0.0373 1.375
Switzerland 178 1.2996 1.3561 0.077 0.1244 0.0339 0.147 -0.0804 0.0546 0.9977
U.K. 4,792 3.8666 1.8814 0.1524 0.1046 0.0301 0.1137 -0.199 0.2486 0.9715
U.S. 1,591 0.4332 0.1879 0.0595 0.0302 0.0376 0.1139 -0.0208 0.0172 0.9854
# Equity issues /    
# Listed companies
Proceeds /         
local market cap Market returns Market liquidity
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Table 3.1 continued
Countries # Equity issues
Market 
volatility
mean (%) st.dev. mean (%) st.dev. mean (%) st.dev. mean st.dev. mean
Emerging 
countries
Argentina 48 0.6133 0.7894 0.1175 0.2703 0.0517 0.2239 -0.9933 0.502 1.5657
Brazil 128 0.5071 0.5244 0.1017 0.1547 0.074 0.2278 -0.4877 0.4578 1.5221
Chile 166 1.0721 1.1693 0.1279 0.2073 0.0335 0.1378 -0.003 0.0023 0.8167
China 1,286 2.9684 3.5382 0.7674 1.2834 0.0612 0.2855 -0.0384 0.0426 1.8783
Greece 218 1.3593 1.6975 0.2272 0.4071 0.0458 0.2298 -2.9752 2.2572 1.3931
India 2,418 0.8823 1.6295 0.1171 0.206 0.0501 0.2269 -0.6527 0.552 1.521
Indonesia 202 1.2762 1.0818 0.4047 0.6211 0.0488 0.2778 -0.0031 0.0043 1.6862
Malaysia 1,232 2.7717 1.5933 0.1612 0.1575 0.0224 0.2196 -1.3489 0.8099 1.1674
Mexico 49 0.5058 0.8336 0.0764 0.1836 0.0704 0.1672 -0.0365 0.0176 1.2442
Philippines 132 1.0569 1.3966 0.0939 0.1845 0.0098 0.2142 -0.1353 0.0676 1.2706
Poland 203 1.9204 2.1497 0.357 0.5329 0.0506 0.229 -2.2061 1.9785 1.5268
Portugal 94 1.7484 1.8641 0.6037 1.1258 0.0282 0.1788 -1.0851 0.8026 0.8617
South 
Africa 66 0.2575 0.3289 0.0393 0.0839 0.0588 0.1594 -0.5774 0.3832 1.1217
South Korea 3,226 3.728 3.4454 0.5561 0.8031 0.0428 0.2854 -0.0009 0.0015 1.8862
Taiwan 1,117 3.5377 1.7733 0.2493 0.2693 0.0174 0.2049 -0.0071 0.0072 1.5083
Thailand 414 1.7046 1.6815 0.2583 0.4254 0.0051 0.2695 -0.1475 0.1485 1.7531
# Equity issues /    
# Listed companies
Proceeds /         
local market cap Market returns Market liquidity
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Table 3.2: Tobit models to explain quarterly variation in equity issues in 36 countries 
This table reports coefficient estimates of pooled tobit models to explain variation in the quarterly number of 
new equity issues (IPOs and SEOs from SDC) – scaled by the number of listed stocks – in each of the 36 
countries in our sample over the period 1995-2008. Independent variables include lead, contemporaneous, and 
lagged local market liquidity innovations and local market returns, a dummy for the first calendar quarter, and a 
lagged dependent variable. The liquidity time-series are taken from Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) and are 
based on daily estimates of Amihud’s (2002) price impact proxy for individual stocks – computed as the absolute 
stock return divided by local currency trading volume. The Amihud measure is multiplied by -10,000 so that we 
obtain a measure that is increasing in liquidity. Since the level of Amihud market liquidity is non-stationary in 
most countries, we use market liquidity innovations (taken as the residuals from country-by-country AR(1) 
regressions of the level of market liquidity) as independent variable. Market returns are the total returns on the 
value-weighted local market index from Datastream. All independent variables are standardized to have zero 
mean and unit standard deviation, so the coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation 
(1SD) shock in the independent variable. The last two rows present the results of F-tests on the joint significance 
of all lagged market liquidity variables and of all market liquidity variables, respectively. Significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively (based on standard errors that are clustered by 
country). 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Market liquidity (t+1) 0.00003 0.00079
Market liquidity (t) 0.00279*** 0.00220*** 0.00217*** 0.00201*** 0.00174** 0.00175***
Market liquidity (t-1) 0.00182*** 0.00033 0.00033 0.00003 0.00021 -0.00064
Market liquidity (t-2) 0.00292*** 0.00194** 0.00214** 0.00190* 0.00284** 0.00146**
Market liquidity (t-3) 0.00160* 0.00147 0.00190** 0.00178** 0.00229** 0.00092
Market liquidity (t-4) 0.00095 0.00152* 0.00166** 0.00162** 0.00234** 0.00126**
Market returns (t+1) -0.00220*** -0.00181*** -0.00149*** -0.00232*** -0.00239*** -0.00187***
Market returns (t) 0.00140* 0.001 0.00126 0.0005 0.00056 0.00221***
Market returns (t-1) 0.00278*** 0.00346*** 0.00346*** 0.00324*** 0.00322*** 0.00329***
Market returns (t-2) 0.00310*** 0.00191** 0.00187*** 0.00195** 0.00158* 0.00049
Market returns (t-3) 0.00173** 0.0007
Market returns (t-4) 0.00122* 0.00054
Quarter 1 dummy -0.00733*** -0.00721*** -0.00715*** -0.00769*** -0.00971***
Equity issues (t-1) 0.544***
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes no no yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes no yes
# Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800
# Countries 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Pseudo R2 0.327 0.329 0.339 0.338 0.33 0.0108 0.437
F -test lagged liquidity 3.751*** NA 1.577 1.928 1.985* 2.409* 2.216*
F -test all liquidity 8.468*** NA 4.242*** 5.522*** 4.337*** 2.972** 3.531***
Dependent variable: # equity issues (IPOs + SEOS) / # listed companies in quarter t
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Table 3.3: Tobit models to explain quarterly variation in equity issues in 36 countries:                                        
Controlling for capital market conditions 
This table reports coefficient estimates of pooled tobit models to explain variation in the quarterly number of 
new equity issues (IPOs and SEOs from SDC) – scaled by the number of listed stocks – in each of the 36 
countries in our sample over the period 1995-2008. Independent variables include lead, contemporaneous, and/or 
lagged local market liquidity innovations, returns, volatility, turnover, liquidity risk (conditional liquidity 
volatility based on a GARCH(1,1) model), market-to-book ratio, price-earnings ratio, dividend-price ratio, a 
dummy for the first calendar quarter, and a lagged dependent variable. The liquidity time-series are taken from 
Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) and are based on daily estimates of Amihud’s (2002) price impact proxy for 
individual stocks – computed as the absolute stock return divided by local currency trading volume. The Amihud 
measure is multiplied by -10,000. Since the level of Amihud market liquidity is non-stationary in most countries, 
we use market liquidity innovations (taken as the residuals from country-by-country AR(1) regressions of the 
level of market liquidity) as independent variable. All independent variables are standardized. The last two rows 
present the results of F-tests on the joint significance of all lagged and all market liquidity variables, respectively. 
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively (based on standard errors 
that are clustered by country). 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Market liquidity (t) 0.00228*** 0.00217*** 0.00264** 0.00161*** 0.00162*** 0.00209*** 0.00192**
Market liquidity (t-1) 0.00024 0.00038 0.00104 0.00008 0.0002 0.00019 -0.00006
Market liquidity (t-2) 0.00190** 0.00217** 0.00165 0.00211** 0.00195** 0.00198** 0.00084
Market liquidity (t-3) 0.00175* 0.00192** 0.00156 0.00217*** 0.00195*** 0.00174** 0.00087
Market liquidity (t-4) 0.00167** 0.00174** 0.00134 0.00167** 0.00163** 0.00158** 0.00129
Market returns (t+1) -0.00165*** -0.00155*** -0.00140** -0.00123* -0.00063 -0.00137** -0.00153**
Market returns (t) 0.00121 0.00101 0.00119 0.00104 0.00061 0.00144 0.00157*
Market returns (t-1) 0.00323*** 0.00341*** 0.00345*** 0.00314** 0.00248** 0.00325** 0.00246*
Market returns (t-2) 0.00155** 0.00194*** 0.00180** 0.00163** 0.00160** 0.00160** 0.00056
Market volatility (t) 0.00045 -0.00123
Market volatility (t-1) -0.00160* -0.00014
Market volatility (t-2) -0.00119 0.00038
Market turnover (t) 0.00135 0.00116
Market turnover (t-1) -0.00054 -0.00046
Market turnover (t-2) -0.00106 -0.00144
Market liquidity risk (t+1) 0.00105 0.00097
Market liquidity risk (t) 0.00068 0.00041
Market liquidity risk (t-1) -0.00354*** -0.00380**
Market liquidity risk (t-2) 0.00115 0.00196
Market-to-book ratio (t) 0.00198 0.00105
Market-to-book ratio (t-1) 0.00067 -0.00112
Market-to-book ratio (t-2) 0.00027 0.00017
Dependent variable: # equity issues (IPOs + SEOS) / # listed companies in quarter t
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Table 3.3 continued
Price-earnings ratio (t) 0.00438*** 0.00250*
Price-earnings ratio (t-1) 0.0014 0.00083
Price-earnings ratio (t-2) -0.00139 -0.00181
Dividend-price ratio (t) 0.0001 0.00298**
Dividend-price ratio (t-1) -0.00129 -0.00229
Dividend-price ratio (t-2) -0.00033 -0.00071
Quarter 1 dummy -0.00746*** -0.00770*** -0.00709*** -0.00701*** -0.00700*** -0.00738*** -0.00954***
Equity issues (t-1) 0.512***
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,762 1,797 1,800 1,762
# Countries 36 36 36 35 36 36 35
Pseudo R2 0.339 0.338 0.339 0.349 0.356 0.338 0.444
F -test lagged liquidity 1.667 1.763 0.758 3.900*** 2.895** 2.295* 0.87
F -test all liquidity 4.603*** 5.249*** 3.710*** 4.771*** 3.362*** 4.141*** 1.651
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Table 3.4: Tobit models to explain quarterly variation in equity issues in 36 countries: 
Controlling for business cycle, asymmetric information, and investor sentiment 
This table reports coefficient estimates of pooled tobit models to explain variation in the quarterly number of 
new equity issues (IPOs and SEOs from SDC) – scaled by the number of listed stocks – in each of the 36 
countries in our sample over the period 1995-2008. Independent variables include lead, contemporaneous, and/or 
lagged local market liquidity innovations and returns, business cycle proxies (GDP and sales growth, OECD 
leading indicator), asymmetric information proxies (idiosyncratic volatility, “stock price synchronicity” or 
average R2 from market model as in Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000), investor sentiment (local closed-end country 
fund discount, global closed-end fund discount, and the U.S. sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler, 2006), a 
dummy for the first calendar quarter, and a lagged dependent variable. All independent variables are 
standardized. The last two rows present the results of F-tests on the joint significance of all lagged market 
liquidity variables and of all market liquidity variables, respectively. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively (based on standard errors that are clustered by country). 
 
  
# equity issues (IPOs + SEOS) / # listed companies in quarter t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Market liquidity (t) 0.00187** 0.00160** 0.00142* 0.00274*** 0.00224*** 0.00251*** 0.00140*
Market liquidity (t-1) -0.00005 -0.00107 -0.00119 0.00077 0.00033 0.00048 0.00004
Market liquidity (t-2) 0.00175* 0.00197* 0.00179* 0.00254*** 0.00212** 0.00231** 0.00122**
Market liquidity (t-3) 0.0015 0.00268*** 0.00236*** 0.00225** 0.00190** 0.00205** 0.00114**
Market liquidity (t-4) 0.00173** 0.00227** 0.00218** 0.00196** 0.00168** 0.00174** 0.00038
Market returns (t+1) -0.00127** -0.00196** -0.00190** -0.00133** -0.00176*** -0.00196*** -0.00210***
Market returns (t) 0.00136 0.00142 0.00127 0.00119 0.00146* 0.00109 0.00099
Market returns (t-1) 0.00352*** 0.00472*** 0.00440*** 0.00296*** 0.00363*** 0.00352*** 0.00293***
Market returns (t-2) 0.00163** 0.00255*** 0.00213** 0.00177** 0.00190*** 0.00201** -0.00011
GDP growth (t+2) 0.00220* 0.00067
GDP growth (t+1) 0.0004 -0.00017
GDP growth (t) 0.0002 0.00107
Sales growth (t+2) 0.00204** 0.00185
Sales growth (t+1) 0.0004 0.00018
Sales growth (t) 0.00192 0.00147
Leading economic indicator (t) 0.00089
Idiosyncratic volatility (t) 0.00234*
Idiosyncratic volatility (t-1) 0.00105
Stock price synchronicity (t) -0.00069
Stock price synchronicity (t-1) -0.0018
Dependent variable:
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Table 3.4 continued
Global sentiment (t) 0.00258 -0.00144
Global sentiment (t-1) -0.00061 0.00033
U.S. sentiment index (t) -0.00022 0.00005
U.S. sentiment index (t-1) -0.00158 -0.00085
Closed-end fund discount (t) 0.00011
Closed-end fund discount (t-1) 0.00024
Quarter 1 dummy -0.00788*** -0.00847*** -0.00868*** -0.00762*** -0.00660*** -0.00676*** -0.0104***
Equity issues (t-1) 0.551***
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 1,746 1,221 1,202 1,800 1,800 1,609 840
# Countries 36 26 26 36 36 35 22
Pseudo R2 0.35 0.413 0.415 0.342 0.338 0.352 0.537
F -test lagged liquidity 1.726 4.377*** 3.993*** 2.602** 1.944 1.986* 3.244**
F -test all liquidity 2.666** 4.242*** 3.530*** 6.455*** 5.461*** 4.235*** 2.729**
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Table 3.5: Tobit models to explain quarterly variation in equity issues in 36 countries: 
Asymmetric effect of liquidity 
This table reports coefficient estimates of pooled tobit models to explain variation in the quarterly number of 
new equity issues (IPOs and SEOs from SDC) – scaled by the number of listed stocks – in each of the 36 
countries in our sample over the period 1995-2008. The key independent variables are (contemporaneous and 
lagged) dummy variables indicating quarters with the top (Market liquidity UP) and bottom (Market liquidity 
DOWN) 33% observations based on liquidity innovations. Other independent variables include lead, 
contemporaneous and lagged local market local market returns, and a dummy for the first calendar quarter. All 
independent variables are standardized. The last two rows present the results of F-tests on the joint significance 
of all UP and DOWN market liquidity variables, respectively. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively (based on standard errors that are clustered by country). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market liquidity UP (t) 0.00311* 0.00319* 0.00227 0.00232 0.0025
Market liquidity DOWN (t) -0.00425*** -0.00428*** -0.00304** -0.00293** -0.00283**
Market liquidity UP (t-1) 0.00097 0.00115 -0.00031 -0.00022 -0.0001
Market liquidity DOWN (t-1) -0.00291** -0.00333*** -0.00146 -0.0017 -0.00168
Market liquidity UP (t-2) -0.00024 0.00075 -0.00058 0.00052 0.00029
Market liquidity DOWN (t-2) -0.00186 -0.00167 -0.00139 -0.00108 -0.0009
Market liquidity UP (t-3) 0.00093 0.00122 0.00069
Market liquidity DOWN (t-3) -0.00246* -0.00276* -0.00213
Market liquidity UP (t-4) -0.00037 -0.00039 -0.00064
Market liquidity DOWN (t-4) -0.00295** -0.00323** -0.00309**
Market returns (t+1) -0.00169*** -0.00169*** -0.00171***
Market returns (t) 0.0012 0.00123 0.00109
Market returns (t-1) 0.00292*** 0.00316*** 0.00307***
Market returns (t-2) 0.00204*** 0.00222*** 0.00236***
Market returns (t-3) 0.00127
Market returns (t-4) 0.00089
Quarter 1 dummy -0.00657*** -0.00672*** -0.00690*** -0.00712*** -0.00713***
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 1,872 1,800 1,872 1,800 1,800
# Countries 36 36 36 36 36
Pseudo R2 0.318 0.33 0.325 0.337 0.338
Dependent variable:                    # equity issues (IPOs + SEOS) / # listed companies in quarter t
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Table 3.6: Tobit models to explain quarterly variation in the fraction of privately placed SEOs in 36 
countries  
This table reports coefficient estimates of pooled tobit models (censored at 0 and 1) to explain variation in the 
quarterly number of privately placed SEOs (from SDC) – scaled by the number of public SEOs plus the number 
of privately placed SEOs – in each of the 36 countries in our sample over the period 1995-2008. Independent 
variables include lead, contemporaneous, and/or lagged local market liquidity innovations and returns, proxies 
for capital market conditions (market volatility, market-to-book ratio), business cycle proxies (GDP growth), and 
asymmetric information proxies (idiosyncratic volatility, “stock price synchronicity” or average R2 from market 
model as in Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000). Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, 
and *, respectively (based on standard errors that are clustered by country).  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market liquidity (t) -0.0256*** -0.0164*** -0.0211*** -0.0303*** -0.0223*** -0.0242***
Market liquidity (t-1) -0.0052* 0.0038 0.0014 -0.006 0.0001 -0.0054*
Market returns (t+1) -0.0288*** -0.0342*** -0.0308*** -0.0369*** -0.0341*** -0.0317***
Market returns (t) 0.0334*** 0.0354*** 0.0295*** 0.0325*** 0.0297*** 0.0412***
Market returns (t-1) -0.0192*** -0.0210*** -0.0612*** -0.0270*** -0.0222*** -0.0191***
Market returns (t-2) -0.0189*** -0.0324*** -0.0130*** -0.0302*** -0.0236*** -0.0226***
Market volatility (t) 0.0320***
Market volatility (t-1) -0.0143
Market volatility (t-2) -0.0528***
Market-to-book ratio (t) -0.0042
Market-to-book ratio (t-1) 0.0627***
Market-to-book ratio (t-2) -0.0934***
GDP growth (t+2) 0.0203*
GDP growth (t+1) -0.0239*
GDP growth (t) 0.0207
Idiosyncratic volatility (t) 0.0220***
Idiosyncratic volatility (t-1) -0.0104
Idiosyncratic volatility (t-2) -0.0465***
Stock price synchr. (t) 0.0269***
Stock price synchr. (t-1) -0.0011
Stock price synchr. (t-2) -0.0062
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 1,236 1,236 1,213 1,208 1,235 1,236
# Countries 36 36 35 36 36 36
Pseudo R2 0.391 0.393 0.385 0.388 0.392 0.391
Dependent variable: # private SEOs / (# public + private SEOs) in quarter t
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Table 3.7: Tobit models to explain quarterly variation in postponements and cancellations of equity issues 
in 36 countries 
This table reports coefficient estimates of pooled tobit models to explain variation in the quarterly number of 
postponed equity issues (models (1)-(4)) scaled by the number of actual equity issues plus the number of 
postponements and in the quarterly number of canceled equity issues (models (5)-(8)) scaled by the number of 
actual equity issues plus the number of cancellations – in each of the 36 countries in our sample over the period 
1995-2008. Postponements and cancellations of IPOs and SEOs are obtained from SDC. Independent variables 
include lead and contemporaneous local market liquidity and returns, proxies for capital market conditions 
(market-to-book ratio), the state of the business cycle (GDP growth), and asymmetric information (idiosyncratic 
volatility, “stock price synchronicity” or average R2 from market model as in Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000). 
Since SDC does not report postponements and cancellations by the postponement or cancellation date but by the 
filing date, we only include contemporaneous and lead independent variables. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively (based on standard errors that are clustered by country). 
  
  
Dependent 
variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-0.0484*** -0.0536*** -0.0572*** -0.0470*** -0.0057 -0.0054 -0.0026 -0.0082
-0.0345*** -0.0466*** -0.0451*** -0.0616*** -0.0011 -0.0046 -0.001 -0.0027
-0.0397*** -0.0482*** -0.0550*** -0.0527*** 0.0078 0.0141 0.0081 0.0169
-0.0276*** -0.0535*** -0.0212*** -0.0523*** -0.0291* -0.0524** -0.0378** -0.0360*
-0.0073 0.0178*** -0.0081 -0.0158*** 0.0165 -0.0028 0.0114 0.0131
-0.0301*** -0.0487*** -0.0295*** -0.0402*** -0.0493*** -0.0514*** -0.0461*** -0.0587***
0.1280*** 0.046
-0.0952*** 0.0078
0.1150*** -0.0523
0.0884*** 0.0161
-0.0588*** -0.0331
0.0658*** 0.00603
0.0143 -0.0028
-0.0656*** -0.0217
0.0402*** 0.0634**
-0.0635*** 0.0056
-0.0072 0.0001
0.0028 -0.0077
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
1,667 1,636 1,607 1,601 1,696 1,664 1,635 1,630
36 35 36 36 36 35 36 36
0.323 0.34 0.32 0.349 0.178 0.182 0.179 0.192
Market liquidity (t+1)
Market liquidity (t)
Market returns (t+2)
Market liquidity (t+2)
Idiosyncratic volatility (t+2)
Market-to-book ratio (t+1)
Market-to-book ratio (t)
GDP growth (t+2)
Market returns (t+1)
Market returns (t)
Market-to-book ratio (t+2)
# cancellations / (# actual issues +             
# cancellations) in quarter t
# postponements / (# actual issues +             
# postponements) in quarter t
Pseudo R2
Country fixed effects
# Observations
# Countries
Stock price synchronicity (t+1)
Stock price synchronicity (t)
Year fixed effects
Idiosyncratic volatility (t+1)
Idiosyncratic volatility (t)
Stock price synchronicity (t+2)
GDP growth (t+1)
GDP growth (t)
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Table 3.8: Tobit models to explain quarterly variation in equity issues in 36 countries: IPOs vs. SEOs  
This table reports coefficient estimates of pooled tobit models to explain variation in the quarterly number of 
new equity issues (separate regressions for IPOs and SEOs from SDC) – scaled by the number of listed stocks – 
in each of the 36 countries in our sample over the period 1995-2008. Models (1) through (4) have IPOs scaled by 
listed companies as dependent variable. Models (5) through (8) have SEOs scaled by listed companies as 
dependent variable. Independent variables include lead, contemporaneous, and/or lagged local market liquidity 
innovations and returns, proxies for capital market conditions (market volatility, market-to-book ratio), business 
cycle proxies (GDP growth, OECD leading indicator), asymmetric information proxies (idiosyncratic volatility, 
“stock price synchronicity” or average R2 from market model as in Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000), investor 
sentiment (global closed-end fund discount), and a dummy for the first calendar quarter. The last two rows 
present the results of F-tests on the joint significance of all lagged market liquidity variables and of all market 
liquidity variables, respectively. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, 
respectively (based on standard errors that are clustered by country). 
  
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Market liquidity (t) 0.00193*** 0.00265*** 0.00250*** 0.00239*** 0.00081* 0.00073 0.00141*** 0.00083*
Market liquidity (t-1) 0.00063 0.00054 0.00065 0.00082 0.00027 -0.0006 0.00039 -0.00091
Market liquidity (t-2) 0.00157** 0.00089 0.00151** 0.00136* 0.00160** 0.00127* 0.00177*** 0.00107
Market liquidity (t-3) 0.00164* 0.00099 0.00174* 0.00212** 0.00099* 0.00094 0.00131** 0.00105
Market liquidity (t-4) 0.00138*** 0.00160** 0.00193*** 0.00232*** 0.00027 0.00087* 0.00084 0.00115**
Market returns (t+1) -0.00062 0.00006 -0.00026 0.0001 -0.00144*** -0.00165*** -0.00116*** -0.00159**
Market returns (t) 0.00009 -0.00053 0.00048 -0.00104 0.00109 0.00147* 0.00083 0.00158
Market returns (t-1) 0.00134* 0.0013 0.00194** 0.00213* 0.00211*** 0.00280*** 0.00195** 0.00247*
Market returns (t-2) 0.00156*** -0.00021 0.00107** 0.00024 0.00154*** 0.00134** 0.00122** 0.00065
Market volatility (t) -0.00124 0.00122
Market volatility (t-1) -0.00163* -0.00031
Market volatility (t-2) 0.00026 -0.00188
Market-to-book ratio (t) 0.00212 0.00007
Market-to-book ratio (t-1) -0.00248** 0.00085
Market-to-book ratio (t-2) 0.00219** 0.00177
GDP growth (t+2) 0.0009 0.00032 0.0013 0.00104
GDP growth (t+1) 0.00057 0.00096 -0.00113 -0.00104
GDP growth (t) 0.0004 0.00015 0.0008 0.00031
Leading econ. indic. (t) 0.00515** 0.00308** 0.00044 0.00042
Idiosyncratic volatility (t) 0.00074 0.00149
Idiosyncratic volatility (t-1) 0.00112 0.00196 0.00021 0.0015
Stock price synchr. (t) 0.00052 0.00082 -0.00138** -0.00264***
Stock price synchr. (t-1) 0.00005 -0.00033 -0.00206** -0.00283**
Global sentiment (t) 0.00103 0.00082
Global sentiment (t-1) 0.00217* -0.00118
Quarter 1 dummy -0.00784*** -0.00612*** -0.00724*** -0.00373** -0.00372*** -0.00414**
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 1,800 1,389 1,800 1,351 1,800 1,389 1,800 1,351
# Countries 36 29 36 28 36 29 36 28
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.209 0.199 0.212 0.422 0.492 0.431 0.51
F -test lagged liquidity 1.961* 1.692 2.804** 2.474** 2.650** 2.283* 2.859** 3.416***
F -test all liquidity 4.433*** 3.292*** 5.145*** 3.318*** 2.858** 1.861* 3.535*** 2.818**
# IPOs / # listed companies in quarter t # SEOs / # listed companies in quarter t
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Table 3.9: Tobit models to explain quarterly variation in equity issues in 35 countries: IPO proceeds vs.  
SEO proceeds  
This table reports coefficient estimates of pooled tobit models to explain variation in the quarterly US$ proceeds 
of new equity issues (separate regressions for IPOs and SEOs from SDC) – scaled by the US$ local market 
capitalization – in 35 countries in our sample (we drop China because of its very large proceeds) over the period 
1995-2008. Models (1) through (4) have IPO proceeds scaled by local market cap as dependent variable. Models 
(5) through (8) have SEO proceeds scaled by local market cap as dependent variable. Independent variables 
include lead, contemporaneous, and/or lagged local market liquidity innovations and returns, proxies for capital 
market conditions (market volatility, market-to-book ratio), business cycle proxies (GDP growth, OECD leading 
indicator), asymmetric information proxies (idiosyncratic volatility, “stock price synchronicity” or average R2 
from market model as in Morck, Yeung, and Yu, 2000), investor sentiment (global closed-end fund discount), 
and a dummy for the first calendar quarter. The last two rows present the results of F-tests on the joint 
significance of all lagged market liquidity variables and of all market liquidity variables, respectively. 
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively (based on standard errors 
that are clustered by country).  
  
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Market liquidity (t) 0.00027*** 0.00034*** 0.00036*** 0.00046*** 0.00001 -0.00002 0.00005 0.00002
Market liquidity (t-1) 0.00002 -0.00007 0 -0.00001 0.00005 -0.00011 0.00002 -0.00014
Market liquidity (t-2) 0.00022*** 0.00011 0.00020** 0.00012 0.00013 0.00005 0.00013 0.00011
Market liquidity (t-3) 0.00040*** 0.00033** 0.00040*** 0.00032** 0.00019 0.0001 0.00020* 0.00014
Market liquidity (t-4) 0.00004 0.00002 0.00014 0.00008 -0.00014 -0.00012 -0.00006 -0.00009
Market returns (t+1) 0.00011 0.00017 0.00015* 0.00013 -0.00014 -0.00023 -0.00012 -0.00023
Market returns (t) 0.00009 -0.00005 0.00019* -0.00028* 0.00020* 0.00026* 0.00025* 0.00017
Market returns (t-1) 0.00017 0.00016 0.00023** 0.00022 0.00045*** 0.00055*** 0.00046*** 0.00038*
Market returns (t-2) 0.00023** -0.00011 0.00015 -0.00003 0.00021 0.00012 0.00016 0.00021
Market volatility (t) 0.00013 0.00022
Market volatility (t-1) -0.00005 0.00022
Market volatility (t-2) -0.00003 0.00029
Market-to-book ratio (t) 0.00043 0.00047
Market-to-book ratio (t-1) -0.00064** -0.00026
Market-to-book ratio (t-2) -0.00003 -0.00016
GDP growth (t+2) -0.00022 -0.00032 0.00044 0.00047
GDP growth (t+1) 0.00073** 0.00092** -0.00051** -0.00047*
GDP growth (t) -0.00004 -0.00004 0.00072*** 0.00072***
Leading econ. Indic. (t) 0.00051*** 0.00054*** 0.00015 0.00018
Idiosyncratic volatility (t) 0.00005 0.00015 -0.00013 0.00001
Idiosyncratic volatility (t-1) 0.00015 0.00019 0.00017 0.00013
Stock price synchr. (t) 0.00020* 0.00026* 0.00009 -0.00002
Stock price synchr. (t-1) -0.00012 -0.00017 -0.00024** -0.00048**
IPO proceeds / local market cap in quarter t SEO proceeds / local market cap in quarter t
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Table 3.9 continued
Global sentiment (t) -0.00032 0.00012
Global sentiment (t-1) 0.00091** -0.00011
Quarter 1 dummy -0.00120*** -0.00096*** -0.00137*** -0.00088** -0.00064** -0.00077*
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
# Observations 1,749 1,338 1,749 1,303 1,749 1,338 1,749 1,303
# Countries 35 28 35 27 35 28 35 27
Pseudo R2 0.051 0.062 0.055 0.068 0.024 0.032 0.026 0.035
F -test lagged liquidity 4.513*** 2.676** 5.650*** 1.988* 1.63 0.723 1.265 0.941
F -test all liquidity 5.940*** 3.562*** 5.988*** 3.134*** 1.355 0.593 1.082 0.762
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Chapter 4                                        
Market Liquidity, Operating Efficiency 
and Bank Performance13 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
There is little ambiguity that the disciplinary role of capital markets is of the 
utmost importance for promoting good corporate governance and ensuring optimal 
allocation of resources in the economy. By trading corporate claims in public 
markets investors are able to monitor managerial conduct and reward investment 
decisions that increase firm value, or penalize those with an adverse effect on 
shareholders’ wealth. Hence, in addition to mobilizing capital expeditiously, 
markets also produce information regarding a firm’s securities, allowing investors 
to evaluate firm performance continuously. In the case of the banking sector, the 
role of capital markets is by no means less important. As a matter of fact, given the 
increasing complexity of the universal banking model, its dispersed funding mix, 
and the expanding type of its activities (Calomiris, 1997), sharing monitoring costs 
with private investors can only benefit official supervisors by allowing them to 
allocate their scarce resources in a more purposeful way. 
According to the premises of agency theory, inefficient contractual 
arrangements or absence of monitoring can allow managers to expropriate investors 
by diverting corporate resources to private benefits, engage in excessive risk-taking 
or under-utilize a firm’s investment capacity due to extraction of monopoly rents 
(e.g. Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997). In the case of banks the situation is further 
complicated due to the existence of high entrance barriers, public subsidies, and 
government guarantees (Merton, 1977; Keeley, 1990). To address such concerns, 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has advanced a “three-pillar” 
regulatory framework which puts market discipline on centre stage (Basel II). The 
                                            
13 We are grateful to the participants of the IPA seminar at the ECB for their helpful comments. 
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third pillar consists of a set of disclosure requirements that would allow market 
participants to exert control over banks, and thus moderate risk taking in the 
financial sector (e.g. BIS, 2001). When compared to the first two pillars14, market 
monitoring demonstrates some particularly useful features which are mainly based 
on markets’ inherent ability to aggregate information in a decentralized and 
continuous way. In contrast to official oversight mechanisms that are typically rigid, 
bureaucratic, and infrequent, investors are endowed with the incentive to monitor 
bank behaviour continuously, using information obtained from a variety of sources 
(Herring, 2003). As a consequence, investors can deter banks from engaging in 
inefficient investments by raising the cost or by restricting the volume of funds 
available for their financing (Crockett, 2002). Moreover, capital markets are 
credited with the ability to moderate agency frictions within the firm (Homström, 
and Tirole, 1993; Chung, Firth, and Kim, 2002; Edmans, 2009; Edmans, and 
Manso, 2011), enhancing performance (Smith, 1996; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and 
Thomas, 2008; Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, and Tehranian, 2007), and maximizing 
economic welfare (Wurgler, 2000; Tadesse, 2004; Durnev, Li, Mock, and Yeung, 
2004). Nevertheless, even though there is an extensive literature discussing the 
positive implications of market monitoring on firm performance, only a limited 
number of studies to date investigate the interplay between capital markets and the 
banking sector in that respect.  
In this paper we contribute to the literature by investigating the influence 
exerted by equity markets on bank operating efficiency, risk-taking, and 
performance from a perspective that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been 
addressed to date, namely that of stock liquidity. To be able to discipline bank 
managers, investors need to be able to transact in a secondary market with the 
minimum possible frictions. Since high liquidity typically translates to low 
transaction costs, which in turn alludes to low information asymmetry (Wurgler, 
and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Sadka, and Scherbina, 2006; Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam, 2008), we expect that investors will be more effective in their 
monitoring when the secondary market of a bank’s securities is more active. Thus, 
our conjecture is that banks with a liquid stock are subject to more rigorous 
monitoring by shareholders, and as a result are forced to operate more efficiently. 
Conversely, limited market participation by investors will impede information 
dissemination and lead to price inertia, thus creating a divergence between bank 
fundamentals and market valuations. This, in turn, can nurture perverse incentives 
by bank managers, leading to excessive risk-taking and shareholder expropriation.  
                                            
14 The first two pillars consist of capital adequacy conditions, and an elaborate review process from official 
supervisors respectively.  
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To assess the role of liquidity, we compile a detailed dataset with balance 
sheet information for more than 1,100 banks, spanning 31 countries around the 
world. The extensive coverage of our data permits us to investigate the importance 
of market monitoring across countries that differ in a number of dimensions, 
namely the extent of economic development, governance standards, the degree of 
concentration within the banking sector, and the intensity of regulatory 
interventions. Given that stock liquidity is an elusive concept that is notoriously 
difficult to quantify, we refrain from relying on a single measure and choose to 
perform our analysis employing three of the most commonly used indicators, 
namely the (modified) Amihud ratio (2002), the (proportional) quoted spread, and 
stock turnover15. We also construct several indicators of risk-taking and alternative 
measures of bank performance.  
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, we document a 
positive relation between bank stock liquidity and Tobin’s Q. In other words, the 
present value of expected cash flows represents a higher multiple of asset 
replacement costs for banks with more liquid stock. We interpret this finding as an 
early confirmation of our hypothesis that banks subject to more intense investor 
monitoring are able to generate more value from their investments. The same 
applies for banks that have low dependence on non-core funding, hold more cash 
on their balance sheet, are better capitalised, and have bigger size. Next, we 
decompose Tobin’s Q into three components, namely a factor accounting for 
investor sentiment, another for leverage, and a proxy for operating profitability 
(Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009). We find that differences in liquidity do not generate 
variation in investor sentiment, but, consistent with the market discipline 
interpretation, are significantly associated with profitability (positive) and leverage 
(negative).  
Naturally, higher profitability can reflect superior lending technology, 
greater skill in the allocation of capital, or more efficient operational structure. 
Nevertheless, it could also reflect increasing risk exposure across a number of 
dimensions. Our analysis lends no support to the latter explanation. Our findings 
are confirmed when we use the equivalent of the Sharpe ratio to measure bank 
profitability per unit of risk employed. In further support of our hypothesis, we 
document that banks with higher stock liquidity operate closer to the efficient 
frontier, demonstrate lower credit risk, and have lower probability of default. 
Consistent with earlier studies, we also show that banks with more diversified 
sources of revenue have a lower share of non-performing loans. In other words, 
increasing reliance to non-core activities can offset the foregone income due to 
                                            
15 For a detailed account of different liquidity measures available, as well as a discussion of their relative 
merits/shortcomings we refer to Hasbrouck (2006) and Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009). 
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more conservative lending, thus explaining the lower credit risk of those banks. 
Greater dependence on non-core financing, however, typically translates to higher 
risk and lower profitability. We also show that capital buffers are negatively 
associated with insolvency risk, which we attribute to the fact that better capitalised 
banks have a more valuable charter, and as a result have less incentive to engage in 
excessive risk.  
Finally, we try to shed more light on the particular mechanism through 
which the liquidity channel operates. An information-based interpretation would 
suggest that improved liquidity encourages the participation of informed investors 
in the price discovery process, thus rendering market monitoring more efficient. 
We investigate this explanation by creating portfolios of bank stocks differing over 
the extent of information-driven trading, but find no evidence of a positive relation 
with liquidity. Our empirical analysis is, however, more supportive of an agency-
based interpretation. For example, when we distinguish banks’ on the basis of their 
susceptibility to principal-agent type of conflicts we find that the liquidity effects is 
significantly more pronounced in the group that ranks higher in that respect. We 
also present evidence that the monitoring exerted by debt holders and depositors is 
significantly more effective in the case of banks with more liquid stock. This is 
reflected in the increasing responsiveness of both deposit growth and debt costs to 
bank risk-taking in banks that belong to the top of the liquidity spectrum. 
An important concern in our study relates to the possibility of endogeneity or 
reverse causality between our measures of bank performance and stock liquidity. 
For example, one might argue that investors will typically increase their holdings of 
banks that outperform and underweight those with disappointing risk-return 
characteristics. Assuming that banks operating closer to the efficient frontier are 
able to deliver superior risk-adjusted performance, it is reasonable to expect an 
increasing demand for their stock by retail investors, which will foster liquidity in 
the secondary market. Moreover, banks engaging in riskier and more opaque 
activities might deter retail investors from holding their stock since information 
costs can be prohibitively high for them to overcome. As a result, retail ownership 
of such information intensive bank stocks will be limited and their liquidity 
contained. To address such concerns we lag our regressors by one year, but also 
confirm the main body of our findings using a two-stage least squares approach 
which we discuss more extensively in the sections that follow. Another argument is 
that liquidity might correlate to bank performance due to their joint dependence 
with an omitted variable. We thus populate our regressions with an extensive 
battery of controls accounting for balance sheet liquidity, credit risk, income 
diversification, dependence on non-core financing, market performance, 
capitalization, and size effects. Moreover, we also extend our empirical setup to 
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include a number of macroeconomic factors controlling for business cycle 
conditions, economic development, and the general level of risk aversion.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, we briefly discuss the related 
literature. In Section 4.3, we describe our data sources, and conduct univariate tests 
proving some first evidence on the relation between stock liquidity and bank 
performance. In Section 4.4, we conduct our multivariate analysis and perform a 
number of empirical tests. We conclude in Section 4.5.    
 
 
4.2 Related Literature 
 
Modern financial intermediaries interact with markets on a daily basis. The 
funding model adopted by banks, combined with the complex nature of their 
activities dictate the issuance of claims with different features, seniority, and legal 
attributes. However, due to differences in their exposure to agency frictions and to 
the extent of (implicit or explicit) government guarantees, different bank securities 
are subject to different levels of scrutiny by investors, and are thus prone to various 
degrees of market discipline. Nevertheless, literature to date has almost exclusively 
focused on the role of credit, keeping a rather negligent stance on the influence 
exerted by shareholders. Morgan and Stiroh (1999, 2001) for example, show that 
even though bond investors price the credit risk of U.S. banks similarly to that of 
non-financial companies with the same credit rating, they tend to treat banks with 
systemic importance more favourably. They also demonstrate that credit spreads 
promptly adjust to changes in the asset mix and the type of income generating 
activities of banks, and thus conclude that the threat of rising financing costs will 
impede banks from excessive risk-taking. In the case of demandable deposits, most 
of the evidence over their disciplinary role is documented for the market of 
uninsured deposits (Sangkyun, and Peristiani, 1998; Peria, and Schmukler, 2001).  
However, even though the risk from rising refinancing costs and the adverse effect 
from increasing interest expenses can constitute a credible self-disciplining 
mechanism, they are still certain drawbacks that might render them inefficient. For 
example, it seems natural to argue that unless bank managers can credibly commit 
to a given level of risk, they can always reduce the cost of debt ex post by engaging 
in more risky activities, after the terms of the debt contract have been established 
(Blum, 2002). Moreover, other studies indicate that the disciplinary role of deposits 
can be undermined by the generous deposit insurance schemes that prevail in many 
countries (Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2004). The aforementioned examples 
thus indicate that even though most of the effort to date has been towards 
illustrating the disciplinary role of debt, there are reasons to expect that other type 
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of claims, e.g. equity, can be an equal if not a superior source of market discipline 
(Levonian, 2001). Since equity is unarguably the most information sensitive 
corporate claim, and shareholders the least protected class of investors (same in the 
case of banks as recent experience demonstrates16), it would be natural to assume 
that common shareholders are better incentivized to monitor the financial condition 
of a bank, especially when compared to creditors with superior seniority who 
typically enjoy substantial government guarantees (Merton, 1977; Nier, and 
Baumann, 2006). Hence, in this paper we decide to place our attention in the equity 
markets and thus further abstract from previous papers which, in their majority, 
investigate the nexus between capital markets and banks from the perspective of 
creditors. 
Regarding the role of stock liquidity, we believe there are a number of 
reasons explaining why it can have a causal effect on bank performance. First and 
foremost, the existence of a liquid market is a necessary precondition for 
informational efficiency, which is valuable for investors who use market signals to 
derive their assessment of managerial decision-making. For example, several 
studies document that the cost of information arbitrage decreases with stock market 
liquidity (Wurgler, and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Chordia et al., 2008), whereas others 
show that convergence to fundamentals is faster when liquidity improves (Sadka, 
and Scherbina, 2006). The rationale is that informed investors can more easily take 
advantage of their superior information in a liquid market since they transact with a 
larger pool of “liquidity” traders at a lower cost, which in turn increases the 
marginal benefits of collecting private information. Hence, the market price of 
liquid stocks provides a credible signal of insiders’ expectations on the long-term 
prospects of current investment, allowing investors to look beyond present earnings 
in their valuation analysis, which typically reflects past decisions. Additionally, the 
importance of the embedded growth component in equity valuations can foster 
managers to overcome their myopic preferences and thus pursue strategies that 
favour sustainable growth, rather than seeking short-term profitability (Dow, and 
Gorton, 1997; Edmans, 2009). Hence, by reducing information costs, market 
liquidity enhances monitoring by investors, mitigates managerial opportunism, and 
promotes long-term growth. Furthermore, managers have a strong incentive to 
incorporate equity market valuations in their decisions because this has direct 
implications on the cost of capital which can determine the type and amount of 
funds available for the financing of future investment opportunities (Mikkelson, 
and Megan, 1988). Hence, by demonstrating superior price informativeness a liquid 
                                            
16 For examples we refer to a series of recent articles e.g. “Long-Suffering Bankia Shareholders Set for More 
Losses”, by Toyer, and Dowsett, Reuters, 2012; “US and UK Unveil Failing Banks Plan”, by Masters, and Giles, 
Financial Times, 2012; “Spain Pressed to Inflict Losses on Small Investors”, by Johnson, Spiegel, and, Chaffin, 
Financial Times, 2012. 
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stock has positive implications on the quality of the feedback managers’ are able to 
extract from the market, which itself consists of an indirect form of discipline. 
The positive impact of liquidity on performance can also have an agency-
based interpretation. In their seminal paper, Homström, and Tirole (1993) argue 
that a liquid market can alleviate the principal-agent problem by facilitating the 
structuring of more efficient compensation schemes. In another study, Maug (1998) 
shows that market liquidity reduces the likelihood of free-riding by small investors 
because it allows large shareholders to purchase additional shares at low cost. This 
increases their incentive to monitor since they can now profit by engaging in 
corporate activism17. However, even in cases when shareholders are diversified and 
might lack the motive to engage in corporate activism, liquidity can still foster 
discipline by reducing their expected cost of exit through a liquidation of their 
shares (Admati, and Pfleiderer, 2009; Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar, 2012). 
Hence, the threat of coordinated dumping by insiders and its potential adverse 
effect on managers’ wealth can impede managerial opportunism and exert a 
disciplining effect. It is also reasonable to assume that liquidity disciplines 
management by making the threat of a takeover more credible. Even though there 
are significant regulatory constraints on hostile bank acquisitions, underperforming 
banks might still become a target of a hostile takeover (e.g. Baradwaj, Fraser, and 
Furtado, 1990). When markets are liquid, the cost of purchasing shares in the 
secondary market is reduced, which suggests that bidders encounter less obstacles 
in their effort to accumulate a critical mass of stock in pursuit of their purpose. As a 
result, the market of corporate control operates more efficiently when a bank’s 
stock is more liquid.  
In addition to the aforementioned agency-based causative explanations, 
efficiency gains from liquidity can be derived due to its ramifications over 
ownership structure or its impact on the cost of equity financing. A considerable 
number of papers document that companies with low information frictions are more 
appealing to small investors, and as a result tend to have more dispersed ownership 
structure (Rubin, 2007). Conversely, low secondary market liquidity can further 
deter small shareholders from investing due to expropriation concerns (e.g. 
collusion of large shareholders with the management) or high adverse selection 
costs; this in turn will translate into inertia in the secondary market, a concentrated 
ownership structure and a further increase in the cost of equity financing. Empirical 
evidence on the relation between ownership structure and bank efficiency, however, 
is at best scarce and inconclusive. Sanders, Strock and Travlos (1990) show that 
deregulation exacerbates risk taking particularly in the case of banks controlled by 
                                            
17  Examples of shareholder activism are typically encountered in voting, proxy contests, shareholders’ 
resolutions, nomination of directors etc.   
98 Chapter 4  
   
 
shareholders rather than managers. In addition, Laeven, and Ross (2009) show that 
concentration in cash flow rights is positively correlated with risk, and that 
increasing regulation can generate perverse incentives in the case of banks with 
large owners. In another paper, Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2007) focus on  
European banks and find that ownership concentration is positively related to asset 
quality and negatively related to insolvency risk, whereas an earlier analysis of the 
German banking sector finds no material difference in efficiency across banks with 
different ownership characteristics (Altunbas, Evans, and Molyneux, 2001).  
Since a concentrated ownership structure is typically associated with a larger 
illiquidity discount rate, it will naturally translate to a larger cost of equity 
financing (e.g. Dierkens, 1991; Butler, Grullon, and Weston, 2005). Hence, by 
raising the financing cost of future investment opportunities through equity, 
illiquidity can have negative implications on expected profitability. Moreover, 
several studies document that firms with illiquid shares use debt markets more 
often to raise capital, and therefore demonstrate higher leverage (Frieder and 
Martell, 2006; Lipson and Mortal, 2009). This increases the agency cost of debt 
which in turn can exacerbate problems of underinvestment. In another example, 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) use an international sample of banks and show that lower 
leverage is associated with better performance in the recent financial turmoil. 
Following the aforementioned evidence, it is intuitive to conjecture that stock 
liquidity can have important implications on banks’ operating efficiency and risk 
appetite through its impact on the type of available financing options and through 
its implications over capital structure (Gropp, and Heider, 2008).  
Nevertheless, there are also reasons to suspect that liquidity can have the 
opposite effect on corporate governance. For example, one might argue that 
increasing stock liquidity due to a dispersed ownership structure implies that the 
marginal benefits from private information collections are now redistributed to a 
larger number of shareholders. This exacerbates the concern of potential “free-
riding” by small investors, and essentially undermines the incentives of large 
investors to monitor managers diligently (Shleifer, and Vishny, 1986). In addition, 
the low transaction costs of liquid companies reduce the cost of exit by large 
shareholders (Bhide, 1993) which can further undermine corporate control since 
shareholders with private information might just choose to “vote with their feet”. 
Even though many of the aforementioned arguments have been refuted by 
theoretical (Homström, and Tirole, 1993; Maug, 1998) as well as empirical work 
(Fang et al., 2009) mostly in the context of non-financial companies, there is 
certainly a lack of research over the role of trading activity and stock liquidity on 
the performance of banks. Our effort in this paper is to cover this shortfall. 
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4.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
 
We use Bankscope to collect annual balance sheet information for publicly 
listed banks over the period 1997 to 2012. Our sample of banks spans 31 countries, 
from which 19 are classified as developed and the remaining 12 as emerging 
markets18. One of the advantages of such an extensive dataset is to that it allows us 
to investigate the tenor of our findings across a heterogeneous number of countries, 
and thus shed more light on the interplay between market monitoring and different 
regulatory restrictions, legal environments, corporate governance standards and 
economic structures. By restricting our attention to listed banks we ensure a 
minimum level of information quality and comparability across different countries 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2010). In the case of international banks, 
Bankscope converts all balance sheet information into U.S. dollars. One concern in 
that respect might be that U.S. dollar denomination might obscure the impact of a 
turmoil in the currency markets on the profitability and financing costs of domestic 
banks. In the case of emerging markets, arms-length financing to local banks is 
mostly extended in hard currency, and thus any unhedged currency mismatch 
between bank assets and liabilities can have a significant impact on the banking 
sector, particularly in periods of dramatic devaluations. However, since all our 
variables are expressed in relative terms (typically in units of balance sheet assets), 
we do not expect this conversion to affect our analysis. 
Our initial sample contains information for a total of 1,527 banks from which 
857 come from the U.S. To avoid double-counting, we restrict our sample to 
include only information obtained from consolidated accounts. We also exclude 
banks classified as investment banks since their funding structure, legal restrictions, 
and business model differs markedly from other types of banks (Delis, and 
Kouretas, 2011). As a result, our final dataset consists of 1,105 banks which are 
categorised either as commercial banks, savings banks, real estate and mortgage 
banks, or bank holding companies. Limited data availability for a number of 
balance sheet components however, will further reduce our sample size as we later 
demonstrate with our empirical analysis. To mitigate the effect of outliers in our 
inference, we also follow the example of previous studies and winsorize the data at 
the 2% level19, in both sides of the sample distribution.  
                                            
18 Following the classification of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), developed markets in our sample 
are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
emerging markets in our sample are Chile, China, Greece, India, Ireland, Malaysia, Peru, Portugal, Russia, South 
Africa, South Korea, and Thailand.    
19 Our findings do not differ materially for different levels of winsorization.  
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4.3.1 Measures of Stock Liquidity 
 
To construct our liquidity variables we compile data from Datastream and 
Bloomberg. More specifically, we use Datastream to collect the weekly adjusted 
price (P; closing price in local currency adjusted for splits and dividends), the 
weekly total return index (RI), the weekly trading volume (VO; expressed in 1,000 
shares), and the corresponding number of shares outstanding (NOSH; expressed in 
thousands of shares) for each bank in our sample. Literature to date has developed 
an extensive number of alternative liquidity measures. Nevertheless, there is no 
conclusive evidence on which is the most appropriate, mainly because different 
measures capture different aspects of liquidity. The Amihud proxy is widely 
considered among the most popular liquidity measures, and several studies 
document that it is significantly correlated with high-frequency measures of 
transaction costs (Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009). It is constructed to 
reflect the marginal price response caused by a unit of trading volume (in local 
currency), and hence its value is increasing with illiquidity. We follow the example 
of other studies (e.g. Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012) and multiply by -1 the 
logarithm of the Amihud ratio in order to obtain a measure that is increasing with 
liquidity. By using the logarithmic transformation we also mitigate concerns related 
to excessive skewness or non-symmetry in our data (we apply the same 
transformation to the other liquidity measures as well). In more detail, we construct 
the Amihud liquidity measure based on the formula below: 
 
               ܮܫ ௜ܳ,௧ = −݈݋݃ ൬1 + หோ௘௧೔,೟ห௉೔,೟∙௏ை೔,೟൰                                                  (4.1) 
 
where ܮܫ ௜ܳ,௧ is the Amihud liquidity measure, ܴ݁ݐ௜,௧ is the stock return, ௜ܲ,௧ is the 
adjusted closing price, and ܸ ௜ܱ,௧ is the trading volume of bank stock i on week t. 
Hence, the greater the price reaction due to a unit of trading volume, the higher the 
compensation requested due to concerns of adverse selection, and thus the lower 
the liquidity. 
Another commonly used measure of liquidity is stock turnover. It primarily 
reflects trading activity in the secondary market and is typically computed as the 
(log) ratio of trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding. Below is 
the respective formula:   
 
 ܶ ௜ܸ,௧ = ݈݋݃ ൬1 + ௏ை೔,೟ேைௌு೔,೟൰                                                            (4.2) 
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where ܶ ௜ܸ,௧  is the turnover measure, ܸ ௜ܱ,௧  is the trading volume, ܱܰܵܪ௜,௧  is the 
number of shares outstanding for bank stock i on week t. Essentially, high stock 
turnover is associated with reduced inventory risk by market makers, and should 
therefore reflect better liquidity. Nevertheless, increased trading volume can also 
indicate a larger participation of short-term investors demonstrating herding 
behaviour, thus consuming rather than enhancing liquidity. In that respect, turnover 
can be a misleading indicator of liquidity since during periods when investors 
liquidate their positions disproportionally and thus liquidity abates, trading volume 
might still appear elevated provided that market makers are still accommodating 
the trading flow. Notwithstanding the ambiguity over its interpretation however, 
stock turnover remains among the most popular liquidity measures, and thus our 
choice is to include it in our study. 
The last of our liquidity proxies is the (proportional) quoted spread, which 
typically qualifies as one of the most refined and direct measures of liquidity. It is 
computed as the ratio of the prevailing ask quote minus the prevailing bid quote, 
standardized relative to the midpoint of the prevailing bid-ask quote. More 
specifically, our computation is based on the formula below: 
 
ܵܲܦ௜,ௗ = ݈݋݃ ൬1 + ௔௦௞೔,೏ି௕௜ௗ೔,೏൫௔௦௞೔,೏ା௕௜ௗ೔,೏൯/ଶ൰                                                 (4.3) 
 
where ܵܲܦ௜,௧ is the proportional quoted spread, ܽݏ݇௜,௧ is the prevailing ask price, 
and ܾ݅݀௜,௧ is the prevailing bid price for bank stock i on day d. To eliminate outliers 
due to reporting errors we exclude stock-day observations with bid quotes larger or 
equal to ask quotes, dollar spreads exceeding 5 (local currency units), and values of 
the proportional spread above 4. Naturally, higher levels of the quoted spread 
reflect higher transaction costs, which is reminiscent of higher information 
asymmetry and reduced liquidity for the particular stock.  
To construct the annual value of the aforementioned liquidity measures we 
compute the arithmetic mean of the weekly Amihud (turnover) ratio and the 
arithmetic mean of the daily quoted spread for each year. For a detailed definition 
of all our variables we refer to Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
 
4.3.2 Bank efficiency, risk, and performance variables  
 
As our first measure of bank performance we use Tobin’s Q which is 
typically computed as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of 
its liabilities divided by the book value of assets. As a market-based measure of 
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performance, Tobin’s Q is considered a closer proxy for the economic rate of return 
of a bank’s assets since it incorporates the discount rate of future profits with the 
appropriate risk premium. Moreover, it is forward-looking and demonstrates higher 
resilience over earnings management, or anticipated changes in tax laws and 
accounting rules which render accounting measures less reliable. In principle, 
banks with assets that trade at a higher multiple of their book value are perceived as 
more efficient, and thus more likely to capitalize on their growth option by 
translating their opportunity set to the maximum possible profits. Within the 
banking industry this can be attributed either to greater managerial competence, 
superior lending/screening technology (e.g. risk management, credit monitoring), 
or more cost-effective operational structure. On the other hand, it can also reflect a 
favourable market valuation of its charter due to superior market power, which 
might have been established over historical rather than efficiency grounds. To 
account for this concern, we apply a decomposition of Tobin’s Q (Fang, Noe, and 
Tice, 2009) and evaluate the relative contribution of stock liquidity to each 
individual component 20 . We also employ two of the most commonly used 
accounting measures of profitability, namely Return on Assets (ROA) and Return 
on Equity (ROE). The former typically reflects the ability of management to 
generate profits conditional on the overall size of the balance sheet, but it can also 
be biased upwards in case a bank commits a substantial amount of capital in off-
balance sheet investment. ROE on the other hand represents the total profit 
generated per unit of shareholder equity, and as a result it might be a more relevant 
metric of the benefits induced by shareholder monitoring. One shortcoming 
however is that the latter measure does not adjust for the level of bank leverage, 
which might be elevated for the purpose of boosting shareholder profits in order to 
favourably influence market valuations at the expense of higher default risk. 
Moreover, ROA and ROE are both backward-looking performance measures since 
they both record the outcome of investments made at an earlier stage. This concern 
however is mitigated by the fact that in our empirical setup all the dependent 
variables follow the regressors by one year. We complement our performance 
analysis using a risk-adjusted measure of performance reminiscent of the Sharpe 
ratio, which we compute as the ratio of the average ROA over its standard deviation. 
Our version of the Sharpe ratio demonstrates only cross-sectional variation, and we 
only compute it when the minimum number of years with available information is 
no less than four (Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2010). A higher Sharpe ratio 
reflects improved ability to realize profits for a given unit of risk and as such it 
alludes to superior skill by management and greater operating efficiency.  
                                            
20 More details can be found in the sections that follow. 
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Our main measure of a bank’s solvency risk is the z-score which we compute 
as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of the mean ROA plus the mean ratio 
of equity capital over assets, divided by the standard deviation of the ROA. The log 
transformation is used to mitigate concerns typically attributed to the skewness of 
the initial distribution (Laeven, and Levine, 2009). The aforementioned ratio 
essentially translates to the number of standard deviations bank ROA needs to 
decline to completely wipe out the equity base of the bank. As such, the values of a 
bank’s z-score are monotonically increasing (decreasing) with the distance 
(probability) to default. Similar to the Sharpe ratio, we require a minimum of four 
years of available information to be able to compute the z-score of each bank. We 
also use the standard deviation of a bank’s ROA as an additional indicator of profit 
uncertainty, and hence risk. We complement our risk analysis with two additional 
measures that vary both across time and the cross-section, namely the share of 
impaired loans in the overall portfolio of bank loans, and the dollar share of assets 
classified as non-performing standardized by the overall value of assets. The former 
accounts for the credit risk in a bank’s loan portfolio, whereas the latter reflects 
credit risk as a proportion of the balance sheet. Given that the share of non-interest 
income in total revenue has been rapidly increasing, the latter measure can provide 
a more informative account of the relative importance of credit risk in the balance 
sheet. 
We also investigate the relation between liquidity and operating efficiency 
across banks. To the extent that banks at the top-end of the liquidity spectrum 
demonstrate superior profitability that is not merely an artifact of riskier activities 
(profit efficiency), it would be interesting to examine how stock liquidity relates to 
operating efficiency. In other words, assuming that stock liquidity proxies for more 
efficient monitoring by shareholders and given its positive ramifications on 
principal-agent frictions and managerial discipline, we would expect that banks 
with higher stock liquidity operate closer to their efficient production function. 
Hence, if market discipline translates to more efficient use of bank capital it might 
also be associated to superior operating standards as reflected in better risk 
management techniques, superior screening and monitoring technology of loans, 
and more accurate valuation techniques. To measure operating efficiency we rely 
on one of the most commonly used cost efficiency metrics, namely the ratio of 
operating costs over total generated income (e.g. Iannotta et al., 2007). As an 
additional efficiency measure we use the ratio of gross revenues over the total 
number of employees. One drawback of the latter approach however is the limited 
number of available observations over the annual number of employees for each 
bank which limits our sample size substantially.     
 
104 Chapter 4  
   
 
4.3.3 Control variables  
 
A potential concern with our analysis relates to the argument that stock 
liquidity and bank performance (or risk) can be both determined by a common set 
of variables. One way to address such concerns that allude to spurious inference 
due to an omitted variable bias is by populating our inference with an extensive 
number of control variables. Thus, our approach is to control for a wide set of 
factors, both at the industry and country level, that previous studies have elicited as 
determinants of bank profitability. We compute the ratio of cash and deposits with 
the central bank (CB) over the total value of assets and interpret it as the proportion 
of liquid assets relative to the size of the balance sheet. More liquidity in the 
balance sheet can translate to higher resilience over the adverse potential of rising 
financing costs, since banks will be able to use their cash to offset the impact of 
deposit withdrawals or deteriorating conditions in the interbank market. On the 
other hand, a higher proportion of liquidity in the balance sheet can exacerbate 
agency issues related to free cash flow problems or indicate a greater risk-shifting 
capacity on behalf of bank managers who can expeditiously mobilize their cash to 
engage in riskier activities. Hence, its relation to risk and bank performance is 
considered ambiguous. We also control for bank dependence on non-core financing 
which typically translates to funding instability since it exposes banks to significant 
rollover risk. To construct our measure, we follow Beltratti, and Stulz (2012) and 
compute the share of non-core liabilities consisting of deposits from other banks 
(also loans and repos), short term borrowing (e.g. money market instruments and 
CDs), and financing obtained from capital markets not categorized otherwise over 
the dollar value of overall short term funds which also include total customer 
deposits. As recent experience demonstrated, non-core liabilities are very sensitive 
to economic conditions and changing market valuations, rendering a bank more 
susceptible to the possibility of a run in the wholesale market (Ivashina, and 
Scharfstein, 2008; Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, and Tehranian, 2011). Nevertheless, 
given the limited supply of deposits, banks with greater access to wholesale funds 
are able to adjust their capital structure faster and can thus reap a larger share of the 
opportunity set when liquidity in the wholesale market is abundant (Adrian, and 
Shin, 2008). Hence, the impact of non-core financing on bank profitability and risk 
can also be ambiguous. We also control for the extent of revenue diversification at 
each bank by computing the share of non-interest related income in total operating 
income. As several studies indicate, non-interest income (e.g. revenues from 
trading securities, brokerage fees, fiduciary income, and charges not otherwise 
categorized) has become an increasingly important source of revenue for banks 
over the recent years (Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2010). Banks exclusively 
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focused on credit provision are more exposed to the risk of a downturn in the real 
estate market compared to those with a more diversified revenue structure. 
However, as several studies indicate, profits derived from certain non-interest 
related activities (e.g. trading securities) demonstrate substantial cyclicality (Stiroh, 
2004), and thus banks being overly dependent on such activities might demonstrate 
even higher susceptibility to economic downturns than otherwise. We also explore 
the relative contribution of the two most important components of the non-interest 
income variable to bank profitability, namely income from securities trading and 
fees, by including their respective share over total operating income in our 
regressions. As a measure of bank exposure to credit risk we use the ratio of the 
dollar value of outstanding loans and committed credit lines divided by total assets. 
Customer loans cover a wide range of lending, from credit extended to 
municipalities or the government, to loans provided to corporate clients, retail 
mortgages etc. Except for the aforementioned type of loans however, many banks 
are exposed to large amounts of unused loan commitments, and can thus face 
substantial liquidity risk during an economic downturn when takedown demand 
increases (Cornett et al., 2011). In extreme conditions, bank clients draw down 
their emergency credit lines en masse, undermining the ability of banks to extend 
credit when it is most needed and capitalize from other profitable opportunities. 
Hence, including untapped credit lines in our computations is quintessential since 
our measure would otherwise understate bank exposure to credit risk. We construct 
a proxy of bank capitalization based on the share of tangible equity in total assets 
(we subtract the value of intangible assets from equity whenever available), which 
essentially corresponds to the bank’s capital buffer to adverse profitability shocks. 
Banks with a higher share of own equity are expected to demonstrate higher risk 
aversion because of the greater costs associated with a default, whereas banks with 
low capitalization might seek to maximize their implicit put option by engaging in 
riskier behaviour. 
  We naturally control for the role of scale economies as well as for other size 
related issues (e.g. systemic importance and implicit government guarantees) by 
including the logarithm of the real value of total bank assets (we deflate them using 
the CPI of the respective year). Larger asset size can also relate to greater analyst 
coverage, and/or higher visibility by equity investors, in which case more 
information would be produced and stock liquidity would increase. We also control 
for market performance by computing the time-series average of weekly stock 
returns for each bank. In this way we account for positive feedback trading by 
momentum investors who might demonstrate a bias towards best performing bank 
stocks, thus elevating trading activity in the secondary market. The underlying 
argument is that if we assume that cash flows shocks are -at least- partially 
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anticipated by equity investors, they would boost market performance and thus 
generate the aforementioned clientele effects that translate to higher liquidity. 
Hence, to identify the role of stock liquidity independently of that from the 
complex mix of signals typically contained in market values it is necessary to 
control for stock market performance. Additionally, we differentiate across banks 
on the basis of the annual growth rate of their loans and deposits, whereas we also 
control for differences the cost structure by including the ratio of overhead 
expenses over total assets (in some specification we specifically control for the 
share of personnel costs in total assets). A rigid cost structure can weigh negatively 
on performance by narrowing down bank profit margins, and as such it is important 
to include in our inference (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2010).  
Bank performance is highly dependent on macroeconomic conditions 
(Athanasoglou, Brissimis, and Delis, 2008). Several studies indicate that the same 
holds for systemic liquidity (e.g. Brockman, Chung, and Pèrignon, 2009; Naes et 
al., 2011). When the economy is growing (contracting) the average number of 
borrowers who are unable to meet their payment obligations abates (soars), and 
thus the quality of banks’ loan portfolio improves (deteriorates). As a result, a 
correlation between liquidity and bank performance might be merely the reflection 
of a general improvement in the economic environment. We address the 
aforementioned concerns by including an extensive number of variables that 
account for the general state of the economy and investor sentiment. We proxy for 
general economic conditions using the annual average of quarterly (year-to-year) 
real GDP growth rate, and the annual average of the quarterly inflation rate (CPI). 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no clear prediction for the relation between 
inflation and bank profitability. Banks able to anticipate inflation successfully can 
divert part of their balance sheet to inflation proof-assets or adjust their cost 
structure to protect their profit margin. In the opposite case, banks unable to foresee 
inflation might be unable to promptly adjust their lending rates to offset rising 
operating expenses, and thus witness a decline in their profitability. We also use the 
S&P500 option implied volatility index (VIX) as a measure of aggregate risk 
aversion and investor sentiment, and the GDP per capita as a proxy of economic 
development. The VIX captures uncertainty over economic conditions and changes 
in global risk aversion that can influence the demand for credit and consequently 
bank profitability, but can also relate to trading activity in equity markets and thus 
to liquidity (Adrian, and Shin, 2008). We also include the domestic short (time-
series average of the quarterly 3-month T-Bill rate) and long term interest rates 
(time series average of the quarterly 10-year sovereign bond rate) to account for the 
stance of monetary policy, prevailing financing conditions, and the average level of 
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interest rate margins. For an overview of all our variables and the respective data 
sources we refer to table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
 
4.3.4 Descriptives and Univariate Analysis 
 
In Table 4.1 we present some descriptive statistics for the basic variables of 
our analysis. By construction, Amihud liquidity is always negative, with values 
closer to zero indicating higher liquidity. Consistent with other studies, our 
liquidity variables demonstrate significant skewness –negative for the Amihud ratio, 
positive for the quoted spread respectively – which is mainly induced by periods of 
extreme marketwide liquidity drops 21 . Moreover, all our liquidity measures 
demonstrate higher variation across rather than within markets, suggesting that 
there are substantial differences in the level of trading activity, particularly between 
developed and emerging markets (e.g. Eleswarapu, and Venkataraman, 2006). 
Tobin’s Q demonstrates less dispersion across countries, varying from a low of 
0.91 to a maximum of 1.35. Based on Table 4.1, the average market value of bank 
assets is almost at parity with their replacement cost (1.04), the average stock price 
trades at an average of 19.3 times its earnings, whereas the median bank is able to 
generate 0.73 cents per additional dollar in balance sheet assets. The average 
income generated from non-interest related activities contributes 30.3% to total 
operating income, very close to the value reported by Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Huizinga (2010) which is 35.3%. This can be attributed to the fact that unlike the 
aforementioned study, our sample extends to the post crisis period between 2008 – 
2012, during which most banks have refocused to their core activities in part due to 
regulatory pressures, but also due to diminishing returns from those alternative 
activities during the crisis period (e.g. securities trading). The average share of non-
deposit funding in our sample of banks (funding fragility) is 18.5% of their total 
short term demandable funding, which lies between the values reported by 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2010) and Beltratti, and Stulz (2012). We observe 
that the average ratio of impaired loans (assets) over total customer loans (assets) 
demonstrates substantial variation, ranging from a low of 0.05% (0.00%) to a 
maximum of 15.5% (9.86%). This is not surprising given the extensive time period 
of our sample, which covers periods both of global economic expansion and of 
prolonged contraction, and given that loan delinquencies are extremely cyclical. 
Weekly stock market returns demonstrate similar dispersion, ranging from as a low 
as -1.85% to as high as 2.61%. Year-to-year deposit growth for the average bank is 
                                            
21 The positive skewness of market turnover can be indicative of either rare liquidity crushes or periods of 
extreme investor euphoria. 
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11.13%, which translates to an average of 9.77% (9.69%) annual growth in total 
customer loans (assets); both numbers compare closely to figures provided by other 
papers (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2010; Foos, Norden, and Weber, 2010). 
The share of tangible equity varies comparably within and across countries, 
whereas the average bank has 8.56% tangible equity over assets. Tangible equity 
demonstrates positive skewness which is naturally attributed to the obligatory 
capital restrictions imposed by regulators across all the countries.  
In figures 4.1 and 4.2 we use a graphical interface to examine the relation 
between liquidity and certain variables of interest, both in a static as well as in a 
dynamic framework that investigates how the relation develops over the years. In 
more detail, for every year in our sample we aggregate banks listed in the U.S. 
(they account for more than half of our sample) on the basis of their ranking in one 
of the four liquidity quartiles the previous year, and then compute the average of 
each variable within every portfolio over time or aggregate across all the years. 
Figure 4.1 presents the top (75%) and bottom (25%) quartiles, which correspond to 
the low and upper end of the liquidity spectrum respectively, since computations 
are made using the quoted spread liquidity measure. Except for issues related to 
reverse causality and spurious correlation, there is also another reason to sort banks 
on the basis of past liquidity. Since liquidity proxies for the extent of investors’ 
direct or indirect involvement in monitoring managerial conduct and the investment 
strategy followed, it is natural to assume that certain time needs to lapse before the 
benefits (disadvantages) of stringent (loose) monitoring start to manifest in bank 
performance or efficiency. The graphs show that the portfolio of bank stocks at the 
upper-end of the liquidity spectrum (below the 25th percentile of the quoted spread) 
almost always display superior performance (higher ROA) and efficiency (lower 
Cost/Income), lower credit risk (Impaired Loans/Loans), and higher market 
valuation of assets (Tobin’s Q) compared to banks at the low-end of the spectrum 
(above the 75th percentile of the quoted spread). We also see that bank profitability 
declined dramatically during the peak years of the recent financial crisis (2007 – 
2008), only to start recovering from 2009 and onwards. Similar to performance, the 
share of non-performing loans in banks’ loan portfolio is surging during the 
financial crisis. It is noticeable however, that the credit risk of banks with more 
liquid stock recovers much faster compared to banks with illiquid stock, indicating 
that the portfolio of banks that were more closely monitored by markets had better 
credit quality and had thus weathered the financial storm being less affected. In 
Figure 4.2 we report the time average of the aforementioned bank characteristics 
for each portfolio of bank stocks. Now we use both the quoted spread and the 
Aminud ratio to assign banks to the respective liquidity quartile. We observe that 
bank performance and market valuation increase (decrease) almost monotonically 
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with the (il) liquidity quartile, whereas the opposite applies for credit risk and the 
inefficiency ratio. Table 4.2 presents the unconditional Pearson correlations 
between our baseline variables. The Amihud ratio and the quoted spread have a 
substantial negative correlation, with statistical significance above the 10% level. 
On the other hand, stock turnover demonstrates very weak correlation with the 
other two liquidity proxies. All our liquidity measures correlate more than 10% 
with Tobin’s Q, at a statistically significant level and with a sign denoting that 
market valuation constitutes a higher multiple of book value in banks with higher 
stock liquidity. Consistent with our reasoning, liquidity has also an unconditional 
negative correlation with both bank cost inefficiency and credit risk. Moreover, the 
share of non-interest income and non-core financing are positively correlated with 
liquidity as well as with Tobin’s Q and bank size. It is natural to expect that large 
banks tap wholesale markets to a larger extent compared to small banks, and also 
rely relatively less on traditional lending to produce their profits. The 
aforementioned activities can generate more visibility among investors which can 
result in higher liquidity. Hence, accounting for differences in the financing model 
and income structure across banks is important in order to isolate the liquidity 
effect and avoid any spurious inference.  
Table 4.3 provides a more detailed univariate comparison between our three 
liquidity measures and several bank characteristics, this time including banks from 
all the countries in our sample. Our variables of interest account for bank 
performance (Tobin’s Q, ROA), credit risk (Impaired Loans), on-balance sheet 
liquidity (Cash/Assets), and bank size ((log) Total Assets). In more detail, for each 
year in our sample we rank banks in one of the four liquidity quartiles on the basis 
of their stock liquidity, separately for each country, and then compute the pooled 
equally-weighted average of each of the aforementioned bank characteristics for the 
year following the sort in each of the four bank portfolios, and across time. To be 
able to construct each of the four groups of banks in every country, we require a 
minimum of ten banks with non-missing information for the particular variable of 
interest. We also compute the difference between the top (Q4) and bottom (Q1) 
(il)liquidity quartiles, and test both for the equality of means of the respective 
quartiles (t-test), as well as the equality of medians (χ2-test). Overall, we observe 
that liquidity demonstrates an almost monotonic relation with all the 
aforementioned bank characteristics, regardless of the particular liquidity measure 
we employ for the portfolio construction. These relations are significant both in 
statistical and economic terms. For example, in the case of our inefficiency ratio we 
notice that a drop from the top (il)liquidity quartile to the bottom translates to an 
increase (decrease) of the inefficiency ratio by 8.05% (6.08%) according to the 
Amihud ratio (Quoted Spread), which is 12.38% (9.36%) of the unconditional 
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sample mean. In the case of profitability (ROA), banks that rank at the top quartile 
demonstrates higher profitability by 0.11% according to the Amihud Ratio (14.77% 
of the unconditional average22), whereas the corresponding difference in the case of 
credit risk is 1.51% which represents the 48.47% of the unconditional mean. Our 
measures of bank size and on-balance sheet liquidity are also positively associated 
with liquidity, which further supports the necessity to control for these factors in 
our multivariate setup. 
 
 
4.4. Econometric analysis and results 
 
In this section we examine the relation between our liquidity measures and 
bank risk-taking, performance, and operating efficiency, using a number of 
empirical models and after accounting for all other possible determinates of the 
aforementioned characteristics. 
 
 
4.4.1 Baseline Specification  
 
The previous section employs a univariate setup to establish the view that 
banks with higher stock liquidity are more cost efficient, demonstrate superior 
profitability and have lower credit risk in their loan portfolio. In other words, our 
earlier findings indicate that more stringent monitoring by equity markets translates 
into more skilful credit provision and monitoring, lower operating costs per unit of 
income generated, and superior ability to generate profits for shareholders. These 
findings however can just be the result of omitted bank characteristics incidentally 
correlated with liquidity, or unobserved country factors that explain both the 
variation in stock liquidity and the differences in our measures of bank performance 
across countries. To address such concerns, this section investigates the liquidity – 
bank performance nexus using a multivariate setting. We begin our analysis using a 
market based measure of performance, namely Tobin’s Q, which evaluates bank 
assets by assigning the appropriate discount rate over expected cash flows and then 
relates them to their respective accounting value. In that respect, it reflects the risk-
adjusted market consensus over a bank’s ability to generate value conditional on 
the size of this balance sheet. We account for any unobserved cross-country 
heterogeneity using country fixed effects, whereas we capture any common 
variation in bank performance that relates to global shocks during particular years 
                                            
22 Summary statistics for the variables not reported in Table 4.1 are available by authors upon request. 
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by including year fixed effects. We also control for differences in the particular 
type of bank charter (commercial banks, savings banks, real estate and mortgage 
banks, bank holding companies) using dummy variables. Equation (4.4) below 
defines the baseline empirical model we have just described.   
 
      ௜ܳ.௝,௧ = ௝ܿ + ܾ ∙ ܮܫܳ௜,௝,௧ିଵ + ∑ ݀௞ ∙ ܤܽ݊݇௜,௝,௧ିଵ௞௄௞ୀଵ + ∑ ݁௠ ∙ ܯܽܿݎ݋௝,௧ିଵ௠ெ௠ୀଵ + ܶݕ݌݁௜ + ܶ݅݉݁௧ + ߳௜.௝,௧   (4.4)  
     
where ௜ܳ.௝,௧ is Tobin’s Q, ܮܫ ௜ܳ,௝,௧ is one of our liquidity measures (Quoted Spread, 
Amihud Ratio, and Stock Turnover), and ܤܽ݊݇௜,௝,௧௞  corresponds to one of our K bank 
level control variables for bank i, country j, and year t respectively. ܯܽܿݎ݋௝,௧௠ is one 
of our M macroeconomic control variables for country j, during year t, ܶݕ݌݁௜ 
accounts for the particular bank type, and ܶ݅݉݁௧ for the year fixed effects. To avoid 
concerns related to the potential of joint determination of our regressors, and our 
liquidity variable in particular, with the measure of bank performance, we lag our 
regressors by one year, and thus implicitly assume they are predetermined. 
Moreover, one year seems to be a sufficient amount of time that is necessary to 
lapse before the benefits (disadvantages) of stringent (loose) market monitoring 
start to manifest in bank performance. Similar to previous studies (e.g. Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Huizinga, 2010), we estimate equation (4.4) as a pooled cross-sectional 
time-series model using OLS with clustering of the standard errors at the bank level.   
Table 4.4 presents the estimates of the basic model in equation (4.4). To facilitate 
the interpretation of our findings, all the regressors are normalized by their 
unconditional standard deviation (SD). We observe that with the exception of 
column 10, the coefficients of the Amihud ratio and of the Quoted Spread are 
always statistically significant at the 1% level. When we exclude the 2007 – 2012 
crisis period, statistical significance is reduced to 10% for Quoted Spread (and 
Turnover23), whereas the Amihud ratio remains significant at the 1% level. In the 
case of the extended regression model presented in Columns (7)-(9), we find that 
1SD increase in the Quoted Spread (Amihud Ratio) translates to a 0.67% (1.7%) 
decrease (increase) in Tobin’s Q, which corresponds to a 0.64% (1.03%) decrease 
(increase) compared to the unconditional mean. Results for turnover are still 
significant but weaker both in statistical and economic terms. From a different 
perspective, the impact of liquidity (Amihud Ratio) is larger than the impact of our 
measure for global risk aversion (VIX), and almost twice the magnitude of the real 
GDP growth variable. Hence, stock liquidity appears to be an important 
determinant of bank performance. Regarding our control variables, funding 
                                            
23 Results for Turnover are not presented due to space limitation. They are, however, available from the authors 
upon request. 
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fragility seems to have a particularly strong effect on market performance, with a 
1SD increase in the share of non-core financing to be associated with a 0.98% 
decrease in market performance the following year (Column (8)). Market 
performance and balance sheet liquidity have both a strong positive effect on 
performance, whereas bank size is also positively correlated to market performance 
alluding to advantages associated with scale economies in the banking sector. The 
implied volatility index demonstrates the most pronounced effect among our macro 
variables, indicating that an increase in global risk aversion weighs negatively on 
bank performance.  
The basic disadvantage of a market-based measure is that cash flow 
expectations or market consensus over the respective discount rate can change due 
to fluctuations in investor sentiment. In addition, banks might seek to exploit 
favourable economic conditions and investor’s euphoria by increasing leverage, 
thus boosting expected profits, and further enhancing market valuations. To 
disentangle the role of liquidity from the aforementioned effects and shed more 
light upon the liquidity – bank performance nexus, we follow Fang et al. (2009) 
and decompose Tobin’s Q as follows:  
 
                        ௜ܳ.௝,௧ =  ெ௏_ா௤௨௜௧௬೔.ೕ,೟ே௘௧_ை௣௘௥_ூ௡௖೔,ೕ,೟ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇥ
௉ ாൗ
∙ ெ௏_஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,ೕ,೟ெ௏_ா௤௨௜௧௬೔,ೕ,೟ᇣᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇥ
௅௘௩௘௥௔௚௘షభ
∙ ே௘௧_ை௣௘௥_ூ௡௖೔,ೕ,೟஻௏_஺௦௦௘௧௦೔,ೕ,೟                            (4.5)   
 
where ܯܸ_ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ௜.௝,௧ corresponds to the market value of equity, ܰ݁ݐ_ܱ݌݁ݎ_ܫ݊ܿ௜,௝,௧ is the 
net operating income, ܯܸ_ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௝,௧ is the market value of assets, and ܤܸ_ܣݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௝,௧ 
is the book value of assets of bank i, at country j, during year t. The first component 
can be interpreted as a sentiment indicator24, the second component is the inverse of 
financial leverage, and the third demonstrates the ability of a bank to generate 
profits after adjusting for the size of its respective balance sheet. Hence, among the 
aforementioned Tobin’s Q components, it is the third ratio that captures most 
clearly the extent of managerial skill in the allocation of economic resources.      
We now repeat our estimation of equation (4.4), by replacing Tobin’s Q with 
each of the components indicated in equation (4.5). Table 4.5 presents the 
respective results. If the relation between liquidity and performance is driven by 
their joint correlation with investor sentiment, it is natural to expect that banks with 
higher stock liquidity will trade at a higher multiple of their net income compared 
to banks with low stock liquidity. If that is the case, it would be the sentiment 
component that was mainly responsible for our earlier results. Table 4.6 shows that 
with the exception of Stock Turnover, both the Amihud Ratio and the Quoted 
                                            
24 The P/E ratio is widely used as a barometer of investor sentiment. 
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Spread have no explanatory power over a bank’s PE ratio. Conversely, the latter 
liquidity measures are strongly associated with the other two components of 
Tobin’s Q, with statistical significance always at the 1% level. In more detail, a 
1SD increase in the Amihud’s Ratio (Quoted Spread) predicts a 49.5% (19.8%) 
increase (decrease) of net income over its unconditional average, and a 16% (10.8%) 
decrease (increase) in financial leverage respectively. Hence, the effect of liquidity 
on Tobin’s Q documented in Table 4.4 is mainly due the former’s positive 
association with profitability and its negative relation to financial leverage. The 
effect of (Amihud) liquidity on profitability (Column 2) is almost equivalent to the 
effect of economic growth, which previous studies identify as one of the most 
important determinants of bank performance (e.g. Iannotta et al., 2007; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010).  Only the most crude of our liquidity measures, namely 
Stock Turnover, does not seem to validate our hypothesis, namely that market 
monitoring can enhance bank operating performance without a subsequent increase 
in risk or leverage. In that respect, it is not without relevance that stock turnover is 
often used by previous studies as a proxy for investor sentiment (e.g. Baker and 
Stein, 2004; Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan, 2012). Among our remaining variables, we 
notice that banks with a higher share of non-interest related activities demonstrate 
higher profitability but trade at a lower multiple of their earnings. One 
interpretation might be that non-core revenue sources are perceived by equity 
investors as more risky and less reliable, although they account for an increasing 
proportion of bank profits. On the other hand, funding fragility is negatively 
associated both with profitability and investor sentiment, whereas more on-balance 
sheet liquidity is only (positively) correlated with future profits at a statistically 
significant level. It is noteworthy that stock returns are strongly related to all three 
components of Tobin’s Q, significantly at the 1% level. This finding further 
supports our earlier intuition regarding the added value of stock liquidity as a more 
refined predictor of future bank performance, given that market returns typically 
reflect a much wider mix of signals. Consistent with previous studies, we also find 
that better capitalized banks are able to generate higher profits, and tend to trade at 
a higher multiple of their earnings, perhaps indicating the predominance of 
overoptimistic investors or due to demand pressure attributed to clientele effects.  
 
 
4.4.2 Stock liquidity, bank performance, and risk  
 
We now turn our attention to the relation between liquidity, leverage, and 
bank performance in more detail. Our findings so far indicate that banks at the 
upper-end of the liquidity spectrum have lower financial leverage and higher 
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profitability compared to banks at the bottom-end. However, the significant relation 
between the aforementioned components of Tobin’s Q and liquidity, which we 
have already documented, is not sufficient for concluding the existence of a causal 
relationship between them. For example, in the case of financial leverage one 
argument might be that our measure demonstrates a mechanical correlation with 
liquidity since it uses the market value of equity for its construction which already 
incorporates an illiquidity discount. We address this concern by computing 
leverage based on accounting values, and then repeat our earlier estimation. 
Moreover, leverage figures can conceal substantial differences in the riskiness of 
balance sheet assets which might not be properly captured by accounting values. So 
we try to verify our conclusions using a risk-adjusted version of accounting 
leverage. Another concern relates to the problem of endogeneity. One argument is 
that investors might shun away from banks that typically resort to higher leverage 
in order to boost their earnings, thus lowering their distance to default, and 
implicitly back-loading any adverse market valuation effects. In the case of 
performance, investors might refrain from holding stocks of banks lagging behind 
in terms of competitiveness or market share which are thus expected to deliver 
relatively low profits in the future. This behaviour can in turn induce low trading 
volume and result in thin markets. To address such concerns we instrument bank 
stock liquidity, and complement our analysis with a two-stage least squares 
estimation (2SLS). Our set of instruments consists of the type of bank charter, and 
the average idiosyncratic volatility of two other banks with the closest possible 
market value to that of the instrumented bank. It is reasonable to assume that banks 
with different charters adopt distinct business models, which in turn translates to 
differences over the extent of their dependence on equity financing, and thus 
different depth in the secondary market. It is also natural to assume that a bank’s 
charter is exogenously determined. On the other hand, the level of idiosyncratic 
volatility typically reflects the extent of private information flow that is 
incorporated into stock prices through informed trading (Roll, 1988), and as such it 
directly relates to liquidity. Ferreira and Laux (2007) for example document that 
stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility correspond to companies with better 
governance standards, and fewer anti-takeover provisions, and as such induce more 
trading by institutional investors. Moreover, given that the set of candidate banks 
used to construct our idiosyncratic volatility instrument extends to all the countries 
in our sample, it is difficult to argue that an adverse shock affecting both liquidity 
and leverage can systematically correlate with the extent of informed trading of 
stocks listed across different exchanges. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that both 
our instruments are closely related to bank stock liquidity, and are exogenous. 
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Table 4.6 presents our findings regarding the relation between leverage 
(accounting), the ratio of interest expenses, the cost of debt financing, and bank 
stock liquidity. Except for the last specification, stock liquidity is always negatively 
associated both to leverage and the cost of debt financing significantly at the 1% 
level. In unreported results we find the same relation holds if we replace our 
measure of leverage with one that takes into consideration the riskiness of different 
assets by weighting them accordingly (risk weighted assets over equity). Our 
findings are also significant in economic terms. According to Column (2), one 
standard deviation increase in the Amihud ratio is associated with a decrease in 
leverage of 34.8% compared to its mean25, and a decline in the cost of debt by 6.5% 
over its unconditional mean. The tenor of our findings remains unchanged when we 
resort to 2SLS estimation to explicitly address endogeneity concerns. The partial R2 
indicates that our set of instruments captures a meaningful share of the variation in 
bank stock liquiditiy, whereas the F-test always rejects the null that the coefficients 
of our instruments are jointly equal to zero. Our findings are thus consistent with 
earlier studies showing that companies with higher stock liquidity have lower 
leverage and typically favour equity issuance over alternative sources of external 
financing (e.g. Lipson and Mortal, 2004). Our findings also suggest that banks with 
shares trading in more liquid markets not only benefit from a smaller illiquidity 
discount in the price of their shares, but also from a lower cost of debt. 
In Table 4.7 we present our findings over the relation between bank stock 
liquidity and future performance using a number of measures. Stock liquidity is 
always positively associated with future profitability, significantly at the 1% level. 
In the last two columns we use a cross-sectional measure of performance 
resembling the Sharpe ratio in which average profits are adjusted with their 
respective volatility. A one standard deviation increase in the quoted spread 
predicts a decline of 0.13% (1.88%) in next year’s ROA (ROE), and a 17.6% 
decline in the Sharpe ratio (Columns (1), (5), and (9) respectively). We note that 
our instruments typically capture a larger share of the variation in the Amihud ratio 
compared to the Quoted Spread, but the F-test always rejects the null of our 
instruments being jointly zero for both measures of liquidity. Consistent with 
intuition, our findings suggest that banks that are better capitalized, with more 
diversified sources of revenue, and less dependence on non-deposit financing 
typically demonstrate superior profitability. General economic conditions are also 
equally important determinants of bank performance as manifested by our GDP 
Growth variable. Interestingly, the liquidity effect (Amihud) dominates that of 
economic growth (GDP) across all our models. In unreported results we find that 
                                            
25  The unconditional means for (accounting) leverage and the cost of debt are 13.9779% and 3.1640% 
respectively. 
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stock turnover is only weakly associated with performance, demonstrating mixed 
sign, whereas it is not robust to alternative specifications.  
It is commonly perceived that banks can ex-ante improve expected 
profitability by increasing their leverage or by engaging in riskier activities. Hence, 
the positive relation between market liquidity and performance might merely reflect 
an indirect association of the former with either leverage or risk. Since our earlier 
findings establish the opposite relation between stock liquidity and leverage, we 
now explicitly investigate the potential link with bank risk-taking. In Tables 4.8, 
and 9 we present our findings using two different measures of risk, namely (on 
balance sheet) credit risk and the bank distance-to-default as dependent variables, 
respectively. Similar to our earlier specifications, we explicitly account for 
potential endogeneity between liquidity and risk using a 2SLS approach using the 
instruments we have already discussed. We also control for the growth rate of loans 
and the expansion rate of the balance sheet (Total Assets Growth) since earlier 
studies identify excessive lending as an important driver of bank risk (Foos et al., 
2010). Both tables document a negative relation between stock liquidity and bank 
risk-taking, which remains robust and statistically significant across a number of 
specifications. We also find that banks depending more on non-interest income 
have lower credit risk, whereas larger reliance on funding from capital markets 
reflects riskier lending choices from banks. The latter finding is also confirmed by 
our cross-sectional regressions using the z-score and the overall variation in profits, 
SD(ROA). Hence, banks rely to unsecured short-term financing to extend credit to 
less qualified borrowers, exposing themselves both in higher maturity risk and in 
higher credit risk. Interestingly, the growth rate of loans correlates negatively to 
credit risk, but is positively associated to average default risk. Our explanation is 
that since retail borrowers are more likely to default at some later stage following 
the issuance of the loan (e.g. close to maturity if they are unable to refinance), more 
time might be required for credit losses to start manifesting themselves. On average 
however, Table 4.9 shows that banks expanding more aggressively their lending 
operations are doing so at the expense of higher variation in profits and a lower 
distance-to-default. Moreover, Table 4.9 shows that banking sector insolvency risk 
is positively related to the generosity of deposit insurance and the concentration of 
the banking sector. In that respect, our findings are aligned with previous studies 
arguing that public guarantees to the banking sector can create perverse incentives 
and lead to moral hazard.  
Now we turn our attention to the relation between liquidity and efficiency. If 
more intense market monitoring translates to higher profitability while at the same 
time being negatively related to leverage and risk-taking, this should demonstrate 
the ability to operate closer to the efficient frontier. We use two measures of 
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efficiency, namely cost efficiency which is constructed as the ratio of total 
overhead expenses over total operating income, and productive efficiency which 
we compute as the dollar amount of revenue produced per employee. Table 4.10 
presents the respective results. We find that stock liquidity is positively associated 
with cost efficiency consistently across all our specifications, whereas evidence 
with respect to productive efficiency is less robust. In more detail, we find that 1SD 
increase in the Quoted Spread is associated with an increase of 2.31% in the ratio 
of costs per unit of revenue, which corresponds to a 3.55% increase over its 
unconditional sample mean and is significant at the 1% level (Column (1)). Non-
interest income is negatively correlated to cost-efficiency but demonstrates no 
significant relation to productive efficiency. In Columns (2) and (5) we explicitly 
control for two of the most important components of non-interest income, namely 
revenues generated from securities trading and fees, but we find no evidence of a 
significant contribution on cost efficiency26. We also find that more tangible equity 
and a larger size of the balance sheet are both positively correlated to efficiency, 
with the latter probably alluding to the ability of larger banks to take advantage 
from economies of scale. 
 
 
4.4.3 Liquidity, Agency frictions, and Institutional Quality 
 
In this section we investigate in more detail the different mechanisms 
through which stock liquidity can affect bank operating performance, giving 
particular emphasis to the governance based interpretation. Agency theory posits 
that firms with an abundance of cash are more susceptible to principal-agent type of 
conflicts since managers are less subject to monitoring by capital markets as they 
are able to use cash to finance new investment (Jensen, 1986). We believe that 
similar arguments can be used in the case of banks. It is intuitive to argue that cash-
rich banks are typically perceived as more safe and are thus less subject to 
monitoring by creditors, whereas they also depend less on capital markets to 
finance the expansion of their balance sheet. Moreover, a greater share of cash on 
the balance sheet can allow banks to engage in risk-shifting faster and with less 
cost. Hence, we rank each country’s banks into terciles depending on the average 
ratio of their cash holdings relative to assets, and then examine the impact of stock 
liquidity on profitability, cost-efficiency and credit risk for the top and bottom 
tercile separately. Table 4.11 presents the respective results. We find that stock 
liquidity is much stronger predictor of performance and credit risk for banks that 
                                            
26 Only the share of fees in total operating income is negatively related to productive efficiency at a statistically 
meaningful level.  
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are more susceptible to agency frictions (top tercile) according to our ranking. The 
difference between the two terciles is particularly pronounced when we use Quoted 
Spread as our liquidity measure. We also note that with the exception of Column 
(2), both our liquidity measures are always significantly associated to profitability, 
credit risk, and cost-efficiency at a statistically significant level.  
As we have already discussed in the literature section, stock liquidity can 
benefit corporate governance by allowing activist investors to increase their 
influence through the accumulation of shares at a low cost, or by increasing the 
credibility of their exit threat. Assuming the threat of exit is a more efficient 
governance mechanism, we would expect that the disciplinary effect of liquidity 
becomes more pronounced during periods of poor market performance rather than 
the opposite. Hence, we formulate the aforementioned conjecture into an empirical 
test by identifying those individual bank-years with disappointing stock market 
performance27 and investigate whether the marginal impact of liquidity increases 
during those years. Table 4.12 displays the corresponding results. With the 
exception of Column (1), the interaction term between stock liquidity and our 
indicator of bottom returns is not significant in any of our models. Thus, our 
empirical setup provides no support to the notion that the disciplinary role of 
liquidity is a manifestation of an exit threat by shareholders. However, our findings 
should be interpreted with caution since valuation shocks are rarely exogenous to 
liquidity. As a result, disappointing returns might correlate to factors that are also 
associated to liquidity, in which case our current setup cannot produce a conclusive 
answer regarding the importance of the exit threat over bank performance. Such 
concerns however do not seem to be substantiated in our data since years of low 
returns have a negligible correlation with years of low liquidity (bottom quartile).  
Another channel through which liquidity can improve bank governance is by 
fostering the participation of informed traders. As we have already argued, 
enhanced liquidity increases the marginal benefit from information acquisition, and 
thus encourages trading by informed investors. As a result, market prices reflect 
future growth prospects and performance more accurately and thus reduce the cost 
of monitoring by activist investors, but also facilitate the structuring of more 
efficient compensation schemes for managers. Hence, by accommodating the trades 
of informed traders, liquid markets reduce agency frictions in the governance of 
banks and better align the interests of managers with those of the shareholders. To 
assess whether the liquidity effect is operating through the aforementioned 
information channel we follow the example of Llorente at al. (2002) and construct a 
                                            
27 As years with disappointing performance we classify those that lie at the bottom quartile of the annual stock 
return distribution for each bank. For this purpose, we only consider banks with at least 10 years of available 
annual stock returns. 
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measure of information based trading by estimating the following time-series 
relation for each bank-year in our sample: 
 
                          ܴ௜,ௗାଵ = ܿ଴,௜ + ܿଵ,௜ ∙ ܴ௜,ௗ + ܿଶ,௜ ∙ ܴ௜,ௗ ∙ ܶ ௜ܸ,ௗ + ߝ௜,ௗାଵ                   (4.6) 
 
where ܴ௜,ௗ is the stock return, and ܶ ௜ܸ,ௗ is the detrended28 log turnover of bank i, 
during day d. The estimated coefficient ܿଶ,௜ is our measure for information-driven 
trading, and is obtained for all the bank-years in our sample. Table 4.13 reports the 
time-series average of our information driven trading measure, aggregated each 
year across banks sorted in the same quartile based on the ranking of their stock 
liquidity the year before. We find no indication of a monotonically increasing 
relation between any of our measures of stock liquidity and the extent of 
information driven trading. Interestingly, in the case of the Amihud Ratio and Stock 
Turnover, the relation with informed trading seems to be of the opposite direction. 
Moreover, we find no evidence of any significant relation between liquidity and 
informed trading when we employ a multivariate setup, similar to that of equation 
(4.4), in which we use ܿଶ,௜ as our dependent variable. Hence, our empirical analysis 
so far lends little support to the idea that liquidity is operating through the 
information channel.  
To investigate the market discipline channel of liquidity, we examine the 
sensitivity of deposit growth and debt financing costs over a number of dimensions, 
namely the bank’s share of tangible equity (Tangible Equity), its credit risk 
(Impaired Loans), and profitability (ROA). Similar to previous studies (e.g. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2004) we conjecture that greater responsiveness of 
deposits and borrowing costs over changes in the aforementioned factors is 
indicative of closer monitoring by investors, and thus reflects greater market 
discipline. For this purpose we separate banks into two groups depending on 
whether the time-series average of their stock liquidity (Quoted Spread) ranks 
above or below the corresponding country median. Table 4.14 presents our findings. 
We notice that with the exception of Columns (7) – (8) that refer to the relation 
between debt costs and capitalization, the high liquidity group of banks 
demonstrates significantly higher responsiveness in both deposit growth and debt 
costs over capitalization, credit risk and profitability. The differences observed 
between the two groups are also substantial in economic terms. For example, a 1SD 
positive shock to profitability leads to an increase in deposit growth by 27.6% of its 
unconditional mean for the high liquidity group (Quoted Spread below the country 
median), and an increase of 16.6% for the low liquidity group. Moreover, a 1SD 
                                            
28 Similarly to Llorente at al. (2002) we detrend by subtracting the corresponding 200 trading days moving 
average. 
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increase in the share of impaired loans is associated with a decline of 10.4% in 
deposit growth over its unconditional mean for the high liquidity group, and a 
corresponding decline of 6.9% for banks with below median stock liquidity. 
However, one caveat of our present setup is the significantly lower number of 
observations in the low liquidity group of banks which could potentially increase 
the noise in the measurement of respective variables and thus undermine the 
magnitude of the results compared to the high liquidity group.    
Naturally, a definitive test of the bank stock liquidity-performance nexus 
would ideally involve an exogenous shock to liquidity, and would thus seek to 
exploit the cross-sectional variation in respective liquidity increments to isolate 
their effect over bank risk and profitability. Given the close relation between 
liquidity and performance however, such a task is by no means trivial, whereas the 
fact that our sample spans a large number of countries only increases the 
complexity of such undertaking. In unreported results, we pursue the 
aforementioned natural experiment approach using the exogenous increase in 
market liquidity for bank stocks listed on the NYSE, due to the decimalization of 
the exchange that became effective in January 2001 (e.g. Fang et al., 2009; Bharath 
et al., 2012). Our approach involves two types of empirical tests. The first one 
employs changes in measures of performance and efficiency calculated between the 
year following and the year before the decimalization, over corresponding changes 
in stock liquidity and control variables. The second test is based on a difference-in-
difference type of analysis using variables in levels and focusing on the interaction 
between liquidity and an indicator that separates the sample between pre and post 
decimalization periods. Both our tests however do not produce any significant 
results. Our explanation is that the lack of significance should be attributed either to 
reduced power due to limited sample size or to potential asymmetries in the impact 
of positive versus negative liquidity shocks, with the latter having more important 
ramifications on performance. In other words, a decline in the extent of monitoring 
by equity investors originating from a negative liquidity shock might generate a 
more pronounced impact on performance compared to a marginal increase in 
market monitoring due to a positive shock, similar to the aforementioned.  
 
 
4.5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we investigate the relation between bank stock liquidity, risk, 
and performance across a number of dimensions. In theory, high stock liquidity is 
associated with more intense market monitoring, greater benefits from private 
information collection, more informative prices, more efficient contractual 
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arrangements with managers, lower agency frictions, and lower cost of capital. As a 
consequence, there are a number of potential channels through which bank stock 
liquidity can influence bank behaviour and affect performance, none of which has 
been investigated by the literature to date. To the best of our knowledge, the 
present study is the first to provide evidence of such a relation, but also the first that 
tries to explore its implications and identify the underlying mechanisms through 
which it operates in the context of the banking sector. 
To assess the role of liquidity, we construct a detailed dataset with balance sheet 
information for more than 1,100 banks, spanning 31 countries around the world. 
We find that banks with higher stock liquidity enjoy a superior market valuation. A 
decomposition of Tobin’s Q reveals that liquidity is inversely related to leverage 
and positively associated with the ability to generate profits. However, our main 
measures of liquidity demonstrate no association with Tobin’s Q sentiment 
component, further supporting our intuition regarding the existence of material 
benefits due to greater monitoring by shareholders. We proceed with our analysis 
showing that liquidity is negatively associated to risk-taking, measured both in 
terms of realized credit risk, and using the distance-to-insolvency. We also show 
that banks at the top end of the liquidity spectrum are able to operate closer to their 
efficient frontier, both in terms of average cost per unit of generated income (cost 
efficiency), as well as in terms of income produced per employee (productive 
efficiency). The main body of our results is confirmed using both a time-series as 
well as a purely cross-sectional framework, and by employing a large number of 
alternative measures for performance. Our findings are also robust to a 2SLS 
approach in which we explicitly account for potential endogeneity by instrumenting 
stock liquidity with the type of bank charter, and the average idiosyncratic volatility 
of two other banks matched in terms of size.  
Next, we show that the liquidity effect is more pronounced in the case of 
banks with a greater share of cash in their balance sheet, which we interpret as 
evidence that the liquidity effect operates by mitigating principal-agent frictions 
within banks. In support of the market discipline channel, we also show that higher 
liquidity implies greater responsiveness of deposits and borrowing costs over 
changes in tangible equity, credit risk, and profitability. Nevertheless, our data 
reveal no link between liquidity and the extent of informed trading, whereas we 
also find no evidence in support of an exit threat by shareholders as a means of 
discipline.  
Except for its contribution to the academic debate regarding the role of 
markets as moderators of bank risk-taking and performance, we believe our study 
will also provide useful insights to policy-makers and regulators who typically 
employ market signals to develop forward-looking indicators of potential 
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vulnerabilities in the banking sector. Especially when compared to accounting 
information which is backward-looking and only periodically released, market 
based indicators like stock liquidity have the additional advantage that they can be 
constructed on a daily basis, and thus provide supervisors with timely warning 
signs over potential problems in specific banks. 
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pro
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ed
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co
nt
inu
ed
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2: 
Co
rr
ela
tio
n m
atr
ix 
of 
ba
sel
ine
 sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n v
ar
iab
les
 
Th
is 
tab
le 
rep
ort
s t
he
 pa
irw
ise
 Pe
ars
on
 co
rre
lat
ion
s b
etw
ee
n o
ur 
ba
sel
ine
 sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n v
ari
ab
les
. D
efi
nit
ion
s o
f a
ll t
he
 va
ria
ble
s c
an
 be
 fo
un
d i
n T
ab
le 
A1
 of
 th
e A
pp
en
dix
.  *
 
Ind
ica
tes
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e t
he
 ab
ov
e t
he
 10
% 
lev
el 
(5%
 or
 1%
). 
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3: 
Ba
nk
 Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 C
ha
ra
cte
ris
tic
s b
y L
iqu
idi
ty 
Qu
ar
til
e 
Th
is 
tab
le 
pre
sen
ts 
ba
nk
 pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 (T
ob
in
’s
 Q
, R
O
A)
, c
red
it r
isk
 (I
mp
air
ed
 L
oa
ns
/L
oa
ns
), a
nd
 ot
he
r c
ha
rac
ter
ist
ics
 (C
as
h/A
sse
ts,
 L
og
_A
sse
ts)
 fo
r e
ac
h o
f t
he
 fo
ur 
liq
uid
ity
 
qu
art
ile
s. 
Ea
ch
 ye
ar,
 w
e c
rea
te 
fou
r p
ort
fol
ios
 of
 ba
nk
 st
oc
ks
 ba
sed
 on
 th
e r
an
kin
g o
f t
he
 re
sp
ec
tiv
e l
iqu
idi
ty 
me
asu
re 
(Q
uo
ted
 S
pr
ea
d, 
Am
ihu
d 
Ra
tio
, a
nd
 St
oc
k T
ur
no
ve
r) 
du
rin
g t
he
 pr
ec
ed
ing
 ye
ar 
in 
on
e o
f t
he
 fo
ur 
liq
uid
ity
 qu
art
ile
s. 
W
ith
in 
ea
ch
 po
rtf
oli
o w
e c
om
pu
te 
the
 eq
ua
lly
 w
eig
hte
d a
ve
rag
e o
f o
ur 
va
ria
ble
 of
 in
ter
est
 ac
ros
s a
ll b
an
ks
, a
nd
 
the
n w
e c
om
pu
te 
the
 an
nu
al 
av
era
ge
 fo
r e
ac
h q
ua
rti
le.
 W
e a
lso
 co
mp
ute
 th
e d
iff
ere
nc
e b
etw
ee
n t
he
 va
lue
s o
f t
he
 to
p a
nd
 bo
tto
m 
liq
uid
ity
 qu
art
ile
s (
Q4
-Q
1).
 T-
sta
t r
ep
ort
s t
he
 
t-s
tat
ist
ic 
fro
m 
the
 eq
ua
lit
y o
f m
ea
ns
 te
st 
be
tw
ee
n t
he
 to
p a
nd
 bo
tto
m 
qu
art
ile
s, 
Q4
 an
d Q
1 r
esp
ec
tiv
ely
, w
he
rea
s C
hi-
Sq
ua
re
 st
at 
rep
ort
s t
he
 C
hi-
Sq
ua
re
 st
ati
sti
c f
ro
m 
the
 
eq
ua
lity
 of
 m
ed
ian
s t
est
 be
tw
ee
n t
he
 af
ore
me
nti
on
ed
 liq
uid
ity
 qu
art
ile
s. 
Sig
nif
ica
nc
e a
t th
e 1
%,
 5%
, a
nd
 10
% 
lev
el 
is 
ind
ica
ted
 by
 **
*, 
**
, a
nd
 *,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To
bin
's 
Q 
Qu
ote
d 
Sp
re
ad
 
Am
ihu
d 
Ra
tio
 
Sto
ck
 
Tu
rn
ov
er
 
Im
pa
ire
d 
Lo
an
s 
Qu
ote
d 
Sp
re
ad
 
Am
ihu
d 
Ra
tio
 
Sto
ck
 
Tu
rn
ov
er
 
Q1
 
1.0
53
4 
1.0
22
5 
1.0
36
8 
Q1
 
2.8
49
5 
4.3
88
8 
3.5
72
2 
Q2
 
1.0
28
8 
1.0
23
8 
1.0
25
3 
Q2
 
3.2
46
2 
3.4
02
7 
3.4
22
4 
Q3
 
1.0
25
9 
1.0
33
3 
1.0
29
4 
Q3
 
3.3
98
7 
3.3
17
6 
3.2
44
8 
Q4
 
1.0
31
9 
1.0
60
9 
1.0
52
0 
Q4
 
4.1
15
4 
2.8
70
0 
3.0
56
5 
Di
ffe
re
nc
e 
-0.
02
14
 
0.0
38
5 
0.0
15
1 
Di
ffe
re
nc
e 
1.2
65
9 
-1.
51
88
 
-0.
51
57
 
t-s
tat
  
-9.
77
75
**
* 
10
.36
72
**
* 
6.7
84
0*
**
 
t-s
tat
  
8.1
02
0*
**
 
-9.
48
84
**
* 
-3.
38
13
**
* 
Ch
i-S
qu
ar
e s
tat
 
96
.87
10
44
**
* 
24
5.8
38
0*
**
 
19
.77
90
**
* 
Ch
i-S
qu
ar
e s
tat
 
11
.09
02
**
* 
41
.14
89
**
* 
20
.77
02
**
* 
In
eff
ici
en
cy
 R
ati
o 
Qu
ote
d 
Sp
re
ad
 
Am
ihu
d 
Ra
tio
 
Sto
ck
 
Tu
rn
ov
er
 
 (L
og
) A
sse
ts 
Qu
ote
d 
Sp
re
ad
 
Am
ihu
d 
Ra
tio
 
Sto
ck
 
Tu
rn
ov
er
 
Q1
 
62
.48
54
 
69
.81
43
 
65
.93
28
 
Q1
 
11
.26
04
 
9.2
96
1 
9.7
73
6 
Q2
 
66
.38
30
 
67
.64
15
 
67
.26
23
 
Q2
 
10
.01
35
 
9.7
38
7 
9.6
97
4 
Q3
 
67
.13
97
 
66
.11
48
 
67
.05
59
 
Q3
 
9.7
82
4 
9.9
28
0 
10
.01
98
 
Q4
 
68
.57
23
 
61
.76
37
 
63
.15
53
 
Q4
 
9.7
22
5 
11
.87
18
 
11
.45
89
 
Di
ffe
re
nc
e 
6.0
86
9 
-8.
05
06
 
-2.
77
75
 
Di
ffe
re
nc
e 
-1.
53
79
 
2.5
75
6 
1.6
85
3 
t-s
tat
 (m
ea
n)
 
8.8
98
0*
**
 
-11
.47
44
**
* 
-4.
28
56
**
* 
t-s
tat
  
-16
.97
32
**
* 
29
.39
43
**
* 
19
.94
35
**
* 
Ch
i-S
qu
ar
e s
tat
 (m
ed
ian
) 
87
.40
91
**
* 
15
4.2
38
6*
**
 
37
.81
82
**
* 
Ch
i-S
qu
ar
e s
tat
 
63
.35
57
**
* 
18
4.5
22
2*
**
 
13
1.0
64
7*
**
 
RO
A 
Qu
ote
d 
Sp
re
ad
 
Am
ihu
d 
Ra
tio
 
Sto
ck
 
Tu
rn
ov
er
 
 Ca
sh
/A
sse
ts 
Qu
ote
d 
Sp
re
ad
 
Am
ihu
d 
Ra
tio
 
Sto
ck
 
Tu
rn
ov
er
 
Q1
 
0.6
76
1 
0.6
23
2 
0.7
19
1 
Q1
 
3.2
89
5 
4.1
25
4 
4.0
50
8 
Q2
 
0.6
16
8 
0.6
25
3 
0.6
00
4 
Q2
 
3.3
04
7 
3.6
55
1 
3.5
26
1 
Q3
 
0.6
78
7 
0.5
93
1 
0.5
78
0 
Q3
 
3.8
18
2 
3.1
98
0 
3.1
91
1 
Q4
 
0.7
14
9 
0.7
30
2 
0.7
52
1 
Q4
 
4.3
25
1 
3.3
62
8 
3.4
82
8 
Di
ffe
re
nc
e 
0.0
38
8 
0.1
07
0 
0.0
33
0 
Di
ffe
re
nc
e 
1.0
35
6 
-0.
76
26
 
-0.
56
80
 
t-s
tat
 (m
ea
n)
 
0.8
44
6 
2.2
01
7*
* 
0.7
23
8 
t-s
tat
  
6.2
34
0*
**
 
-4.
45
91
**
* 
-3.
54
49
**
* 
Ch
i-S
qu
ar
e s
tat
 (m
ed
ian
) 
11
.41
53
**
* 
78
.93
28
**
* 
3.9
08
5*
* 
Ch
i-S
qu
ar
e s
tat
 
29
.54
14
**
* 
12
.07
04
**
* 
9.3
69
6*
**
 
 
 
Ta
ble
 4.
4: 
T
ob
in
’s
 Q
 a
nd
 M
ar
ke
t L
iq
ui
di
ty
 o
f B
an
k 
St
oc
ks
 
Th
is 
tab
le 
pre
sen
ts 
OL
S e
sti
ma
tio
n r
esu
lts
 fr
om
 e
qu
at
io
n 
(4
). 
Th
e 
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is
 T
ob
in
’s
 Q
. C
ol
um
ns
 (1
) 
– (
8) 
pre
sen
t r
esu
lts
 fo
r t
he
 w
ho
le 
tim
e p
eri
od
 (1
99
7 -
20
12
), 
wh
ere
as 
the
 la
st 
thr
ee
 co
lum
ns
 ex
clu
de
 th
e r
ec
en
t c
ris
is 
pe
rio
d, 
20
08
 –
 2
01
2. 
Re
gre
sso
rs 
are
 n
or
ma
liz
ed
 b
y 
the
ir 
un
co
nd
itio
na
l s
tan
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n. 
De
fin
itio
ns
 o
f a
ll 
the
 
va
ria
ble
s c
an
 be
 fo
un
d i
n T
ab
le 
A1
 of
 th
e A
pp
en
dix
. A
ll t
he
 re
gre
ssi
on
s i
nc
lud
e y
ea
r f
ixe
d e
ffe
cts
, c
ou
ntr
y f
ixe
d e
ffe
cts
, a
nd
 fi
xe
d e
ffe
cts
 ac
co
un
tin
g f
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n b
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 fo
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De
fau
lt 
Di
sta
nc
e a
nd
 B
an
k S
toc
k L
iqu
idi
ty 
Th
is 
tab
le 
pre
sen
ts 
est
im
ati
on
 re
su
lts
 fr
om
 re
gre
ssi
on
s o
f t
he
 di
sta
nc
e-t
o-d
efa
ult
, lo
g(z
-sc
or
e),
 an
d t
he
 va
ria
tio
n i
n p
rof
ita
bil
ity
, S
T(
RO
A)
, o
n b
an
k s
toc
k l
iqu
idi
ty 
an
d o
the
r 
reg
res
so
rs.
 A
 de
tai
led
 de
fin
itio
n o
f a
ll t
he
 va
ria
ble
s c
an
 be
 fo
un
d i
n T
ab
le 
A1
 of
 th
e A
pp
en
dix
. A
ll v
ari
ab
les
 ar
e c
on
str
uc
ted
 as
 th
e a
nn
ua
l a
ve
rag
e o
f e
ac
h r
esp
ec
tiv
e s
eri
es 
for
 
ev
ery
 ba
nk
. R
eg
res
so
rs 
are
 no
rm
ali
ze
d u
sin
g t
he
 (b
etw
ee
n) 
sta
nd
ard
 de
via
tio
n. 
Re
gre
ssi
on
s a
re 
est
im
ate
d u
sin
g O
LS
, u
nle
ss 
ind
ica
ted
 ot
he
rw
ise
. A
ll 
the
 re
gre
ssi
on
s i
nc
lud
e 
co
un
try
 fi
xe
d e
ffe
cts
, a
nd
 fi
xe
d e
ffe
cts
 ac
co
un
tin
g f
or 
the
 di
ffe
ren
t ty
pe
 of
 ba
nk
 ch
art
ers
 (e
xc
ep
t in
 th
e 2
SL
S e
sti
ma
tio
n).
 C
olu
mn
s (
2),
 (5
) a
nd
 (7
) a
nd
 (9
) a
re 
est
im
ate
d u
sin
g 
2S
LS
.  W
e i
ns
tru
me
nt 
sto
ck
 liq
uid
ity
 us
ing
 th
e d
iff
ere
nt 
typ
es 
of 
ba
nk
 ch
art
er,
 an
d t
he
 tim
e s
eri
es 
av
era
ge
 of
 th
e m
ea
n i
dio
sy
nc
rat
ic 
vo
lat
ilit
y o
f t
he
 tw
o c
los
est
 ba
nk
s i
n t
erm
s 
of 
eq
uit
y m
ark
et 
va
lua
tio
n. 
Sta
nd
ard
 er
ror
s a
re 
clu
ste
red
 at
 th
e c
ou
ntr
y l
ev
el.
 Si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e a
t th
e 1
%,
 5%
, a
nd
 10
% 
lev
el 
is 
ind
ica
ted
 by
 **
*, 
**
, a
nd
 *,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
.  
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co
nt
inu
ed
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try
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ye
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ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
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ye
s 
ye
s 
ye
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ye
s 
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us
ter
ing
 
Le
ve
l 
Co
un
try
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un
try
 
Co
un
try
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un
try
 
Co
un
try
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un
try
 
Co
un
try
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un
try
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un
try
 
Co
un
try
 
Pa
rti
al 
R^
2 
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0.2
18
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93
1 
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F-
Sta
tis
tic
 
(In
str
um
en
ts)
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8.2
27
**
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9.5
09
**
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44
8.2
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13
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# C
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ntr
ies
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25
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25
 
30
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ser
va
tio
ns
 
64
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63
9 
56
1 
63
7 
63
6 
55
7 
63
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56
1 
63
6 
55
7 
Ad
j. R
^2
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55
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55
 
0.3
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0.3
21
 
0.3
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20
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: C
os
t-E
ffi
cie
nc
y a
nd
 B
an
k S
toc
k L
iqu
idi
ty 
Th
is 
tab
le 
pre
sen
ts 
est
im
ati
on
 re
su
lts
 o
f c
os
t a
nd
 p
rod
uc
tiv
e e
ffi
cie
nc
y 
on
 st
oc
k 
liq
uid
ity
 an
d 
oth
er 
reg
res
so
rs.
 C
os
t e
ffi
cie
nc
y 
is 
co
mp
ute
d 
as 
the
 ra
tio
 o
f t
ota
l o
ve
rhe
ad
 
ex
pe
ns
es 
ov
er 
tot
al 
op
era
tin
g i
nc
om
e, 
wh
ere
as 
pro
du
cti
ve
 ef
fic
ien
cy
 is
 co
mp
ute
d a
s t
he
 (l
og
) r
ati
o o
f o
pe
rat
ing
 in
co
me
 ov
er 
the
 nu
mb
er 
of 
em
plo
ye
es.
 A
 de
tai
led
 de
fin
itio
n o
f 
all
 th
e 
va
ria
ble
s c
an
 b
e 
fou
nd
 in
 T
ab
le 
A1
 o
f t
he
 A
pp
en
dix
. E
sti
ma
tio
n 
is 
pe
rfo
rm
ed
 fo
r t
he
 w
ho
le 
sam
ple
 p
eri
od
, 1
99
7 
-20
12
. R
eg
res
so
rs 
are
 n
or
ma
liz
ed
 u
sin
g 
the
ir 
un
co
nd
itio
na
l s
tan
da
rd 
de
via
tio
n. 
Re
gre
ssi
on
s a
re 
est
im
ate
d 
us
ing
 O
LS
, u
nle
ss 
ind
ica
ted
 ot
he
rw
ise
. A
ll 
the
 re
gre
ssi
on
s i
nc
lud
e y
ea
r f
ixe
d e
ffe
cts
, c
ou
ntr
y f
ixe
d 
eff
ec
ts,
 an
d 
fix
ed
 ef
fec
ts 
ac
co
un
tin
g f
or 
the
 di
ffe
ren
t t
yp
e o
f b
an
k c
ha
rte
rs 
(ex
ce
pt 
in 
the
 2
SL
S e
sti
ma
tio
n).
 C
olu
mn
s (
3),
 (6
) a
nd
 (8
) a
nd
 (1
0) 
are
 es
tim
ate
d u
sin
g 2
SL
S. 
 W
e i
ns
tru
me
nt 
sto
ck
 liq
uid
ity
 us
ing
 th
e d
iff
ere
nt 
typ
es 
of 
ba
nk
 ch
art
er,
 an
d t
he
 av
era
ge
 id
ios
yn
cra
tic
 vo
lat
ilit
y o
f t
he
 tw
o c
los
est
 ba
nk
s i
n t
erm
s o
f e
qu
ity
 m
ark
et 
va
lua
tio
n. 
Sta
nd
ard
 er
ror
s a
re 
clu
ste
red
 at
 th
e b
an
k l
ev
el.
 Si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e a
t th
e 1
%,
 5%
, a
nd
 10
% 
lev
el 
is 
ind
ica
ted
 by
 **
*, 
**
, a
nd
 *,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
ely
. 
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Table 4.13: Information Driven Trading by Liquidity Quartile 
This table presents the time series average of our measure for information driven trading (Equation (6)) for each of the 
four liquidity quartiles. Each year, we create four portfolios of bank stocks based on the ranking of the respective liquidity 
measure (Quoted Spread, Amihud Ratio, and Stock Turnover) during the preceding year in one of the four liquidity 
quartiles. Within each portfolio we compute the equally weighted average of our information driven trading measure 
across all banks, and then we compute the annual average for each quartile. We also compute the difference between the 
values of the top and bottom liquidity quartiles (Q4-Q1). T-stat reports the t-statistic from the equality of means test 
between the top and bottom quartiles, Q4 and Q1 respectively, whereas Chi-Square stat reports the Chi-Square statistic 
from the equality of medians test between the aforementioned liquidity quartiles. We limit our sample to countries with a 
minimum of 10 banks with non-missing information over bank stock liquidity. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Information Driven  
Trading Measure 
Quoted 
Spread 
Amihud 
Ratio 
Stock 
Turnover 
Q1 0.0098* 0.0356*** 0.0384*** 
Q2 0.0162*** 0.0112* 0.0123** 
Q3 0.0139** 0.0122** 0.0099*** 
Q4 0.0200*** -0.0023 -0.0002 
Difference 
(Q4-Q1) 0.0102 -0.0379*** -0.0386*** 
t-stat 1.2182 -3.509 -3.1244 
Chi-Square  
statistic 3.5717* 7.3181*** 6.6479*** 
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Appendix 
Table A4.1: Variable Description and Data Sources 
Variable Description Sources 
Quoted Spread 
We compute the daily (log) ratio of the prevailing ask quote minus the prevailing 
bid quote, standardized relative to the midpoint of the prevailing bid-ask quote. 
More specifically, our computation is based on the formula: ࡿࡼࡰ࢏,ࢊ =
࢒࢕ࢍ ൬૚ + ࢇ࢙࢑࢏,ࢊି࢈࢏ࢊ࢏,ࢊ൫ࢇ࢙࢑࢏,ࢊା࢈࢏ࢊ࢏,ࢊ൯/૛൰ . Then we compute the time-series average for each 
bank-year. Data for the daily bid, ask, and midpoint quotes are obtained from 
Bloomberg.                        
 
Own 
Computations 
Amihud 
We compute the Amihud ratio as the (-log) ratio of the absolute value of weekly 
returns over the value of weekly trading volume expressed in local currency: 
ࡸࡵࡽ࢏,࢚ = −࢒࢕ࢍ ൬૚ + หࡾࢋ࢚࢏,࢚หࡼ࢏,࢚∙ࢂࡻ࢏,࢚൰. Then we compute the time-series average for each 
bank-year. Data on weekly returns, ࡾࢋ࢚࢏,࢚, weekly stock prices, ࡼ࢏,࢚, and weekly 
trading volume, ࢂࡻ࢏,࢚, are obtained from Datastream. 
Own 
Computations 
Stock 
Turnover 
We compute stock turnover as the (log) ratio of weekly trading volume divided by 
the respective number of outstanding shares: ࢀࢂ࢏,࢚ = ࢒࢕ࢍ ൬૚ + ࢂࡻ࢏,࢚ࡺࡻࡿࡴ࢏,࢚൰. Then we 
compute the time-series average for each bank-year. Data on the weekly trading 
volume, ࢂࡻ࢏,࢚, and the number of shares outstanding, ࡺࡻࡿࡴ࢏,࢚, are obtained from 
Datastream. 
Own 
Computations 
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility 
We compute each bank’s idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation of the 
residual component, ߝ௜,ௗ, obtained from regressing the daily excess stock return, 
ݎ௜,ௗ௘ , on the daily excess market return, ݎ௠,ௗ௘ : ݎ௜,ௗ௘ = ܿ + ߚ ∙ ݎ௠,ௗ௘ + ߝ௜,ௗ. We discard 
bank-years with more than 200 days of missing stock returns. We compute the 
daily market return based on the domestic market index provided by Datastream. 
As the risk-free rate we use the yield of the 3-month U.S. T-Bill.  
Own 
Computations 
Tobin’s Q Computed as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of assets. Bloomberg 
P/E Annual ratio of the market value of equity, scaled by total earnings. Datastream 
Financial 
Leverage 
Computed as the ratio of the market value of assets over the market value of 
equity. The former is computed as the book value of assets plus the market value 
of equity minus the book value of equity.  
Bankscope 
Z-score 
Computed as the natural logarithm of one plus the sum of the mean ROA plus the 
mean ratio of equity capital over assets,ܥܣܴ , divided by the standard deviation of 
the ROA, ܴܱܵܣ : log ቀ1 + ௠௘௔௡(ோை஺ା஼஺ோ)ௌோை஺ ቁ . For our computations we require a 
minimum of four observations for every bank in our sample. Data are obtained 
from Bankscope. 
Own 
Computations 
ROA Annual net income over average total assets. Bankscope 
ROE Annual net income over average total equity. Bankscope 
STD(ROA) 
Standard deviation of annual net income over average total assets, ROA. For our 
computations we require a minimum of four observations for every bank in our 
sample. Data are obtained from Bankscope. 
Own 
Computations 
Sharpe(ROA) 
Computed as the annual net income over average total assets, ROA, over its 
corresponding standard deviation. For our computations we require a minimum of 
four observations for every bank in our sample. Data are obtained from 
Bankscope. 
Own 
Computations 
Cost Efficiency Computed as the ratio of annual overhead costs over total operating income. Bankscope  
Productive 
Efficiency 
Computed as the annual ratio of total operating income over total number of bank 
employees. Data are obtained from Bankscope and Bloomberg. 
Own 
Computations 
  
Table A4.1, continued 
Share of 
Impaired Loans 
Computed as the annual ratio of the total value of loans with an impairment 
(e.g. non-accrued, restructured, overdue etc.) over the total gross value of all 
outstanding loans.  
Bankscope 
Share of Non-
Performing 
Assets 
Annual ratio of non-performing assets divided by the total value of bank 
assets. Bloomberg 
Cost-of-Debt Weighted average yield to maturity of all outstanding bank debt. Bloomberg 
Interest 
Expense 
Computed as the annual ratio of total interest expenses over the aggregate 
value of interest bearing liabilities.  Bankscope 
Loans and 
Committed 
Credit Lines 
Computed as the ratio of the total value of outstanding loans, and 
committed credit lines over the total value of assets. Bankscope 
Non-Interest 
Income 
Computed as the ratio of total non-interest operating income over total 
operating income. Non-interest operating income includes net trading 
income, insurance income, revenues from fees and commissions etc.  
Bankscope 
Funding 
Fragility 
Computed as the share of short term non-core liabilities that consist of 
deposits from other banks (also loans and repos), short term borrowing (e.g. 
money market instruments and CDs), and financing obtained from capital 
markets over the dollar value of total short term liabilities which also 
include total customer deposits (Beltratti, and Stulz, 2012).  
Bankscope 
Cash and 
Balances with 
CB 
Computed as the ratio of total cash and non-interest-earning balances with 
central banks over the value of total assets. Bankscope 
Overhead Computed as the ratio of total overhead expenses over the value of total assets. Bankscope 
Fee Income Computed as the ratio of total income from fees and commissions not related to loans over total operating income.  Bankscope 
Trading 
Income 
Computed as the dollar value of total marketable securities and short term 
investment over the value of total assets. 
Bloomberg, 
and 
Bankscope 
Personnel 
Costs 
Computed as the ratio of total personnel expenses over the value of total 
assets. Personnel expenses include wages, salaries, social security costs, 
pension costs and other staff costs.  
Bankscope 
Market Return Computed as the annual time-series average of the weekly stock return. Datastream 
Tangible 
Equity 
Computed as the total value of common equity minus the value of 
intangible assets (include whenever available), over the value of total assets. 
Intangible assets include goodwill, mortgage servicing assets and purchased 
credit card relationships.  
Bankscope 
Total Assets Natural logarithm of the value of total assets deflated by the consumer price index of the corresponding year. 
Bankscope, 
and Haver 
Analytics 
Short Interest 
Rate (3m) Annual average of the quarterly rate on the 3 month T-Bill of each country. 
Haver 
Analytics 
Long Interest 
Rate (10yr) 
Annual average of the quarterly rate on the 10 year government bond of 
each country. 
Haver 
Analytics 
VIX (Implied 
Volatility) 
Annual average of the daily implied volatility based on S&P 500 index 
options. Bloomberg 
Inflation Time-series average of the quarterly, year-to-year, growth rate of the consumer price index of each country. 
Consensus 
Economics  
GDP per 
Capita 
Annual ratio of a country’s nominal GDP divided by the size of its 
population. 
Haver 
Analytics 
GDP growth Time-series average of the quarterly, year-to-year, real and seasonally adjusted GDP for each country. 
Consensus 
Economics  
   
 
   
 
Table A4.1, continued 
 
Information 
Driven Trading  
Our measure of information driven trading, ࢉ૛,࢏, is obtained by regressing 
daily stock returns, ࡾ࢏,ࢊା૚, on the respective lag-1 stock return, ࡾ࢏,ࢊ, and its 
product with the (detrended) stock turnover, ࢀࢂ࢏,ࢊ, for all the bank-years in 
our sample: 
ࡾ࢏,ࢊା૚ = ࢉ૙,࢏ + ࢉ૚,࢏ ∙ ࡾ࢏,ࢊ + ࢉ૛,࢏ ∙ ࡾ࢏,ࢊ ∙ ࢀࢂ࢏,ࢊ + ࢿ࢏,ࢊା૚    
Detrending is performed by removing the moving average of the past 200 
trading days of (Llorente at al., 2002). From our computations we exclude 
bank stocks without trading information for at least 22 days in a year, 
and/or stocks with zero return days for more than 90% of the trading days 
during each year. Data on the daily trading volume, and daily returns are 
obtained from Datastream. 
Own 
Computations 
Bank 
Concentration 
Computed as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each 
country, averaged over the sample period. Data are constructed by Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, "Bank Concentration and Crises", Journal of 
Banking and Finance,2003, and provided by the World Bank. 
World Bank 
Market 
Capitalization 
Computed as the time series average of the annual ratio of stock market 
capitalization over GDP. Data are obtained from the Database on Financial 
Development and Structure, which is constructed by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, 
Levine, Cihak, and Feyen, and provided by the World Bank. 
World Bank 
Governance 
Composite of six governance indicators (1998 data): voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and corruption. Individual factors are weighted equally 
to determine overall score of economic freedom. Data are obtained from the 
Database on Financial Development and Structure, which is constructed by 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, Cihak, and Feyen, and provided by the 
World Bank. 
World Bank 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Principal component indicator measuring the generosity of deposit 
insurance, based on co-insurance, coverage of foreign currency and 
interbank deposits, type and source of funding, management, membership 
and level of explicit coverage. Data are obtained from the Database on 
Financial Development and Structure, which is constructed by Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Levine, Cihak, and Feyen, and provided by the World 
Bank. 
World Bank 
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Chapter 5                                             
The Determinants of Liquidity Contagion 
Across Markets 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In modern financial parlance, few words are as closely associated to market 
efficiency as liquidity. This notion is not completely unwarranted given that 
liquidity has ramifications extending beyond the price discovery process, affecting 
functions as distant and important as the market for corporate control and the 
efficient allocation of capital across different sectors (e.g. Tadesse, 2004). Yet, to 
the detriment of investors and regulators alike, there are times when liquidity 
simply disappears across many markets simultaneously. Although rather infrequent, 
synchronous liquidity crashes are typically accompanied by pervasive price 
distortions, and thus carry substantial costs both for investors and the real economy. 
Moreover, such episodes undermine the benefits of diversification at a time when 
they are most needed, casting doubt over one of financial theory’s most acclaimed 
presumptions. Yet, although one must acknowledge significant progress in 
identifying the origins of contagion in a number of occasions (e.g. Peek and 
Rosengren, 1999; Christiansen and Ranaldo, 2009; Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz, 2010; 
Schnabl, 2012), extant literature offers little guidance when it comes to 
synchronous liquidity dry-ups. In the present study we attempt to furnish a better 
understanding of the circumstances behind these episodes, and investigate the 
mechanism through which adverse liquidity shocks propagate from one market to 
another. 
Our goal in this paper is twofold. First, we investigate the extent of 
clustering of adverse liquidity shocks within and across particular geographic 
regions. Given that geographic distance typically correlates positively with 
information frictions (Portes, and Rey, 2005; van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 
2009), it is reasonable to expect liquidity shocks to have a disproportionate effect 
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over markets in a certain geographic proximity. Second, we try to assess the 
relative importance of a number of channels that previous studies have solicited as 
important determinants of liquidity, both for the aggregate market as well as across 
subsets of the cross-section organized on the basis of different stock characteristics. 
This way we are able to evaluate a number of empirical predictions generated by 
theory regarding the type of stocks that are more susceptible to adverse liquidity 
shocks originating from abroad. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper 
to pursue such a task. Our ultimate goal is to shed more light on the importance of 
different mechanisms through which liquidity shocks propagate from one market to 
another. We believe this task of paramount interest since liquidity spillovers can 
exert a re-pricing of risk, and cause a reallocation of capital in global markets, thus 
undermining global economic growth. As a result, we believe the aforementioned 
questions are of importance not only for investment professionals (especially for 
their risk management operations), but also for central banks and policymakers 
responsible for safekeeping financial stability. The former are delegated to 
diversify their holdings in a way that reduces the concern of having to liquidate 
their positions simultaneously across many markets, aggravating their losses even 
further (Duffie, and Ziegler, 2003). Central banks on the other hand need to remain 
alert to boost liquidity conditions and prevent market crashes, since if intervention 
is delayed they might need to endorse more dramatic actions at the expense of a 
larger cost to taxpayers (Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet, 2000).   
Most of the extant literature on contagion focuses on currency, stock market 
or banking crises. These are identified as unanticipated, extreme currency 
depreciations, stock market declines or failures of systemically important financial 
institutions respectively (Pericoli, and Sbracia, 2003). Depending on the particular 
context of contagion, a number of different explanations have been advanced to 
date. Glick and Rose (1999) for example argue that the transmission of currency 
crises can be explained by the extent of trade relations across countries, whereas 
other studies (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; van Rijckeghem, and Weder, 2003; 
Liu) show that financial sector linkages are of equivalent if not superior importance. 
Goldstein (1998), and Ahluwalia (2000), favor the “wake-up-call” explanation 
according to which, similarities across countries can lead to a reassessment of 
fundamentals, and potentially trigger a “snowball” effect typically observed in 
currency markets. Regarding stock market contagion, King, Sentana, and 
Wadhwani (1994) provide some early evidence of contagion, arguing that a large 
portion of the covariance across stock markets cannot be attributed to observable 
economic factors. More recently, Cumperayot, Keijzer, and Kouwenberg (2006), 
and Christiansen, and Ranaldo (2009) document the existence of negative spillover 
effects between the U.S. stock market and markets in Asia and Europe, as well as 
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between the new and the old EU member states, respectively. Regarding the role of 
banks in the transmission of financial shocks, Peek and Rosengren (1999) show 
that Japanese banks contracted their lending in the U.S. as a response to the decline 
in their domestic stock holdings. Other papers focus on hedge fund contagion (e.g. 
Klaus, Benjamin, and Rzepkowski, 2009; Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz, 2010), and 
show that the observed clustering in performance across different styles increases 
with funding shocks or when the rate of redemptions rises. In the area of banking 
contagion, Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin (2010) show that contagious failures of 
interconnected financial institutions can result from small shocks in their illiquid 
holdings, whereas a number of other studies (e.g. Gropp, Duca, and Vesala, 2009; 
Lucey, and Sevic, 2010) empirically demonstrate the existence of extreme excess 
co movement within the banking sector. 
In this paper we deviate from the aforementioned examples and decide to 
examine financial contagion from a perspective that has not been considered to date, 
namely that of market liquidity. At this point, one question that might naturally 
arise is whether liquidity contagion is possible in the first place. In other words, is 
there any reason to expect liquidity shocks to propagate beyond their epicenter and 
adversely affect other markets? In that respect, financial crises of the past provide 
us with considerable anecdotal evidence indicating that liquidity can diminish 
quickly and often simultaneously across different markets. In theory, liquidity 
contagion can be produced due to a common lender effect. One such channel is 
associated with the presence of global prime brokers or banks that operate 
internationally. Such institutions can amplify the transmission of liquidity shocks 
both indirectly, as a consequence of deleveraging that adversely affects the balance 
sheet of their peers abroad through (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), or directly, 
by contracting their lending through their affiliated branches as a response to 
domestic losses (Peek and Rosengren, 1997, 2000). Liquidity crises can also spread 
as a result of imperfect liquidity sharing across banks, under the assumption of 
incomplete interregional bank claims (Allen, and Gale, 2000). Another reason can 
be information cascades concerning interregional assets with similar underlying 
fundamentals. A liquidity drop in one market can impair liquidity in other markets 
by making prices of related assets less informative (Cespa, and Foucault, 2011; 
Bernhardt, and Taub, 2008). As a result, market makers will generally face higher 
costs in their inference of factors that commonly determine the price of securities 
they trade domestically with those in the affected market. In addition, following the 
perspective advanced by Kodres and Pritsker (2002), liquidity contagion can 
emerge as the result of cross market portfolio rebalancing or hedging that is 
mistakenly perceived as information driven by domestic market makers or 
uninformed investors (Genotte, and Leland, 1990). Overall, as several of the 
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aforementioned studies imply, rising information asymmetries in foreign markets 
can potentially impair liquidity conditions in the home market through a number of 
implicit as well as explicit transmission mechanisms.  
 Our first contribution in this paper comes from providing evidence of 
liquidity contagion both within as well as across regions. This is certainly not a 
trivial undertaking since contagion is an ambiguous concept that is intrinsically 
difficult to identify precisely. Our task complicates further by the fact that market 
behavior differs markedly during periods of stress compared to normal times (Borio, 
2004). This, however, is another way our analysis abstracts from research to date 
and particularly from the recent literature on liquidity commonality. Given that 
papers on this topic are principally concerned with liquidity co movement across 
the whole range of liquidity’s empirical distribution, they tend to focus on average 
rather than extreme correlations (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000; 
Brockman, Chung, and Perignon, 2009; Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012). Since 
contagion is typically perceived as s temporary increase in the linkages of different 
markets (Longstaff, 2010) our analysis is based on weekly data (e.g. Hameed, Kang, 
and Viswanathan, 2010). Our preference for a weekly frequency is further justified 
by the necessity to overcome variation in time conventions across markets or 
phenomena related to microstructure noise that are typically prevalent in higher 
frequencies and could potentially compromise our inference. Thus, to pursue our 
task we construct weekly stock market liquidity indexes (Amihud, 2002), based on 
data for 38,808 different individual stocks from 39 markets, for the period from 
January 1995 until December 2008. Given the large number of arguments against 
earlier methodologies that typically generate an overidentification of contagious 
events (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon, 2002), our definition of contagion is purposefully 
conservative. Following the example of recent studies (e.g. Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Ng, 2005; Boyson et al., 2010), we attribute to contagion any correlation over and 
above what can be explained by own market fundamentals, and as such is 
manifested in the synchronicity of unexpected adverse (negative) liquidity shocks 
(exceedances) across markets. Our filtering regressions control for an extensive set 
of factors the literature has elicited as determinants of market liquidity, namely 
market performance, general uncertainty, aggregate order flow, funding liquidity 
conditions, and sentiment. In the case of no contagion our approach implies zero 
correlation between the probability of a liquidity exceedance and the extent of 
clustering in liquidity shocks across other markets. 
Our findings indicate that local turmoil carries the seeds of liquidity 
contagion to other markets within the region. Except for evidence of within-region 
contagion, our analysis also demonstrates that deteriorating liquidity conditions in 
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systemically important markets exert, in certain cases, a disproportionate impact 
over foreign markets. Our findings are substantial in statistical as well as economic 
terms. For example, the probability of a liquidity exceedance in Emerging Europe 
rises more than twofold when all our Global markets experience a liquidity co-
exceedance the same week. When we try to identify the liquidity factors with the 
greatest explanatory power over the likelihood of a liquidity exceedance, our proxy 
for investor sentiment (market-to-book) together with aggregate volatility stand out 
as the ones with the most pronounced effect. Interestingly, even though global 
aggregates are important in their own respect, (orthogonalized) regional aggregates 
demonstrate a leading role when it comes to explain liquidity exceedances in the 
same region.  
Next, we move a step forward and investigate the extent of cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in the clustering of adverse liquidity shock across groups of stocks 
with particular characteristics. Our goal is to furnish a better understanding of those 
characteristics that make certain stocks more resilient while others more susceptible 
to liquidity contagion. For this purpose we sort stocks on the basis of their market 
capitalization, idiosyncratic volatility, the extent of information-driven order flow, 
and sensitivity over sentiment. Our findings at this point are also particularly 
interesting. Contrary to initial expectations, we show that liquidity contagion is 
more pronounced in “high” rather than “low quality” stocks. Our conjecture is that 
market makers or sophisticated investors operating across many markets typically 
invest in the top-end of the market spectrum in terms of quality for reasons related 
to clientele effects, as well as due to moderate transaction costs and lower 
information impediments associated with stocks of this category. As a result, 
during periods of market distress liquidity drops are more correlated across stocks 
of “high quality”. This is another example indicating how the pursuit of 
diversification at the micro-level can compromise diversity at the macro-level and 
thus impair the stability of the financial system during periods of crises (Wagner, 
2010). 
We also investigate the relative importance of different factors that previous 
papers elicit as important determinants of aggregate liquidity. The most consistent 
results in that respect concern the Variance Premium and the volatility of our index 
of Global prime brokers. Our findings suggest that an increase in the implied risk 
aversion reflected in the Variance Premium, together with higher uncertainty 
regarding the state of financial intermediaries is associated with a greater extent of 
liquidity contagion within a number of regions. Another important determinant is 
the cost of funding typically reflected by the Credit Spread. Our analysis lends 
further support to the notion that commonality in liquidity becomes particularly 
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pronounced in periods of deteriorating global funding conditions as well as 
downbeat investor sentiment. Furthermore, we investigate the role of international 
investors and financial intermediaries as channels through which liquidity crises 
propagate from one market to another. We study to what extent foreign equity 
flows and cross-border bank lending can provide a mechanism of transmission of 
potential liquidity shocks. Consistent with intuition, our findings suggest that 
markets receiving more investment either in the form of equity purchases or in the 
form of cross-border bank lending demonstrate a greater extent of liquidity 
contagion once global risk aversion increases. However, our coefficient estimates 
of other factors are more challenging to interpret in that respect. 
 
 
5.2 Data description 
 
In this section we describe the data sources we use, as well as and the 
screening procedures we apply to construct our set of variables. We give particular 
emphasis to our measure of market liquidity, since it is the variable employed for 
the identification of tail events that occur simultaneously across countries.  
 
5.2.1 Data sources and variable definitions 
In the present study, our prime goal is to investigate to what extent adverse 
liquidity shocks tend to cluster across international markets, but also identify the 
relative importance of a number of potential channels in explaining the time series 
of synchronous liquidity drops. To perform our analysis we collect data from a total 
of 39 countries around the world, covering the period from January 1995 until 
December 2008. From the 39 countries in our sample, 12 countries belong to 
Developed Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland), 7 belong to Emerging Europe 
(Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Portugal, Turkey), 11 belong to 
Asia/Pacific (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand), and 5 belong to Latin 
America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru). To classify the aforementioned 
markets as Developed or Emerging we follow the categorization suggested by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). We also collect data for four additional 
markets, namely Australia, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States which 
we classify in a separate category (Global) due to their dominant role in the global 
financial system. Although the selection of the aforementioned countries is, to 
some extent, arbitrary, it is beyond doubt that they exert substantial influence over 
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neighboring markets both due to the overwhelming volume of transactions they 
accommodate, as well as the size of their respective economies. As an indication, 
these four markets account for approximately 75% of the total market capitalization, 
and more than 50% of the total economic output at the beginning of our sample 
period (both figures are computed in 1995 U.S. dollars).  
We use DataStream to collect the daily adjusted price (P; closing price in 
local currency, which is adjusted for splits and dividends), the daily total return 
index (RI), trading volume at a monthly frequency (VO; expressed in 1,000 shares), 
number of shares outstanding (NOSH; expressed in thousands of shares), and the 
monthly market capitalization (MV; expressed in millions of local currency) for all 
individual stocks in the 39 countries of our sample. In line with Karolyi et al. (2012) 
we only include stocks from major stock exchanges. These are the exchanges on 
which the majority of each country’s stocks are listed. In the case of the U.S., we 
only use data from the NYSE, since volume definitions are different in NASDAQ. 
Countries for which we collect data from more than one stock exchange include 
China (Shenzen and Shanghai), Japan (Osaka and Tokyo), and Germany (Frankfurt 
and Xetra). In the case of Brazil, and Germany we only collect data following 1999 
due to issues related to different volume definitions and missing data for the earlier 
part of our sample (Karolyi et al., 2012). Similar to previous studies (Chordia, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003), we exclude stocks with 
special features, such as depository receipts (DRs), real estate investment trusts 
(REITs), closed-end funds, and preferred stocks. To avoid survivorship bias, we 
also include dead and delisted stocks. We use the same source to collect daily 
returns of bank indexes 29 , as well as the daily market-to-book ratio for the 
respective markets in our sample. In addition, we construct an index of global 
prime broker returns by computing the equally weighted average of the 26 leading 
prime brokers that operate internationally30. We obtain the conditional volatility of 
our global prime broker return index by estimating a GARCH(1,1) process. 
As a short term rate we typically use the domestic 1 month interbank offered 
rate unless it is not available, in which case we replace it with data on the 
corresponding bank deposit rate (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and India), the 
commercial paper rate (Japan, Korea, and the U.S.), the money market rate 
                                            
29 Due to missing data, in the case of New Zealand, China, and Indonesia we use the market capitalization-
weighted average bank index return from the remaining markets in the same region, namely Hong Kong, 
Singapore, India, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
30  Our list of global prime brokers consists of ABN AMRO, BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO, BANK OF 
AMERICA, BARCLAYS, BEAR STEARNS, BNP PARIBAS, CITIGROUP, CREDIT SUISSE, DEUTSCHE 
BANK, DRESDNER BANK , FORTIS, GOLDMAN SACHS, JEFFERIES, JP MORGAN CHASE, LEHMAN 
BROS, MORGAN STANLEY, NORDEA BANK, NORTHERN TRUST, ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND, 
ROYAL BANK CANADA, RABOBANK, BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA, UBS, CANADIAN IMPERIAL 
BANK OF COMMERCE, SOCIETE GENERALE, and CREDIT AGRICOLE. 
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(Taiwan), or the market capitalization-weighted average of short term interest rates 
of all the other countries in the same region31. Our preference among each of the 
aforementioned alternatives is determined solely on the basis of data availability. 
Following previous studies (e.g. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine, 2002) we 
compute the global interest rate as the market capitalization-weighted average of 
the short-term interest rate of all the countries in our sample using country’s market 
value the respective year. The data for the market capitalization (in current U.S. 
dollars) are collected from the DataStream.  
We use Bloomberg to collect daily data on the VIX index which is 
constructed from the implied volatilities of index options on the S&P 500, as well 
as data on the U.S. TED spread which corresponds to the difference between the 3-
month LIBOR rate and the rate on the U.S. Treasury bill with the same maturity. 
We use the same source to compute the U.S. Credit Spread which we define as the 
difference between the yield of the US High-Yield Bond Index (BB-B) and that on 
the 10 year Treasury bond. 
To proxy for changes in the external flow of funding liquidity we use the 
quarterly change in cross-border holdings of U.S. banks (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
obtained from Haver Analytics. The aforementioned dataset is based on the Bank 
of International Settlements’ (BIS, 2003a) consolidated banking statistics and 
consists of aggregate contractual lending32 (consolidated) of banks in the reporting 
country (U.S.), along with all their foreign branches and subsidiaries, vis-à-vis to 
the rest of the world. Consequently, foreign claims are net of inter-office positions. 
The aforementioned information provides a comprehensive coverage of cross-
border financial exposure from the perspective of the creditor country and is 
collected by domestic central banks or monetary authorities through their resident 
commercial banks (BIS, 2003a). The majority of the reporting claims consist of 
standard bank loans extended to non- affiliated banks and non-banks, but also 
credit lines, and securities holdings (e.g. bonds, equities, money market instruments) 
issued by banks and the non-financial sector of the recipient country. Since data 
before the second quarter of 1999 are incomplete, we only include bank flow 
information from that date onwards. Naturally, we convert U.S. bank foreign 
holdings in real terms by using the GDP deflator of the recipient country 
(Papaioannou, 2009). The formula we use is the following: 
                                            
31 In the case of Cyprus, Hungary, Portugal, and Turkey we use the market capitalization-weighted average of 
short term rates from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and 
Spain. Similarly, in the case of Indonesia we use the market capitalization-weighted average of short term rates 
from Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore, India, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
32 Naturally, the dataset accounts only for on-balance sheet positions and as a result might underestimate the true 
exposure of reporting banks.   
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ܤܽ݊݇_ܨ݈݋ݓݏ௤஼ = ∆(஻௔௡௞_௛௟ௗ௦೜
಴)
ீ஽௉೤                                                                       (5.1) 
where Δ denotes the first order change between subsequent quarters, 
ܤܽ݊݇_ܨ݈݋ݓݏ௤஼ is our measure of foreign bank flows, ܤܽ݊݇_ℎ݈݀ݏ௤஼ is the unscaled 
measure of aggregate bank holdings between U.S. banks and country C in million 
U.S. dollars in quarter q, and ܩܦ ௬ܲ  corresponds to the GDP of country C (in 
current U.S. dollars), the year y.  
 Furthermore, we use the U.S. Treasury International Capital (TIC) reporting 
system to obtain monthly data on cross-border equity portfolio flows (expressed in 
million US$) between the U.S. and the remaining 38 countries in our sample. These 
data consist of financial transactions of at least $50 million (gross purchases and 
sales of foreign stocks) between the U.S and foreign residents. U.S. residents 
include branches or subsidiaries of foreign entities located in the U.S. Branches of 
U.S. companies incorporated outside the U.S. are considered foreign residents. 
Direct cross-border investment activities are not included in the data. Similar to our 
measure of bank flows, we calculate net equity portfolio flows by scaling the sum 
of monthly net purchases – purchases minus sales – of foreign equity by U.S. 
investors during each quarter, with the GDP of the recipient country the respective 
year. The formula we use is the following: 
ܰ݁ݐܨ݈݋ݓݏ௤஼ = ∑ ൫௉௨௥௖௛௔௦௘௦೟
಴ିௌ௔௟௘௦೟಴൯೟:೟∈೜
ீ஽௉೤                                                              (5.2) 
where ܰ݁ݐܨ݈݋ݓݏ௤஼  is our standardized measure of net equity flows, ܲݑݎܿℎܽݏ݁ݏ௧஼ 
(݈ܵܽ݁ݏ௧஼) indicates gross purchases (sales) of foreign equity between U.S. investors 
and the residents of country C during quarter q, and ܩܦ ௬ܲ is the GDP (in current 
U.S. dollars) of country C the respective year y. Data on GDP are collected from 
the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. 
 
5.2.2 Liquidity measure  
The market microstructure literature has produced a number of alternative 
measures for liquidity to date. However, there is little consensus on which one is 
the most appropriate, mainly because different measures capture different aspects 
of liquidity. Since the most refined of these measures (e.g. quoted spread, effective 
bid-ask spread etc.) are based on detailed microstructure information that is 
generally not available for markets outside the U.S. without compromising the 
quality of the data, we decide to use a modified version of the Amihud’s (2002) 
price impact measure as our proxy for market liquidity. The Amihud ratio is 
designed to capture the impact of a unit of trading volume (in local currency) on the 
price of the stock, and is therefore associated with the illiquidity of the particular 
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stock. It is computed as the ratio of the absolute daily stock return divided by the 
trading volume of the respective stock measured in domestic currency.  
A large number of recent empirical studies attest to the credibility of this 
particular proxy. Among other papers, Hasbrouck (2009), as well as Goyenko, 
Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) show that the Amihud measure performs quite well 
relative to other proxies, especially when it comes to daily transaction level data for 
the U.S. market. Lesmond (2005) reports a high correlation between this measure 
and bid-ask spreads for 23 emerging markets. Examples of other studies that have 
been using the Amihud measure include Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Spiegel and 
Wang (2005), Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006), Kamara, Lou, and Sadka 
(2008), Watanabe and Watanabe (2008), and Karolyi et al. (2012).33 
We follow previous studies (Karolyi et al., 2012) and transform the Amihud 
(2002) liquidity ratio in a way that is increasing with stock liquidity. Thus, 
according to our modified measure, the liquidity of stock i on day t is defined as 
follows: 
 ܮܫ ௜ܳ,௧஼ ≡ −݈݋݃ ൬1 + หோ೔,೟
಴ ห
௉೔,೟಴ ௏ை೔,೟಴
൰,                                                  (5.3)    
where ܮܫ ௜ܳ,௧஼  is the modified Amihud liquidity measure, ܴ௜,௧஼  is the return, ௜ܲ,௧஼  is the 
adjusted closing price, and ܸ ௜ܱ,௧஼  is the trading volume of stock i on day t, for 
country C.  
Similar to previous studies, we perform a number of data screens in order to 
mitigate the effect of reporting errors (e.g. Karolyi et al., 2012) 34 . Then, we 
construct our daily market-wide liquidity index as the equally-weighted average of 
all individual stock liquidity using the following relation:    
ܮܫܳெ,௧஼ ≡ ଵே ∑ ܮܫ ௜ܳ,௧஼ே௜ୀଵ  ,                                                                                       (5.4) 
where ܮܫܳெ,௧஼  is our daily liquidity index, ܮܫ ௜ܳ,ௗ஼  is the modified daily Amihud 
liquidity measure, of stock i on day t, for country C.  
           To control for changing patterns in the trading behaviour of investors, as 
well as the impact of trading volume on inventory risk which should both be 
reflected on aggregate liquidity conditions, we compute the daily turnover, first for 
each particular stock and then for the whole market. To address any non-
stationarity concerns typically associated with the turnover series, we use the 
following trend-adjusted definition of turnover which is also used in previous 
studies (Karolyi et al., 2012): 
                                            
33 We refer to Hasbrouck (2009), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), and Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) for a 
detailed discussion of different liquidity measures. 
34 For a detailed account of the various filters we refer to Vagias and van Dijk (2011).  
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ܶ ௜ܸ,௧஼ ≡ ݈݋݃ ൬1 + ௏ை೔,೟
಴
ேைௌு೔,೟಴
൰ − ଵே ∑ ݈݋݃ ൬1 +
௏ை೔,೟షೖ಴
ேைௌு೔,೟షೖ಴
൰ଶଶ௞ୀଵ ,                                      (5.5)   
where ܶ ௜ܸ,௧஼  is the daily stock turnover, ܸ ௜ܱ,௧஼  is the trading volume, and ܱܰܵܪ௜,௧஼ is 
the number of shares outstanding for stock i at day t, in country C. Similar to 
liquidity, we then construct the market-wide turnover series as the equally-
weighted average of daily stock turnover on each day. 
To address any complications due to different time conventions across 
markets, and moderate the increasing noise of daily estimates, we aggregate our 
daily measures into weekly frequency by computing the corresponding time series 
average. We also winsorize all our variables at the 2% level in order to mitigate the 
effect of outliers in our inference. 
  
5.2.3 Identifying adverse liquidity shocks  
Although the term “contagion” is frequently encountered in the financial 
press, literature to date has produced a number of alternative definitions, some of 
which have ambiguous interpretations and are notoriously difficult to implement35. 
In the present study, we follow the example of Boyson et al. (2010) and define 
contagion as the simultaneous realization of an extreme liquidity shock across a 
number of markets, in excess of what could be anticipated after controlling for 
market specific fundamentals. Since market makers or any type of investors 
operating as liquidity providers can offset anticipated liquidity shocks, we assume 
that it is only unanticipated shocks that can trigger spillover effects due to the 
inefficient liquidation of otherwise profitable positions or the inability to provide 
liquidity at a cost that would effectively clear the market. In this way, we also 
implicitly account for the possibility of mistakenly identifying as contagion shocks 
that can be attributed to deteriorating own market fundamentals, and might only 
appear to relate to adverse liquidity shocks in other markets due to common 
exposure to certain latent factors. Even though our approach is admittedly 
restrictive, it nevertheless asserts that we only identify truly contagious shocks 
rather than reflections of interdependence. Hence, we construct our variable of 
liquidity shocks using the following regression model that we estimate separately 
for every market in our sample: 
ܮܫܳெ,௧஼ =  ߙ஼ + ߚଵ,஼ܮܫܳெ,௧ିଵ஼ + ߚଶ,஼ܴெ,௧ିଵ஼ + ߚଷ,஼ܸ݋݈ெ,௧ିଵ஼ + ߚସ,஼ܶ ெܸ,௧ିଵ஼ +
ߚହ,஼ܸܶ_ܸ݋݈ெ,௧ିଵ஼ + ߚ଺,஼ܤܽ݊݇_ܴெ,௧ିଵ஼ + ߚ଻,஼ܴܽݐ݁ெ,௧ିଵ஼ + ߚ଼,஼ܯ/ܤெ,௧ିଵ஼ + ߝ௧஼                       
                           (5.6) 
                                            
35 For a more detailed discussion we refer to King, Sentana, and Wadhwani (1995), Allen and Gale (2000), 
Claessens and Forbes (2001), Karolyi (2003), and Dungey, Fry, and Gonzalez-Hermosillo (2010). 
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where ܮܫܳெ,௧஼  is our daily liquidity index, ܴெ,௧஼  is market return, ܸ݋݈ெ,௧஼  is market 
volatility, ܶ ெܸ,௧஼ is market turnover, ܸܶ_ܸ݋݈ெ,௧஼  is turnover volatility, ܤܽ݊݇_ܴெ,௧஼  
corresponds to the return of the bank index, ܴܽݐ݁ெ,௧஼  is the short term interest rate, 
and ܯ/ܤெ,௧஼  is the aggregate market-to-book ratio of country C during week t. The 
aforementioned model includes an extensive number of factors that account for the 
most commonly identified determinants of liquidity, namely market conditions 
(ܴெ,௧஼ , ܸ݋݈ெ,௧஼ ), inventory risk arising from changing trading behaviour (ܶ ெܸ,௧஼ , 
ܸܶ_ܸ݋݈ெ,௧஼ ), funding liquidity conditions ( ܤܽ݊݇_ܴெ,௧஼ , ܴܽݐ݁ெ,௧஼ ), and investor 
sentiment (ܯ/ܤெ,௧஼ )36. We also account for the persistence of liquidity series by 
including an autoregressive term in the regression. 
We arbitrarily define an extreme liquidity shock (exceedance) as one that 
corresponds to 1 standard deviation (SD) drop below the empirical mean of the 
corresponding filtered liquidity series. We decide to restrict our attention to 
extreme liquidity shocks, since interdependence across capital markets becomes 
more prevalent during periods of stress as opposed to periods when market 
advances (Yuan, 2005; Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp, 2006). Hence, by limiting 
our attention to extreme events we aim to isolate the causes and implications of 
common liquidity shocks from patterns that appear under ordinary market 
conditions. In this way we hope to elicit the factors or channels that emerge as 
particularly important under adverse market conditions. Moreover, using 1SD 
distance from the mean as a threshold enables us to identify a substantial number of 
liquidity events in the left tail of the empirical distribution for each country. In 
unreported results however, we find that the tenor of our results holds if we choose 
different cutoff points for our identification (e.g. 0.8 or 0.5 SD), and therefore the 
choice of the particular threshold has no material impact on the conclusions we 
draw in our present study37. 
To model liquidity contagion within and between regions we adopt the 
approach suggested by Bae et al. (2003). Studying coexceedances has the 
advantage that it is both parsimonious as a measure and straightforward in its 
interpretation. In this way, we overcome the problem of multiple and, many times, 
conflicting definitions of contagion found in the literature (Corsetti, Pericoli, and 
Sbracia, 2005). An additional advantage of our approach is that we implicitly 
account for the inherent differences in liquidity’s higher moments across markets, 
whereas by controlling for conditional volatility in our filtering regressions we are 
also able to address the heteroskedasticity bias illustrated by Forbes and Rigobon 
                                            
36 For more information regarding our motivation for the selection of the aforementioned variables we refer to 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005). 
37 In earlier versions of the current paper we used the 5% percentile as  a cutoff threshold. 
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(2002). Hence, we count the number of joint realizations of weekly liquidity shocks 
1SD below the mean for countries in a particular region, and then use it as our 
variable of interest in a limited dependent variable framework. We model liquidity 
coexceedances as a polychotomous variable that distinguishes between 3 categories, 
namely no liquidity exceedance or just in one market, liquidity coexceedances 
between two markets, and liquidity coexceedances including 3 or more countries 
(zero or one exceedances is considered the category of reference). Our decision to 
truncate coexceedances in more than three countries and include them in one group 
is made to retain the parsimony of the estimated model and to obtain a sufficient 
number of instances for each category. Because of the natural ordering of our 
dependent variable we decide to estimate an ordered logit model which is described 
as follows: 
 ܲൣܮܫܳ_ܥܺோ,௧ = ݆|ܺோ,௧൧ = ܲݎൣߤோ,௝ିଵ < ߚோᇱ ܺோ,௧ + ݑோ,௧ ≤ ߤோ,௝൧ = 
                                                       = ܨ൫ߤோ,௝ − ߚோᇱ ܺோ,௧൯ − ܨ൫ߤோ,௝ିଵ − ߚோᇱ ܺோ,௧൯    (5.7)                    
where ܮܫܳ_ܥܺோ,௧ corresponds to the category of liquidity coexceedances (0 to 2) in 
region R, at day t, ߚோᇱ  is the vector of coefficients,  ܺோ,௧ is the vector of covariates 
determining the number of coexceedances, ݑோ,௧ is the error term that is assumed to 
follow a logistic distribution, and ߤோ,௝’s denote the unknown cutoff parameters to 
be estimated together with the coefficients.  
  
5.2.4 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 1 we present summary statistics of the variables discussed earlier, 
separately for every country in our sample. As it can be easily observed, our 
variables demonstrate substantial cross-sectional variation. At this point, it is 
important to underline though that our liquidity ratio is not comparable across 
markets. This is due to the absence of consistent trading volume definitions, but 
also because our price impact ratio is expressed in units of local currency. In terms 
of market performance, Turkey is the top performer with average weekly returns of 
17.69bps, followed by Brazil with 7.65bps. This corresponds to an average 
annualized weekly return of almost 10% for Turkey and approximately 4% for 
Brazil. Japan is at the bottom of the cross-sectional distribution with an average 
weekly return of 0.02bps, followed by Thailand with 0.58bps. With respect to the 
performance of the banking sector, Turkey still ranks at the top with average 
weekly returns of 21.02bps, followed by Hungary with 12.38bps. The market with 
the worst performing banking sector is, not surprisingly, Japan with an average 
weekly return of -1.38bps, followed by Thailand with -0.65 bps. The two most 
volatile markets are Turkey and Korea, whereas New Zealand and Chile rank at the 
bottom in that respect. The market with the highest market-to-book ratio is, not 
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surprisingly, the U.S. (more than 1.5 times higher compared to the cross-sectional 
average) illustrating its superior efficiency in generating future profits for a given 
level of investment.   
The biggest recipient of equity portfolio flows is Cyprus with an average 
quarterly rate of almost 40 bps over its GDP, with Hong Kong ranked second in 
that respect, demonstrating a quarterly ratio of  25.81 bps. The countries favored 
less in that respect are the Netherlands, and Belgium in which U.S. investors have 
been net sellers at the average quarterly rate of -7.62bps and 3.87bps respectively. 
On the other hand, the average stock of U.S. bank claims of foreign assets is the 
highest in the case of Singapore and Hong Kong, corresponding to an average 
ownership ratio (asset-to-GDP) of 17.40% and 12.52% respectively. At the bottom-
end of the cross-sectional distribution in that respect we find China, which perhaps 
can be explained by the dominant role of the domestic banking sector in the 
provision of credit and the absence of an institutional framework that would allow 
arms-length financing to develop in the country. 
In table 2, we report descriptive statistics from the filtering regressions 
described in equation (6). To render our liquidity ratios comparable, we first scale 
them with the standard deviation of the respective empirical distribution. As 
explained in the section above, our purpose is to investigate the extent of clustering 
of unanticipated liquidity shocks across markets. Shocks of this kind cannot be 
hedged by domestic liquidity providers and as such can create pervasive price 
distortions with substantial costs for investors. The lagged nature of our empirical 
model allows us to overcome issues associated with endogeneity or concerns of 
reverse causality assuming we can now consider our covariates as predetermined. 
This way we are also able to evaluate the relative importance of different contagion 
channels without the concern of a spurious correlation between persistent 
components of market liquidity and our proxies for contagion. Consistent with 
intuition, market return is a positive conditional predictor of next week’s liquidity 
for the vast majority of cases. This can be attributed both in the declining capacity 
of domestic markets makers to provide liquidity, but also in the increasing demand 
for immediacy by investors which are expected to have a disproportionate effect in 
down markets. There is only a minority of cases in which market return appears to 
have a negative correlation with liquidity, but none of them is significant at the 5% 
level. Equally conclusive is the share of markets in which aggregate volatility has a 
negative effect on future liquidity (approximately 77%). This is again in line with 
previous work (e.g. Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010) and can be interpreted 
as a positive associate between the cost of funding or prevailing margin 
requirements and the general level of uncertainty in the market. When volatility 
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exceeds certain levels, generally employed risk models typically dictate the 
offloading of risky securities increasing the demand for immediacy among 
investors which can only be satisfied at the expense of a higher cost even assuming 
unchanged capacity to supply liquidity by market makers. On the other hand, 
increasing volatility would typically lead to tighter funding conditions and an 
increase in the risk aversion of domestic market makers which would now require 
higher (ex-ante) compensation for assuming their market clearing role (Nagel, 
2012). We also find that turnover and turnover volatility on average demonstrate a 
negative and positive conditional correlation with liquidity respectively, which is 
admittedly counterintuitive. However, interpretation of the aforementioned finding 
is complicated both by the detrending we imposed at the beginning, as well as by 
the fact that the share of markets demonstrating turnover (and turnover volatility) 
coefficients with opposite sign is almost equal. As a result, we believe that the 
aforementioned finding should be treated with caution.  
Moreover, the sign of estimated coefficients of our bank index return 
variable and of the short term interest rate both indicate that increasing funding 
costs as reflected in underperforming intermediators or rising borrowing rates will 
eventually erode the capacity of liquidity providers to fulfill their role. Market-to-
book ratio is a positive and statistical significant predictor of future liquidity for the 
vast majority of markets. This confirms intuition that improving sentiment is 
associated with a higher participation of retail investors in the market, thus 
decreasing the risk of informed order flow and consequently the cost of liquidity 
provision. The strongly significant AR(1) term also confirms the persistent nature 
of our liquidity series as it has been already illustrated by a number of previous 
studies (e.g. Karolyi et al., 2012). By performing the aforementioned analysis 
separately between our groups of Developed and Emerging markets we find that 
the tenor of our aggregate results remains mostly unchanged.  
Having performed our filtering regressions we now plot the share of 
countries experiencing a liquidity exceedance separately for the whole sample, and 
our groups of Developed and Emerging markets. In figure 1 exceedances are first 
identified using the AR(1)-adjusted liquidity series whereas in figure 2 we use our 
filtered liquidity series based on the model described in equation (6). Both figures 
highlight the existence of substantial clustering in the share of countries 
experiencing an adverse liquidity shock, which peaks in periods of global turmoil 
typically associated with adverse events of global importance (e.g. LTCM crisis,  
9/11 attacks, burst of dot-com bubble, and the onset of the recent financial crisis). 
Another observation is that with the exception of few occasions mostly identified in 
the earlier period of our sample, the share of Developed markets experiencing 
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liquidity co-exceedances mostly dominated the equivalent share for the Emerging 
markets. We attribute this finding to the increasing extent of integration that has 
been taking place among Developed markets over the past couple of years, 
enabling foreign capital to move across markets at a minimum cost. On the other 
hand, the abolishment of capital controls has benefited local economies 
substantially in view of the subsequent decline in the cost of capital, only however 
at the expense of higher commonality across markets due to herding, clientele 
effects, portfolio rebalancing by global investors, varying global risk-aversion, 
common funding practices, and an increasing exposure over global risk factors. In 
addition, we notice our un-filtered liquidity series typically demonstrates a larger 
share of countries experiencing a liquidity co-exceedance when compared to our 
filtered series, which clearly manifests that the extent of clustering of liquidity 
shocks can be, to some extent, attributed to market-specific factors that are 
themselves correlated with potential contagion channels and whose expected 
impact over local liquidity can be forecasted, in many cases. As discussed earlier, 
our identification strategy appears to be particularly conservative implying that our 
findings concerning the importance of potential contagion channels can be even 
more pronounced than what is indicated in our empirical framework. However, we 
do not expect this to undermine the core findings of the present analysis which is 
mainly concerned with evaluating the relative rather than the absolute importance 
of alternative contagion channels. 
Table 3 presents the frequency of different types of liquidity exceedances 
separately across markets in the Developed and Emerging group. This way we can 
obtain a more informed perspective regarding potential differences in the extent of 
liquidity contagion across the two groups, as well as identify the markets that 
appear to be more susceptible (resilient) to contagion within each group. 
Interestingly, Emerging markets demonstrate significantly less liquidity co-
exceedances in the top categories compared to Developed Markets, both in the case 
of filtered as well as in the case of unfiltered liquidity series. In the case of filtered 
liquidity series for example, Switzerland is the only market in the category of 
Developed demonstrating zero co-exceedances, whereas in the group of Emerging 
Markets 14, 12 and 6 markets demonstrate zero co-exceedances in the categories of  
(>=) 6, 5, and 4, respectively. This can be considered as an early indication that 
Emerging Markets are significantly less responsive to common liquidity shocks 
when compared to Developed Markets. Regarding the countries with the highest 
number of co-exceedances, Denmark ranks at the top with one third of its co-
exceedances occurring simultaneously with at least 5 more Developed markets, 
whereas Indonesia ranks first among Emerging Markets in that respect.     
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5.3 Empirical Results 
This section describes the modeling framework used to identify the 
determinants of contagion within and across regions, as well as the respective 
findings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to present evidence of 
liquidity contagion, both within specific regions and across markets otherwise 
distant. Our baseline approach is based on logistic regressions for the different 
regions in our sample. After investigating the extent of liquidity contagion across 
markets, we also try to ascertain the relative importance of a number of potential 
channels, as well as to evaluate the importance of foreign flows in transmitting 
adverse liquidity shocks from one market to another.  
 
5.3.1 Contagion within Regions –Logistic Regressions  
In an attempt to identify the channels through which crises tend to propagate 
from an epicenter to neighboring markets, a significant number of papers to date 
have focused primarily on the regional nature of many of the past crises. In view of 
the fact that geographic distance correlates positively with information frictions, 
and given the importance of the latter in the market for assets and/or goods (Portes, 
and Rey, 2005; van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009), it is hardly surprising to 
observe that crises spread primarily across countries within the same region. The 
two most commonly suggested explanations regarding the transmission mechanism 
concern the existence of strong trade and/or financial linkages, as well as the 
similarity of the underlying economic fundamentals that are typical between 
markets in geographic proximity. Glick and Rose (1999) for example show that the 
prevalence of currency crises within a region can be attributed to strong trade ties, 
even after controlling for a variety of macroeconomic effects. As far as capital 
markets are concerned, Forbes and Chinn (2004) argue that developments in the 
largest economy of a region exert substantial influence in the performance of other 
markets in the same region. The importance of financial linkages within a region is 
also manifested by the extent of cross-border bank lending, since it is generally 
observed that banks tend to be more active creditors within their own region. Hence, 
the existence of a common lender that contracts its lending as a response to a 
domestic crisis, can significantly impair the availability of funding in regional 
markets, and thus cause contagion (Kaminsky, and Reinhart, 2000; van Rijckeghem, 
and Weder, 2001). In addition, a number of previous studies argue that “wake-up 
call” effects can have a disproportionate impact over countries within the same 
region (e.g. Ahluwalia, 2000; van Rijckeghem, and Weder, 2003).  
Our current empirical setup follows closely that of Boyson et al. (2010) and 
tries to assess the relative importance of contagious effects within and across 
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regions by estimating whether a particular market is more likely to experience an 
adverse liquidity shock when the percentage of other markets experiencing similar 
a shock is higher. In Table 4 we model the probability of a liquidity exceedance in 
one market as a function of the share of markets (%) experiencing a liquidity 
exceedance the same week in the same region (excluding the market of interest), 
but also as a function of liquidity exceedances occurring in one of the remaining 
regions, as well as in our group named Global that consists of Australia, Japan, 
U.K., and the U.S. Our dependent variable indicates whether the filtered liquidity 
series of a particular market declines 1SD below its respective mean (by 
construction the mean value is always zero). Under the hypothesis of no contagion, 
the extent of liquidity co-exceedances in a region should have no significant 
explanatory power over the probability of a liquidity exceedance in another market. 
Thus, we pertain that, in the context of our analysis, a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on the share of countries experiencing a liquidity co-
exceedance corresponds to a correlation over and above what can be attributed to 
own market fundamentals, and as a result should be considered as evidence of 
contagion (Bekaert et al., 2005; Boyson et al., 2010). To control for time-invariant 
heterogeneity across markets we introduce dummy variables for each market, 
whereas year dummies are included to account for any unobserved periodic effects. 
Except for a logistic framework we also employ a complementary logarithmic 
setup which, contrary to the logistic transformation, assumes that the respective 
cumulative distribution function is asymmetric around zero ( ܨ(ݔ) = 1 −
݁ݔ݌൫−݁ݔ݌(ݔ)൯). As it can be easily observed, the tenor and significance of our 
results remain unchanged regardless of the estimation methodology employed.   
Table 4 presents the results of the aforementioned estimation. We observe 
that within-region contagion is statistically significant at the 1% level in the case of 
Developed Europe and marginally significant in the case of Latin America (10% 
level), but does not seem to be of any importance in the case of Emerging Europe 
and Asia. It is also noticeable that markets in Developed Europe are susceptible to 
adverse liquidity shocks both from Asia and Global markets with the former 
demonstrating a more pronounced effect even when compared to within-region 
contagion. It is also noteworthy that with the exception of markets in Latin 
America, the extent of negative liquidity shocks in our group of Global markets 
carries the seeds of contagion to other regions as well. Our finding confirms the 
common perception that developments in markets of systemic importance for the 
global financial system such as the aforementioned have implications extending far 
beyond their own geographic limits. Our results are particularly impressive also in 
economic terms. In the case of Emerging Europe for example, the probability of a 
market experiencing a liquidity exceedance rises from almost 15%, when none of 
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the Global markets has an exceedance, to almost 37% when all four markets 
(Austrlia, Japan, U.K., and U.S.) experience a liquidity co-exceedance the same 
week. Cross-regional contagion is also substantial. In the case of Asia (Panel C, 
Column 5), the probability of a market experiencing a liquidity exceedance 
increases from 3.3% when none of the markets in Developed Europe have a 
liquidity exceedance, to approximately 17.5% when all the markets in Developed 
Europe experience a coexceedance. Hence, as the aforementioned findings 
illustrate, liquidity contagion is not only important in statistical terms, but is also 
substantial in economic terms in many of the regions considered in our analysis. 
Now we move a step further and try to assess the relative importance of 
different factors in explaining liquidity contagion within and across regions. Our 
set of liquidity determinants is similar to the one used in our filtering regressions. 
In our tests for within-region contagion (Columns 1, 4, and 7) each regressor is 
computed as the equally-weighted average of the same factor across all remaining 
markets in the specific region. In the case of Global markets, regressors are 
computed as the equally-weighted average of respective factors across Australia, 
Japan, U.K., and the U.S. In Columns 3, 6, and 9, we try to distinguish the relative 
importance of Global versus local determinants (own region) by first removing any 
global component from our set of local factors. As a result, own region 
determinants are orthogonalized on the respective global factors using an OLS 
estimation framework separately for each market. Similar to Table 4, our dependent 
variable is an indicator obtaining the value of 1 once the respective market 
experiences an adverse liquidity shock, whereas estimation is performed using a 
logistic framework. In Table 5 we present the respective results. It is noteworthy 
that the aggregate market-to-book ratio is the most consistent predictor of market 
liquidity exceedances. When we investigate the importance of local and global 
factors separately, the aforementioned variable is always statistical significant at 
least at the 5% level. However, when we orthogonalize the local factors on the 
respective global and introduce both in the regression, only the local component 
remains statistical significance. Our interpretation is that local sentiment dominates 
global as a determinant of liquidity exceedances of markets within a particular 
region, although the latter has also important ramifications. Another explanation 
however could be that our global averages, although orthogonal to respective 
regional factors, might still correlate with some of the remaining regional variables 
which could potentially underplay their statistical significance. The direction of the 
relation between sentiment and negative liquidity shocks is intuitive. When investor 
sentiment improves within a particular region or within our set of global markets, 
then the probability of a liquidity exceedance in an individual market is reduced, 
ceteris paribus. Our finding can have multiple interpretations. During periods of 
170 Chapter 5  
 
elevated sentiment, investors might increase their otherwise limited presence in 
foreign markets, particularly neighboring, and thus increase the share of non-
informed trading flow in those markets, with positive implications over domestic 
liquidity. The same reasoning extends to market makers whose risk aversion will 
typically decline during such periods, and thus command a lower premium for 
providing liquidity in many of the markets they operate (Nagel, 2012). 
Alternatively, when the share of optimistic investors increases and prices 
overshoot38, market makers operating across multiple markets will experience a 
positive shock in their net worth which, in turn, will increase their capacity to 
provide liquidity. When we estimate the model including all markets (Columns 1-
3), aggregate volatility demonstrates positive and significant correlation with the 
probability of a liquidity exceedance (Columns 1 and 2). However, when we run 
the model including both regional and global factors, statistical significance is lost. 
Global market performance is also negatively correlated with the probability of a 
liquidity co-exceedance when we estimate our model including all markets or when 
we limit estimation to our sample of Developed markets. Nevertheless, statistical 
significance is again limited and does not survive the inclusion of our set of 
orthogonalized local factors (Columns 3, 6). Finally, our set of chi-square tests 
indicates that overall significance of (orthogonalized) regional factors is always 
superior to that of respective global factors.  
After investigating the time-series of liquidity contagion in markets of 
different regions/categories (Developed Europe, Emerging Europe, Asia, and Latin 
America), we now turn our attention to the respective time-series properties of the 
cross-section of stocks. This way we try to identify particular stock characteristics 
associated with increasing susceptibility over adverse liquidity shocks originating 
from different markets within the same region or from our set of Global markets. 
Our selection of stock characteristics is motivated by theory as well as by previous 
empirical findings. First, it is intuitive to argue that during periods of financial 
turmoil, when the allocation of liquidity is scarce and the demand for immediacy 
increases, liquidity provision should be particularly subdued for stocks perceived as 
riskier or of inferior quality. In that respect, low capitalization stocks are, on 
average, associated with more pronounced information frictions since they 
typically demonstrate lower ownership by institutional investors and poorer 
governance structure. The same holds for stocks with low levels of idiosyncratic 
volatility which typically incorporate less private information and are thus 
associated with higher levels of information asymmetry (Ferreira and Laux, 2007). 
As a result, stocks in the aforementioned categories incorporate a greater extent of 
                                            
38 We assume some type of short-selling constraints are present (e.g. Bris,Goetzmann, and Zhu, 2007).  
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subjective valuations which deems more difficult the separation of transitory from 
information induced shocks by market makers. Hence, it is reasonable to except 
that the cost of liquidity provision will increase disproportionally for this type of 
stocks during periods of general financial turmoil. The same holds for stocks with 
lower extent of information driven trading, as well as for those more responsive to 
changes in investor sentiment. Overall, the aforementioned characteristics account 
for a different extent of prevalence of trading frictions in the cross-section of the 
market and deem mispricing difficult to arbitrage due to increased noise trader risk, 
short-selling constraints, and asymmetric information impediments. As a result, it is 
reasonable to expect such stocks to be particularly susceptible to adverse liquidity 
shocks originating from abroad.  
For this purpose, we create groups of stocks based on their ranking 
(above/below median) in one of the following four dimensions, namely market 
capitalization, idiosyncratic volatility, the extent of trading on private information, 
and overreaction to sentiment. For the first three categories we create separate 
liquidity indices by assigning every stock of a particular market in one of the 
aforementioned groups depending on whether it ranks above or below the cross-
sectional median of market capitalization, idiosyncratic volatility, and of our proxy 
for private information trading flow the previous year. The idiosyncratic volatility 
of a stock is computed as the standard deviation of the residual obtained from 
regressing daily stock returns on the daily market return every year. Our measure of 
trading based on private information follows Llorente at al. (2002) and is obtained 
by running the following regression every year for every stock in a market: 
ܴ௜,ௗାଵ = ܿ଴,௜ + ܿଵ,௜ ∙ ܴ௜,ௗ + ܿଶ,௜ ∙ ܴ௜,ௗ ∙ ܶ ௜ܸ,ௗ + ߝ௜,ௗାଵ                                            (5.8) 
where ܴ௜,ௗ  is the stock return, and ܶ ௜ܸ,ௗ  is the detrended log turnover of stock i, 
during day d. The estimated coefficient ܿଶ,௜ is our measure of information-driven 
trading. Overreaction to sentiment is assessed by running regressions of monthly 
stock returns on an AR(1) term and our (lagged) proxy of global sentiment for the 
whole time period. Our preference of a global rather than a local sentiment index in 
our effort to characterize stocks’ responsiveness to sentiment induced trading is 
motivated by Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan (2012) who show that the global 
component from a number of local sentiment indicators is a particularly strong 
predictor (contrarian) of local market returns. We construct our proxy of global 
sentiment as the monthly GDP-weighted average of the closed-end fund discount 
across 24 countries in our sample39. A lower closed-end fund discount typically 
reflects elevated investor sentiment. Thus, stocks demonstrating a greater price 
                                            
39 Closed-end fund discount data are obtained from http://mathijsavandijk.com. We construct our global index 
only for the markets included in the present analysis. 
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reversal (increase) following months with high (low) investor sentiment are 
typically associated to noise trading and are also considered more difficult to 
arbitrage. As a result, stocks with a conditional correlation between performance 
and sentiment that is above the cross-sectional median are considered as high-
sentiment, whereas stocks that rank below the respective median are considered as 
low sentiment.        
After classifying each stock of a market in one of the aforementioned 
categories, we construct the respective liquidity index by computing the equally-
weighted average of the Amihud ratio across all stocks in each group during the 
following year (with the exception of our sentiment indicator for which ranking is 
performed for the whole time period). To identify the corresponding liquidity 
coexceedances per index we perform the filtering regression described in Equation 
(6), and then use the identification strategy described earlier. In Table 6 we present 
the results from logistic regressions of liquidity exceedances separately for each 
group of stocks on the share of markets experiencing a liquidity exceedance within 
the same region and in our group of Global markets. Panels A and B report the 
estimation results including the share co-exceedances within the same region and in 
the group of Global markets separately, whereas panel C is estimated including 
both variables. As it can be easily observed, contagion within a region and from our 
group of Global markets is strongly significant in statistical terms in the whole 
cross-section of markets. In economic terms however, we notice that the within 
region term has always a more pronounced effect compared to Global markets. For 
example, the probability of a liquidity exceedance for stock indixes in the low-
sentiment category is almost 15% when all the markets in the same region and 50% 
of Global markets are experiencing an exceedance, whereas the same probability 
declines to 11% when all Global markets and half of the markets in the same region 
are experiencing an adverse liquidity shock. Our finding confirms the perception 
that contagion is particularly strong within the geographic barriers of a region, even 
though systemically important markets also exert substantial influence in that 
respect. Contrary to intuition however, we observe that liquidity contagion is more 
pronounced in the case of big rather than small capitalization stocks. The same 
holds for stocks with more information-driven order flow the past year, and lower 
responsiveness over sentiment. This extends both for liquidity shocks originating 
from the same region as well as for shocks from Global markets. On the other hand, 
consistent with our expectations, stocks with lower idiosyncratic volatility are more 
susceptible to contagious shocks compared to stocks that rank higher in that respect. 
One potential explanation for the aforementioned puzzling result is that market 
makers or investors operating across several markets typically hold the most liquid 
end of the spectrum in those markets and thus extreme correlations will become 
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more pronounce across assets of higher rather than lower quality during periods of 
a widespread liquidity shortage. This channel can operate through a portfolio-
rebalancing effect, but also due to investors first cashing-out their most easily 
marketable, and thus liquid positions.   
                         
5.3.2 Channels of Liquidity Contagion 
In Table 7 we investigate the relative importance of different factors that 
theory elicits as important determinants of aggregate liquidity (Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen, 2009; Boyson et al., 2010). These consist of the TED spread, the level of 
anticipated volatility on the S&P500 index (Expected Volatility), the Variance 
Premium, the return and volatility of our index of global prime brokers (Prime 
Broker Returns, and Prime Broker Volatility), the world interest rate (World Rate), 
and the spread between the US High-Yield Bond Index (BB-B) and the 10 year U.S. 
Treasury bond (Credit Spread). The Expected Volatility and Variance Premium 
account for a decomposition of the VIX index on an uncertainty component and a 
risk aversion component respectively. Since the VIX index has been already 
identified as commoving positively with the cost of liquidity provision40 (Nagel, 
2012), we believe it is meaningful to disentangle between the importance of the 
uncertainty component which is computed under the physical measure and that of 
risk aversion which alludes to changing risk preferences. The TED spread reflects 
the general borrowing terms of financial intermediaries when compared to riskless 
Treasury bonds, but also the extent of counterparty risk as perceived by the 
interbank market. As a result, it typically correlates negatively with market 
liquidity. Prime broker performance and volatility also reflect the ability of 
financial intermediaries to perform their role as liquidity providers. When their 
market performance is disappointing and investors are particularly uncertain about 
their outlook, prime brokers would typically curtail the supply of liquidity, 
effectively increasing the cost of immediacy. The world interest rate on the other 
hand captures general monetary conditions prevailing at each point in time, 
whereas the Credit Spread implicitly relates to the cost of borrowing by investors 
and financial intermediaries alike and as such should negatively relate to liquidity.  
In Table 7 we try to assess the explanatory power of each of the 
aforementioned channels over the time-series evolution of liquidity contagion in 
each of our regions. Our dependent variable in this example reflects the extent of 
liquidity contagion within a particular region. Hence, we model coexceedances as a 
polychotomous variable that distinguishes between 3 categories of liquidity 
                                            
40 In unreported results we find VIX to be positively associated to the extent of contagion across all our regions 
in a statistically significant level. 
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contagion, namely zero or a single liquidity exceedance in the region, liquidity 
coexceedances between two countries, and liquidity coexceedances including 3 or 
more countries (zero or one exceedances is considered the category of reference). 
The test statistic reported in the last column investigates the joint significance of 
each factor across all regions. Interestingly, the factor most consistently explaining 
liquidity contagion in our regions (with the exception of Emerging Europe) is the 
Variance Premium. Consistent with intuition, an increase in implied risk aversion is 
associated with a greater likelihood of two or more coexceedances in the region 
compared to the base case. In addition, the joint test of the aforementioned factor 
being simultaneously zero across all regions is easily rejected at the 1% statistical 
level. Prime Broker Volatility is also positively associated with an increasing 
likelihood of at least two liquidity exceedances in the region in the case of 
Developed Europe and Latin America, whereas increasing borrowing costs in the 
category of high yield bonds is also a positive indicator of contagion but statistical 
significance is limited only in the case of Latin America. With the exception of 
Developed Europe, the sign of the TED spread is also consistent with intuition and 
is positively correlated with an increasing likelihood of two or more coexceedances 
in Latin America, and in our group of Global markets. Overall, our results show 
that adverse developments in funding conditions (e.g. an increase in borrowing 
costs, counterparty risk or uncertainty regarding the prospects of the intermediating 
sector), combined with an increase in aggregate risk aversion increase the 
likelihood of simultaneous liquidity shocks within a region. On the other hand, 
global monetary conditions seem to demonstrate much lower relevance in that 
respect.  
After having investigated the importance of different contagion channels in 
explaining the clustering of adverse liquidity shocks at the index level we now try 
to furnish a better understanding regarding contagion in the cross-section of stocks 
in respective markets. Our goal is to assess whether the relative importance of each 
of the aforementioned channels differs when we condition our inference on 
particular stock characteristics. This time our dependent variable is the share (%) of 
liquidity coexceedances across all the markets in our sample. Given the censored 
nature of the variable, estimation is performed using a tobit model. In unreported 
results however we repeat our inference using a simple OLS estimator, but also an 
(ordered) logistic framework and results remain qualitatively unchanged. With the 
exception of the TED spread, the impact of the remaining factors is consistent with 
the intuition explained earlier. Variance Premium and Expected Volatility are 
always positively associated with a greater share of liquidity co-exceedances, 
significantly at the 1% level. Interestingly however, their impact is typically more 
pronounced in the case of “high” rather than “low” quality stocks, namely high 
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market capitalization, those with more information-induced trading, and lower 
overreaction to sentiment. The same extends for stocks with lower levels of 
idiosyncratic volatility. An exception in that respect is the effect of Expected 
Volatility which is stronger in the case of stocks demonstrating less extensive 
information-induced trading. In addition, an increase in Prime Broker Volatility is 
associated with a greater extent of liquidity contagion across markets, which is 
mostly statistical significant among “high quality” stocks. As it has been already 
indicated, the negative sign in the point estimate of the TED spread is puzzling. 
Our explanation is that this reflects the residual correlation of the aforementioned 
factor and our dependent variable since the component reflecting changes in 
borrowing costs and counterparty risk is already captured by our other variables 
(e.g. Credit Spread, Prime Broker Volatility). Overall, our findings in this table 
confirm the importance of funding conditions and risk aversion in explaining the 
extent of contagion across aggregate liquidity indices as well as across the liquidity 
of different categories of stocks. However, we also confirm our puzzling finding 
that the majority of our contagion channels seem to be more pronounced among 
“high” rather than “low quality” stocks. Again, one potential explanation is that 
market makers or investors operating across many markets typically prefer high 
“quality stocks” for reasons related to clientele effects as well as due to moderate 
transaction costs and lower information impediments. If that is indeed the case, it 
would be reasonable to expect the aforementioned contagion channels to have a 
more dramatic effect over stocks of higher rather than lower quality during periods 
of general market turmoil. 
Next we try to shed more light on the potential transmission mechanism of 
liquidity shocks across markets. Understanding how liquidity shocks propagate 
across markets is of utmost importance among policymakers that aspire to develop 
protective mechanisms that would offset such shocks. One such mechanism can be 
manifested through the positions of international investors and particularly through 
cross-border equity portfolio flows. Several empirical studies to date (e.g. Cao, 
Chen, Liang, and Lo, 2009; Aragon and Strahan, 2012) have identified certain 
types of sophisticated investors as performing the role of liquidity providers with 
the objective to cash-out from potential liquidity premia across many markets. As a 
result, it is reasonable to infer that during times of tightening margins and 
increasing borrowing costs such investors will most likely react by withdrawing 
liquidity simultaneously from the markets they operate, thus contributing to the 
transmission of contagion. Similar behavior can be triggered by a number of 
different reasons including “flight to quality” episodes, information cascades, or 
sudden spikes in risk aversion. Another important mechanism works through 
lending institutions and financial intermediaries operating in more than one market 
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simultaneously. It is intuitive to argue that an adverse shock to the financial state of 
banks or deteriorating funding conditions of financial intermediaries in one market 
will undermine their capacity to extend credit not only in the domestic market but 
also abroad. This in turn will generate an adverse shock to funding conditions in 
markets other than the one initially experiencing the shock which can eventually 
translate to declining market liquidity abroad.    
Table 9 investigates the predictions of the aforementioned arguments 
regarding the role of international equity investors and that of cross-border bank 
lending. If foreign equity or bank flows render a market more susceptible to 
contagion through sudden outflows, this means that markets attracting more foreign 
capital should demonstrate greater synchronicity in terms of liquidity shocks. In 
Table 9 we create two groups of markets every quarter, one that includes markets 
that have received above median equity or bank flows over the course of the 
respective quarter and those ranking below median in that respect. Then we 
compute the share of markets within each group experiencing a liquidity 
exceedance and regress it on our set of contagion determinants used in the previous 
tables. Once more our findings are not perfectly aligned with theoretical predictions. 
Consistent with intuition, the Variance Premium has a disproportionate effect over 
markets that have been above median recipients of equity and bank flows. In other 
words, markets receiving more investment either in the form of equity purchases or 
in the form of cross-border bank lending demonstrate a greater extent of liquidity 
contagion once global risk aversion increases. The same holds for Prime Broker 
Volatility, but only when we consider bank flows as the identifying characteristic 
for sorting. The Credit Spread however demonstrates a more pronounced effect in 
markets ranking below median both in terms of bank flows as well as stock 
purchases by foreign investors. The TED spread is again negative, whereas the 
world interest rate demonstrates little consistency in terms of the estimated sign. 
Overall, our findings suggest that markets receiving more investment either in the 
form of equity purchases or in the form of cross-border bank lending demonstrate a 
greater extent of liquidity contagion once global risk aversion increases. However, 
our coefficient estimates of other factors are more challenging to interpret in that 
respect.  
    
5.4 Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the extent of liquidity contagion within, as well 
as across different geographic regions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first paper to pursue such a task. Given the large number of arguments against 
earlier methodologies that typically generate an overidentification of contagious 
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events (e.g. Forbes, and Rigobon, 2002), our definition of contagion is purposefully 
conservative and based on the clustering of adverse liquidity shocks (exceedances) 
in excess of what can be attributed to market specific determinants (Bekaert et al., 
2005; Boyson et al., 2010). Our filtering regressions control for an extensive set of 
factors the literature has elicited as determinants of market liquidity. In the case of 
no contagion our approach implies zero correlation between the probability of a 
liquidity exceedance and the extent of clustering in liquidity exceedances across 
other markets.  
Our analysis provides strong evidence of contagion across several regions in 
our sample. We also find that deteriorating liquidity conditions in systemically 
important markets like in Australia, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. exert, in certain 
cases, a disproportionate impact over other markets. Our findings are substantial in 
statistical as well as economic terms. When we try to identify the liquidity factors 
with the greatest explanatory power over the likelihood of a liquidity exceedance, 
our proxy for investor sentiment (market-to-book) together with aggregate volatility 
stand out as the ones with the most pronounced effect. Interestingly, even though 
Global aggregates are important in their own respect, (orthogonalized) regional 
aggregates demonstrate a leading role when it comes to explain liquidity 
exceedances in the same region.  
After investigating the time-series of liquidity contagion across markets of 
different regions/categories (Developed Europe, Emerging Europe, Asia, and Latin 
America), we next turn our attention to the respective time-series properties of the 
cross-section of stocks. Our effort is to identify particular characteristics that render 
stocks susceptible to adverse liquidity shocks originating from abroad. Our findings 
at this point are also interesting. Contrary to initial expectations, we show that 
liquidity contagion is more pronounced in “high” rather than “low quality” stocks. 
Our conjecture is that market makers or sophisticated investors operating across 
many markets typically prefer the top-end of the market spectrum in terms of 
quality for reasons related to clientele effects, as well as due to moderate 
transaction costs and lower information impediments associated with stocks of this 
category. As a result, during periods of market distress investors that otherwise 
provide liquidity increase the demanded payoff in return for supplying liquidity or, 
even worse, they demand immediacy themselves, thus hampering liquidity across 
their holdings.   
     We also investigate the relative importance of different factors that 
previous papers elicit as important determinants of aggregate liquidity. The most 
consistent results in that respect concern the Variance Premium and the volatility of 
our index of Global prime brokers. Our findings suggest that an increase in the 
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implied risk aversion reflected in the Variance Premium, together with higher 
uncertainty regarding the state of financial intermediaries is associated with a 
greater extent of liquidity contagion within a number of regions. Another important 
determinant is the cost of funding typically reflected by the Credit Spread. Our 
analysis lends further support to the notion that commonality in liquidity becomes 
particularly pronounced in periods of deteriorating global funding conditions as 
well as downbeat investor sentiment. Finally, we investigate to what extent foreign 
equity flows and cross-border bank lending can provide a mechanism of 
transmission of potential liquidity shocks. Consistent with intuition, our findings 
suggest that markets receiving more investment either in the form of equity 
purchases or in the form of cross-border bank lending demonstrate a greater extent 
of liquidity contagion once global risk aversion increases.  
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Table 5.2: Filtering Regressions  
Columns 1-6 presents descriptive statistics of country-by-country OLS regressions of weekly market liquidity on 
lagged determinants described in Equation (6). Liquidity variables are first scaled by their respective standard 
deviation. In more detail, columns 1 and 2 contain the average and median values of respective coefficients, 
column 3 the percentage of markets with estimated coefficients that are positive and statistically significant at 
least at the 5% level, column 4 the percentage of markets with positive coefficient, column 5 the % of markets 
with negative coefficient that is statistically significant at least at the 5% level, and column 6 the percentage of 
markets with negative coefficient. Columns 7 and 8 contain the corresponding estimates obtained by running 
panel regressions with fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the market level. 
 
 Panel A: All Markets Avg. Coeff. 
Median 
Coeff. 
% Markets 
with >0 
Coeff. Sign.
5% Level 
% 
Markets 
with >0 
Coeff. 
% Markets 
with <0 
Coeff. Sign. 
5% Level 
% 
Markets 
with <0 
Coeff. 
Panel 
Regression 
FEs Coeff. 
Panel 
Regression 
FEs t-stat.  
         
Market Return 0.0309 0.0365 0.1282 0.6667 0.0000 0.3333 0.0468 3.6830 
Market Volatility -0.0102 -0.0072 0.0769 0.2308 0.3333 0.7692 -0.0134 -4.3145 
Market Turnover -0.0396 -0.0011 0.0256 0.4872 0.0256 0.5128 -0.0197 -0.7423 
Turnover Volatility 0.0470 0.0521 0.4872 0.6923 0.1282 0.3077 0.0191 1.2427 
Bank Index Return 0.0229 0.0249 0.0000 0.7179 0.0256 0.2821 0.0206 2.1694 
Short Rate -0.0003 -0.0016 0.2564 0.4872 0.2051 0.5128 0.0014 0.2603 
M/B 0.2043 0.2169 0.7436 0.8462 0.0513 0.1538 0.1655 5.5242 
AR(1) 0.5210 0.5339 0.8462 0.9744 0.0000 0.0256 0.5770 12.1715 
Avg. Adj. R2 0.4763 0.5019         0.4349   
Panel B: Developed Markets        
Market Return 0.0470 0.0642 0.1579 0.6842 0.0000 0.3158 0.0974 4.9502 
Market Volatility -0.0184 -0.0139 0.0526 0.1053 0.5263 0.8947 -0.0190 -4.3052 
Market Turnover -0.0194 -0.0225 0.0000 0.4211 0.0526 0.5789 0.0241 0.5622 
Turnover Volatility 0.1105 0.1181 0.6316 0.7895 0.0526 0.2105 0.0934 4.2622 
Bank Index Return 0.0261 0.0249 0.0000 0.7368 0.0526 0.2632 -0.0006 -0.0656 
Short Rate 0.0176 0.0181 0.3684 0.6316 0.1579 0.3684 0.0066 0.4229 
M/B 0.2334 0.2569 0.7895 0.8947 0.0526 0.1053 0.1527 4.4694 
AR(1) 0.5176 0.4385 0.8947 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.7236 14.5826 
Avg. Adj. R2 0.4788 0.4341         0.643   
Panel C: Emerging Markets 
Market Return 0.0427 0.0442 0.2000 0.8500 0.0000 0.1500 0.0633 4.5416 
Market Volatility -0.0053 -0.0052 0.0000 0.3000 0.2000 0.7000 -0.0046 -1.4646 
Market Turnover 0.0063 -0.0047 0.0500 0.4500 0.0000 0.5500 -0.0253 -0.9433 
Turnover Volatility -0.0045 0.0102 0.4500 0.5000 0.2500 0.5000 0.0008 0.0599 
Bank Index Return 0.0196 0.0179 0.0000 0.6500 0.0000 0.3500 0.0069 0.7179 
Short Rate -0.02 -0.0017 0.1500 0.5000 0.2000 0.5000 0.0010 0.1876 
M/B 0.2044 0.1287 0.5500 0.8500 0.0500 0.1500 0.1509 3.7278 
AR(1) 0.6282 0.745 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6969 12.0315 
Avg. Adj. R2 0.6064 0.7314         0.588   
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a l
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n f
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Table 5.7: Determinants of Contagion 
This table reports the results from logistic regressions of within-region liquidity exceedances on a number of 
factors, namely the TED spread, Expected Volatility, Variance Premium, Prime Broker Returns, Prime Broker 
Volatility, World Rate, and Credit Spread. The TED spread is computed as the difference between the daily 3-
month LIBOR rate and the rate on the U.S. Treasury bill with the same maturity, averaged over a week. The 
Volatility Forecast is computed as the square root of the forecasted variance of the daily S&P 500 index return 
using GARCH(1,1) over a horizon of 21 days. The Variance Premium is computed as the weekly difference of 
the Volatility Forecast from the weekly value of the VIX index. Prime Broker Returns are computed as the 
equally-weighted average of 26 leading prime brokers that operate internationally, as described in section 2.1. 
Prime Broker Volatility is computed by estimating a GARCH(1,1) process on the daily Prime Broker Return 
series, and then averaged over a week. The w World Rate is computed as the GDP-weighted average of the short 
term interest rate for all the countries in our sample. The Credit Spread is computed as the difference between 
the yield of the US High-Yield Bond Index (BB-B) and that on U.S. Treasury bonds of comparable maturity. All 
regressions include market and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Developed Europe 
Emerging 
Europe Asia 
Latin 
America Global 
Joint-
test [p-
values] 
TED spread -1.3583*** 0.2601 -0.6556 4.6570** 1.4848* 24.4190 
 (0.4647) (0.6828) (0.5381) (2.2925) (0.7703) [0.0002] 
Expected 
Volatility  0.0207 0.0238 0.0621* -0.3107 0.0576 10.0083 
 (0.0264) (0.0353) (0.0352) (0.1991) (0.0381) [0.0750] 
Variance Premium 0.1348*** 0.0919 0.1004** 0.2446** 0.2055*** 23.9680 
 (0.0489) (0.0665) (0.0497) (0.1034) (0.0700) [0.0002] 
Prime Broker 
Returns 0.0340 0.1199 -0.1180 0.6036 0.0051 2.4595 
 (0.1846) (0.2069) (0.1622) (0.4800) (0.1914) [0.7826] 
Prime Broker 
Volatility 0.4966*** 0.1448 0.1054 2.0239** 0.0666 24.7711 
 (0.1185) (0.1854) (0.2248) (0.9014) (0.2068) [0.0002] 
World Rate -0.1811 -0.2523 0.3569 -0.0492 -0.1604 3.7410 
 (0.2828) (0.3105) (0.2681) (0.2658) (0.2585) [0.5873] 
Credit Spread 0.3299 0.4211 0.1861 3.2597** -0.2324 10.1122 
 (0.2412) (0.3879) (0.2709) (1.3228) (0.3706) [0.0721] 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes  
Market Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes yes yes  
#Observations 738 738 738 738 738  
Pseudo-R2 0.219 0.140 0.109 0.354 0.241  
Joint test stat. 31.83*** 18.23** 22.57*** 25.96*** 31.98***  
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Table 5.9: Potential Contagion Mechanisms 
This table reports the results from tobit regressions of liquidity exceedances across each of the following 
categories of markets, namely markets that receive above (below) median net equity flows the corresponding 
quarter, Above Median Net Flows (Below Median Net Flows), and markets that receive above (below) bank 
flows the corresponding quarter, Above Median Bank Flows (Below Median Bank Flows). Net equity flows 
are computed as the quarterly sum of monthly net purchases – purchases minus sales – of foreign equity by U.S. 
investors during each quarter, scaled by the GDP of the recipient country the respective year. Bank flows are 
computed as the quarterly change of aggregate holdings of U.S. banks in respective countries, scaled by the 
GDP of the recipient country the respective year. The list of regressors includes the TED spread, Expected 
Volatility, Variance Premium, Prime Broker Returns, Prime Broker Volatility, World Rate, and Credit Spread. 
The TED spread is computed as the difference between the daily 3-month LIBOR rate and the rate on the U.S. 
Treasury bill with the same maturity, averaged over a week. The Volatility Forecast is computed as the square 
root of the forecasted variance of the daily S&P 500 index return using GARCH(1,1) over a horizon of 21 days. 
The Variance Premium is computed computed as the weekly difference of the Volatility Forecast from the 
weekly value of the VIX index. Prime Broker Returns are computed as the equally-weighted average of 26 
leading prime brokers that operate internationally, as described in section 2.1. Prime Broker Volatility is 
computed by estimating a GARCH(1,1) process on the daily Prime Broker Return series, and then averaged 
over a week. The w World Rate is computed as the GDP-weighted average of the short term interest rate for all 
the countries in our sample. The Credit Spread is computed as the difference between the yield of the US High-
Yield Bond Index (BB-B) and that on U.S. Treasury bonds of comparable maturity. All regressions include 
market and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 Above Median 
 Net Flows 
Below Median  
Net Flows 
Above Median 
 Bank Flows 
Below Median  
Bank Flows 
TED spread -0.0037 -0.0198* -0.0269* -0.0473*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0142) (0.0136) 
Volatility Forecast 0.0021*** 0.0019** 0.0004 0.0021** 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Variance Premium 0.0057*** 0.0009 0.0047*** 0.0027** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Prime Broker Returns 0.0059 -0.0033 0.0021 0.0009 
 (0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0052) 
Prime Broker Volatility 0.0032 0.0054 0.0146*** 0.0048 
 (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0038) 
World Rate -0.0178*** 0.0101 0.0174 0.0357** 
 (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0187) (0.0158) 
Credit Spread -0.0014 0.0109** 0.0138 0.0235*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0091) (0.0083) 
Constant 0.1553** -0.0846 -0.1105 -0.2264** 
 (0.0610) (0.0622) (0.1026) (0.0896) 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Market Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
# Observations 733 733 522 522 
McFadden-R2 0.124 0.234 0.168 0.264 
Joint test stat. 8.072*** 4.633*** 5.146*** 7.379*** 
194 Chapter 5  
 
Figure 5.1: Ratio of (Raw) Liquidity Co-Exceedances Across Markets 
This figure displays the share (%) of markets experiencing a liquidity exceedance every week for each of the 
following categories, namely “All Markets”, “Developed Markets”, and “Emerging Markets”. A liquidity 
exceedance occurs when the respective AR(1)-adjusted liquidity index of a market drops 1SD below its 
corresponding sample mean. For demonstration purposes, the time-series of coexceedances are smoothed using 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter (ߣ = 100). 
 
 
 
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
%
 S
ha
re
 o
f L
IQ
. C
oe
xc
ee
da
nc
es
 
% Liquidity Coexceedances: Raw Series 
All Markets Developed Markets Emerging Markets
 The Determinants of Liquidity Contagion Across Markets 195 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Ratio of (Filtered) Liquidity Co-Exceedances Across Markets 
This figure displays the share (%) of markets experiencing a liquidity exceedance every week for each of the 
following categories, namely “All Markets”, “Developed Markets”, and “Emerging Markets”. A liquidity 
exceedance occurs when the respective (filtered) liquidity index of a market drops 1SD below its corresponding 
sample mean. Filtering is performed at the market level by running the regression described in Equation (6). For 
demonstration purposes, the time-series of coexceedances are smoothed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
(ߣ = 100). 
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Chapter 6                                     
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
This dissertation consists of four empirical studies that seek to furnish a 
better understanding of liquidity’s role in international capital markets going 
beyond the dimensions traditionally considered in the asset pricing literature. In 
Chapter 2 we investigate the impact of foreign equity flows on local liquidity 
conditions. Our baseline approach involves the estimation of unrestricted VAR 
models at different levels of aggregation. We also explore both the time-series 
properties as well as the differences in the cross-section of stocks over the 
interaction between their liquidity and foreign trading and try to identify periods of 
distinguishing importance in that respect. Our results confirm the belief that foreign 
investors engage in destabilizing strategies. Capital inflows strongly respond to past 
local market returns both for developed and emerging markets, for all six regions, 
and for many individual countries. We also confirm prior evidence that capital 
inflows are associated with higher future local market returns. Both of these effects 
are economically and statistically significant for many regions and countries. In 
addition, market liquidity seems to be an important determinant of cross-border 
portfolio flows, although this effect is more pronounced in our set of Developed 
countries. Our findings are robust across a large number of alternative 
specifications. 
 Finally, we try to explain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the 
responsiveness of liquidity over foreign flows by running cross-sectional 
regressions on proxies for a country’s economic and financial development, 
regulatory and information environment, openness, and market risk. We find that 
the response of liquidity to flows is significantly more positive in countries with 
greater transparency and in countries with less developed financial markets. The 
first effect suggests that in transparent countries it is less likely that foreign 
investors aggravate adverse selection problems on local financial markets. The 
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second effect is consistent with the view that more developed financial markets are 
more resilient to the trading behavior of foreign investors. 
In the third chapter we advance the view that security issuance is inversely 
related to illiquidity. Our analysis suggests that market liquidity plays an important 
role in the decision to perform an equity offering. After conducting an extensive 
battery of tests we conclude that our findings cannot be attributed to liquidity 
serving as a proxy for future economic growth or market sentiment. In further 
support of such an interpretation we show that the relation between equity issuance 
and liquidity is more pronounced during periods of low rather than high liquidity. 
We next take a step forward and investigate the potential relation between liquidity 
and the particular type of equity offering decided. Consistent with intuition we 
show that the fraction of private to public equity offerings increases as liquidity 
worsens. Our interpretation is that market liquidity is less relevant in the case of 
private equity offerings since they typically do not increase the supply of traded 
shares due to selling restrictions. We believe our findings lend further support to 
the view that in imperfectly liquid markets, the demand for shares is downward-
sloping and that corporations take into account the slope of the demand curve for 
their shares in their financing decisions. Finally, we show that postponements and 
cancellations of equity offerings are also negatively related to liquidity innovations, 
which further supports our hypothesis that firms tend to postpone or cancel equity 
issues during times of deteriorating liquidity and decreasing valuations. 
In Chapter 4, we document a positive relation between bank stock liquidity 
and market valuations. Our interpretation is that banks subject to more intense 
monitoring by equity markets are able to generate more value from their 
investments. Next, we decompose Tobin’s Q into three components, namely a 
factor accounting for investor sentiment, another for leverage, and a proxy for 
operating profitability. We find that differences in liquidity do not generate 
variation in investor sentiment, but consistent with the market discipline 
interpretation, are significantly associated with profitability (positive) and leverage 
(negative). In further support of our hypothesis, we document that banks with 
higher stock liquidity operate closer to the efficient frontier, demonstrate lower 
credit risk, and have lower probability of default. 
Finally, we try to shed more light on the particular mechanism through 
which the liquidity channel operates. An information-based interpretation would 
suggest that improved liquidity encourages the participation of informed investors 
in the price discovery process, thus rendering market monitoring more efficient. 
We investigate this explanation by creating portfolios of bank stocks differing over 
the extent of information-driven trading, but find no evidence of a positive relation 
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with liquidity. Our empirical analysis is, however, more supportive of an agency-
based interpretation. For example, when we distinguish banks’ on the basis of their 
susceptibility to principal-agent type of conflicts we find that the liquidity effects is 
significantly more pronounced in the group that ranks higher in that respect. We 
also present evidence that the monitoring exerted by debt holders and depositors is 
significantly more effective in the case of banks with more liquid stock. This is 
reflected in the increasing responsiveness of deposit growth and debt costs to the 
risk-taking of banks that belong to the top-end of the liquidity spectrum. 
In the last chapter I investigate the extent of clustering of adverse liquidity 
shocks within and across particular geographic regions. In addition, I try to assess 
the relative importance of different channels in explaining liquidity contagion both 
for the aggregate market as well as across subsets of the cross-section. My analysis 
produces a number of interesting results in that respect. First, I show that the 
likelihood of an adverse liquidity shock increases when other markets within the 
same region experience similar shocks. Moreover, I show that deteriorating 
liquidity conditions in systemically important markets exert, in certain cases, a 
disproportionate impact over foreign markets even after controlling for own region 
developments. When I try to identify the liquidity factors with the greatest 
explanatory power over the likelihood of a liquidity exceedance, investor sentiment 
combined with aggregate volatility stand out as the ones with the most pronounced 
effect. Interestingly, even though global aggregates are important in their own right, 
regional aggregates demonstrate a leading role when it comes to explain the extent 
of contagion in the same region. 
Next, I investigate the extent of cross-sectional heterogeneity in the 
clustering of adverse liquidity shocks across markets based on a number of 
different stock characteristics. For this purpose I sort stocks on the basis of their 
market capitalization, idiosyncratic volatility, the extent of information-motivated 
order flow, and their sentiment induced overreaction. Contrary to initial 
expectations I show that liquidity contagion is actually more pronounced in “high” 
rather than “low quality” stocks. In other words, during periods of market distress 
liquidity drops are more correlated across stocks of “high quality”. Consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Brunnermeier, and Pedersen, 2009) my analysis demonstrates 
that commonality in liquidity becomes particularly pronounced in periods of 
deteriorating global funding conditions as well as downbeat investor sentiment. 
Finally, I also show that cross-border portfolio investment by international 
investors can aggravate the clustering of negative liquidity shocks across markets 
that benefit disproportionately from such flows.  
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Nederlandse samenvatting  
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
Deze dissertatie bestaat uit vier empirische studies welke erop gericht zijn 
een diepgaander begrip van de rol die liquiditeit speelt in internationale 
kapitaalmarkten te bewerkstelligen dan dat tot op heden het geval is op basis van de 
traditionele dimensies in de asset pricing literatuur. In hoofdstuk 2 bestuderen wij 
de invloed van buitenlandse aandelenkapitaal stromen op de lokale liquiditeit 
condities. Onze basis benadering betreft het schatten van unrestricted VAR 
modellen op verschillende niveaus van aggregatie. We exploreren verder zowel 
tijdreeks eigenschappen als verschillen in de cross sectie van aandelen over de 
interactie tussen hun liquiditeit en buitenlandse handel en proberen met oog op dit 
kenmerk saillante periodes te identificeren.  Onze resultaten bevestigen de gedachte 
dat buitenlandse investeerders destabiliserende strategieën toepassen. Kapitaal 
instromen reageren sterk op de in het verleden behaalde rendementen op de lokale 
markten voor zowel ontwikkelde en ontwikkelingslanden, voor alle zes regionen, 
en voor vele individuele landen. Wij bevestigen tevens het in het verleden 
gevonden bewijs dat kapitaal instromen met hogere toekomstige rendementen op 
lokale markten geassocieerd zijn. Beide deze effecten zijn zowel economisch als 
statistisch significant voor vele regionen en landen. Verder lijkt markt liquiditeit 
een belangrijke determinant van portfolio stromen over landsgrenzen te zijn, 
hoewel dit effect meer aanwezig is in de set van ontwikkelde landen. Onze 
bevindingen zijn robuust voor vele alternatieve specificaties. 
Tot slot beogen wij de cross-sectionele heterogeniteit in de responsiviteit van 
liquiditeit over buitenlandse kapitaalstromen te verklaren door cross-sectionele 
regressies uit te voeren op proxies voor de economische en financiële 
ontwikkelingen van een land, de juridische en informatie omgeving, openheid, en 
markt risico. We vinden dat de reactie van liquiditeit op kapitaalstromen significant 
meer positief is in landen met een hogere mate van transparantie en in landen met 
minder ontwikkelde financiële markten. Het eerstgenoemde effect suggereert dat in 
landen met hoge mate van transparantie het minder waarschijnlijk is dat 
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buitenlandse investeerders adverse selection problemen op de lokale financiële 
markten verergeren. Het tweede effect is consistent met het beeld dat meer 
ontwikkelde financiële markten weerbaarder zijn tegen het handel gedrag van 
buitenlandse investeerders.  
In het derde hoofdstuk verdedigen wij het idee dat het uitgeven van 
waardepapieren omgekeerd evenredig is met illiquiditeit. Onze analyse suggereert 
dat markt liquiditeit een belangrijke rol spelt in de beslissing om aandelenkapitaal 
uit te geven. Na het uitvoeren van een scala aan testen concluderen wij dat onze 
bevindingen niet toe te wijzen zijn aan het fungeren van liquiditeit als een proxy 
voor toekomstige economische groei of markt sentiment. In verdere ondersteuning 
van een dergelijke interpretatie tonen wij dat de relatie tussen het uitgeven van 
aandelenkapitaal en liquiditeit sterker aanwezig is in periodes van lage liquiditeit. 
Vervolgens onderzoeken wij de mogelijke relatie tussen liquiditeit en het specifieke 
type aandelenkapitaal uitgave. In lijn met onze beredenering laten wij zien de 
fractie van het uitgeven van privaat tot publiek aandelenkapitaal toeneemt naarmate 
liquiditeit afneemt. Onze interpretatie hiervan is dat markt liquiditeit minder 
relevant is in het geval van het uitgeven van privaat aandelenkapitaal daar private 
investeerders doorgaans het aanbod van verhandelde aandelen niet doen toenemen 
gezien verkoop restricties. We zijn van mening dat onze bevindingen verder 
ondersteuning bieden aan het idee dat in imperfect liquide markten de vraag naar 
aandelen een neerwaartse richtingscoëfficiënt heeft en dat bedrijven de 
richtingscoëfficiënt van de vraag curve van hun aandelen in beschouwing nemen 
bij hun beslissingen. Tot slot laten wij zien dat zowel het uitstellen als het afstellen 
van het uitgeven van aandelen negatief gerelateerd zijn met liquiditeit innovaties, 
wat verdere ondersteuning biedt voor onze hypothese dat bedrijven geneigd zijn het 
uitgeven van aandelen uit- of af te stellen gedurende periodes van afnemende 
liquiditeit en waarderingen.  
In hoofdstuk 4 tonen wij een positieve relatie tussen de liquiditeit van bank 
aandelen en markt waarderingen. Onze interpretatie hiervan is dat banken die aan 
meer intense monitoring door aandelenmarkten onderhevig zijn, in staat zijn meer 
waarde uit hun investeringen te genereren. Vervolgens splitsen wij Tobin’s Q in 
drie componenten, te weten een factor dat investeerder sentiment ondervangt, een 
tweede voor leverage, en een proxy voor operationele winstgevendheid. We vinden 
dat verschillen in liquiditeit geen variatie in investeerder sentiment genereren, maar, 
in lijn met de markt discipline interpretatie, wel significant geassocieerd zijn 
winstgevendheid (positief) en leverage (negatief). In verdere ondersteuning van 
onze hypothese laten wij zien dat banken met hogere aandelen liquiditeit dichter bij 
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de efficient frontier opereren, lagere krediet risico’s laten zien, en aan lagere 
faillissementskans onderhevig zijn.  
Tot slot trachten wij verdere inzichten te genereren in het specifieke 
mechanisme waarlangs de liquiditeit haar invloed uitoefent. Een informatie-
gebaseerde interpretatie zou suggereren dat verbeterde liquiditeit het deelnemen 
van geïnformeerde investeerders in het prijsontwikkeling proces bevordert, en 
zodoende markt monitoring tot meer efficiënt bekroont. We onderzoeken deze 
verklaring door portfolio’s van bank aandelen te creëren welke verschillen in de 
mate van informatie gedreven handel, maar vinden geen bewijs voor een positieve 
relatie met liquiditeit. Onze empirische analyse ondersteunt echter meer een 
agency-gebaseerde interpretatie. Bijvoorbeeld, wanner wij banken onderscheiden 
op basis van hun ontvankelijkheid voor principal-agent conflicten, vinden wij dat 
de liquiditeit effecten significant meer aanwezig zijn in de groep dat hoger scoort 
op dat gebied. Ook tonen wij bewijs dat de monitoring uitgevoerd door vreemd 
vermogen verschaffers en spaarders significant meer effectief is in het geval van 
banken met meer liquide aandelen. Dit wordt tevens gereflecteerd in de 
toenemende responsiviteit van deposito groei en vreemd vermogen kosten tot het 
risico nemend gedrag van banken die tot de top van het liquiditeit spectrum 
behoren.  
In het laatste hoofdstuk onderzoek ik de mate van het clusteren van 
ongunstige liquiditeit schokken binnen en over specifieke geografische regio’s. 
Verder probeer ik het relatieve belang van verschillende kanalen ter verklaring van 
liquiditeit contagion voor zowel de gehele markt als over delen van de cross sectie 
te beoordelen. Mijn analyse genereert enkele interessante bevindingen. Allereerst 
laat ik ziek dat het kans voor een ongunstige liquiditeit schok toeneemt wanneer 
andere markten binnen dezelfde regio een soortgelijke schok ondervinden. Verder 
toon ik dat verslechterende liquiditeit condities in systematisch belangrijke markten, 
in sommige gevallen, een buitenproportioneel grote invloed op buitenlandse 
markten uitoefenen, zelfs wanneer gecontroleerd wordt voor ontwikkelingen 
binnen de eigen regio. Bij de pogingen tot het identificeren van de liquiditeit 
factoren die de grootste verklarende kracht hebben aangaande de waarschijnlijkheid 
van een liquiditeit overschrijding blijken investeerder sentiment gecombineerd met 
totale volatiliteit het meest sterke effect te tonen. Een andere interessante bevinding 
is dat ondanks dat wereldwijde sommen op zich staand belangrijk zijn, regionale 
sommen een leidende rol op zich nemen daar waar het op het verklaren van de mate 
van contagion in de regio aankomt. 
Vervolgens onderzoek ik de mate van cross-sectionele heterogeniteit in het 
clusteren van ongunstige liquiditeit schokken over markten gebaseerd op een aantal 
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verschillende aandelen karakteristieken. Hiertoe sorteer ik aandelen op basis van 
hun markt kapitalisatie, idiosyncratische volatiliteit, de mate van informatie 
gemotiveerder order flow, en hun sentiment geïnduceerde overreactie. In 
tegenstelling tot de initiele verwachtingen laat ik zien dast liquiditeit contagion 
meer aanwezig is in ‘hoge’ kwaliteit aandelen. In andere bewoordingen, gedurende 
periodes van markt distress zijn liquiditeit dalingen meer gecorreleerd over 
aandelen van ‘hoge’ kwaliteit. In lijn met eerdere studies (e.g. Brunnermeier en 
Pedersen, 2009) tonen mij analyses dat commonality in liquiditeit buitengewoon 
sterk wordt in periodes van verslechterende wereldwijde financiering condities, 
alsook in tijden van sobere investeerder sentiment. Tot slot toon ik dat portfolio 
investeringen door internationale investeerders over landsgrenzen het clusteren van 
negatieve liquiditeit schokken over verschillende market kunnen verergeren, wie 
tevens buitenproportioneel hun voordeel doen met dergelijke stromen.  
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This dissertation consists of four empirical studies that seek to furnish a better
understanding over liquidity’s broader implications in the decision-making process of
investors, managers and regulators in international capital markets. Chapter 2 investigates
the time-series as well as cross-sectional properties of the interaction between foreign
equity flows and local liquidity conditions. My findings suggest that foreign investors are
less likely to aggravate adverse selection problems in financial markets that are more
developed and demonstrate higher levels of transparency. Chapter 3 shows that liquidity
conditions play an important role in the decision to perform an equity offering. Moreover,
my findings suggest that in imperfectly liquid markets, companies take into consideration
the slope of the demand curve for their stock when deciding upon the type of an equity
offering. Chapter 4 shows that banks subject to more intense monitoring by equity markets
operate closer to the efficient frontier and are thus able to generate more value from their
investments. It also shows that the liquidity effects is significantly more pronounced in the
case of banks that are more susceptible to principal-agent type of conflicts. Chapter 5
investigates the extent of clustering of adverse liquidity shocks within and across
particular geographic regions. I document that liquidity contagion is more pronounced in
“high” rather than “low quality” stocks. Finally, I show that cross-border portfolio investment
can aggravate the clustering of negative liquidity shocks across markets that benefit
disproportionately from such flows. 
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